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Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations

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TLDR
Triangulating Peace as mentioned in this paper argues that democracy, economic interdependence, and international mediation can successfully cooperate to significantly reduce the chances of war in the field of international relations, and it is based on ideas originally put forth by Immanuel Kant.
Abstract
Triangulating Peace tackles today's most provocative hypothesis in the field of international relations: the democratic peace proposition. Drawing on ideas originally put forth by Immanuel Kant, the authors argue that democracy, economic interdependence, and international mediation can successfully cooperate to significantly reduce the chances of war.

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