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Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations
Bruce Russett,John R. Oneal +1 more
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Triangulating Peace as mentioned in this paper argues that democracy, economic interdependence, and international mediation can successfully cooperate to significantly reduce the chances of war in the field of international relations, and it is based on ideas originally put forth by Immanuel Kant.Abstract:
Triangulating Peace tackles today's most provocative hypothesis in the field of international relations: the democratic peace proposition. Drawing on ideas originally put forth by Immanuel Kant, the authors argue that democracy, economic interdependence, and international mediation can successfully cooperate to significantly reduce the chances of war.read more
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Book ChapterDOI
Chapter 31 Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic Dispute
Abstract: At least since 1750 when Baron de Montesquieu declared “peace is the natural effect of trade,” a number of economists and political scientists espoused the notion that trade among nations leads to peace. Employing resources more efficiently to produce some commodities rather than others is the foundation for comparative advantage. Specialization based on comparative advantage leads to gains from trade. If political conflict leads to a diminution of trade, then at least a portion of the costs of conflict can be measured by a nation's lost gains from trade. The greater two nations' gains from trade the more costly is bilateral (dyadic) conflict. This notion forms the basis of Baron de Montesquieu's assertion regarding dyadic dispute. This chapter develops an analytical framework showing that higher gains from trade between two trading partners (dyads) lowers the level of conflict between them. It describes data necessary to test this hypothesis, and it outlines current developments and extensions taking place in the resulting trade–conflict literature. Cross-sectional evidence using various data on political interactions confirms that trading nations cooperate more and fight less. A doubling of trade leads to a 20% diminution of belligerence. This result is robust under various specifications, and it is upheld when adjusting for causality using cross-section and time-series techniques. Further, the impact of trade is strengthened when bilateral import demand elasticities are incorporated to better measure gains from trade. Because democratic dyads trade more than non-democratic dyads, democracies cooperate with each other relatively more, thereby explaining the “democratic peace” that democracies rarely fight each other. The chapter then goes on to examine further extensions of the trade–conflict model regarding specific commodity trade, foreign direct investment, tariffs, foreign aid, country contiguity, and multilateral interactions.
Managing Rivalries – Regional Security Institutions and Democracy in Western Europe, South America, Southeast Asia and East Asia
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that inter-democratic institutions are causally responsible for the remarkable stability between democracies, and they identify trans-national and trans-governmental networks as crucial features of interdemocratic institutions.
Journal ArticleDOI
Globalization and Armed Conflict Among Nations
TL;DR: While the effects of globalization appear to be wide reaching, should we expect them to have a significant impact on international security relations? Yes, most certainly we should as mentioned in this paper. But just what a...
War! Who is it Good For? The Relationship between Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders and War ⁄
Alexandre Debs,Hein Goemans +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a formal model of war and domestic politics is proposed and tested, consistent with recent evidence on the relationship between regime type, the outcome of war, and the probability and consequences of losing o'ce.
Posted Content
Imitation in International Relations: Analogies, Vicarious Learning, and Foreign Policy
TL;DR: In this article, the authors suggest a theory and test it on data for foreign policy beliefs and analogies used by Ukrainian and Russian elites and find that learning from vicarious success or imitation has a strong impact on beliefs following a major failure.