Journal ArticleDOI
Ultimate Ownership and Earnings Conservatism
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TLDR
In this article, the extent of timely recognition of unrealized losses into earnings shown by firms with a controlling owner depends on the ownership share of the controlling owner and the divergence between the controlling owners voting and cash flow rights.Abstract:
In this paper we analyze whether the extent of timely recognition of unrealized losses into earnings shown by firms with a controlling owner depends on (1) the ownership share of the controlling owner and (2) the divergence between the controlling owner's voting and cash flow rights. Our results document a negative relation between both aspects of the ultimate ownership structure and timely loss recognition. Our results are consistent with two possible explanations. First, as the controlling owner's stake in the company increases, a smaller portion of the firm's financing needs will be provided by minority shareholders. Minority shareholders do not have access to the company's private information, but demand timely recognition of losses into earnings to protect their claim. Reducing the role of minority shareholders implies also lower demand for timely loss recognition. Second, the results are consistent with an increase in the ownership stake of the controlling owner or in the divergence between the cont...read more
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The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
TL;DR: The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray as discussed by the authors, and a good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan's economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker's Rule.
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The Endogeneity Bias in the Relation Between Cost-of-Debt Capital and Corporate Disclosure Policy
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the effect of disclosure policy on cost-of-debt capital and show that disclosure is impacted by unobservable firm specific factors that are also correlated with cost of capital.
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Large Controlling Shareholders and Stock Price Synchronicity
TL;DR: This article examined the effect of controlling shareholders on stock price synchronicity by focusing on two salient corporate governance features in a concentrated ownership setting and the separation of voting and cash flow rights.
Journal ArticleDOI
The implications of research on accounting conservatism for accounting standard setting
Araceli Mora,Martin Walker +1 more
TL;DR: The authors provides a commentary on the academic literature on accounting conservatism with a view to highlighting the insights of that literature that are potentially useful for accounting stand-archers, and provides a discussion of the benefits of accounting conservatism.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Book
Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data
TL;DR: This is the essential companion to Jeffrey Wooldridge's widely-used graduate text Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (MIT Press, 2001).
Journal ArticleDOI
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
TL;DR: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism as mentioned in this paper is a seminal work in the field of economic institutions of capitalism. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 528-530.
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Law and Finance
Rafael La Porta,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny,Robert W. Vishny +7 more
TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Journal ArticleDOI
Law and Finance
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French civil law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil law countries located in the middle.