Showing papers on "Cognitivism (psychology) published in 2013"

Feedback research revisited.

Abstract: In a previous examination of feedback research (Mory, 1996), the use of feedback in the facilitation of learning was examined extensively according to various historical and paradigmatic views of the past feedback literature. Most of the research presented in that volume in the area of feedback was completed with specific assumptions as to what purpose feedback serves. This still holds true, and even more so, because our theories and paradigms have expanded, and the field of instructional design has undergone and will continue to undergo rapid changes in technologies that will afford new advances to take place in both the delivery and the context of using feedback in instruction. It is not surprising that feedback may have various functions according to the particular learning environment in which it is examined and the particular learning paradigm under which it is viewed. In fact, feedback is incorporated in many paradigms of learning, from the early views of behaviorism (Skinner, 1958), to cognitivism (Gagne´, 1985; Kulhavy & Wager 1993) through more recent models of constructivism (Jonassen, 1991, 1999; Mayer, 1999; Willis, 2000), settings such as open learning environments (Hannafin, Land, & Oliver, 1999), and views that support multiple approaches to understanding (Gardner, 1999), to name just a few.While feedback has been an essential element of theories of learning and instruction in thepast (Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, Kulik, & Morgan, 1991), it still pervades the literature and instructional models as an important aspect of instruction (Collis, De Boer, & Slotman, 2001; Dick, Carey, & Carey, 2001).The basic meaning of feedback has remained the same in Webster’s New World Dictionary from the 1984 edition to the current one. Webster’s (2001) continues to define feedback as

From the Revolution to Embodiment: 25 Years of Cognitive Psychology

Abstract: In 1988, the cognitive revolution had become institutionalized: Cognition was the manipulation of abstract symbols by rules. But, much like institutionalized political parties, some of the ideas were becoming stale. Where was action? Where was the self? How could cognition be smoothly integrated with emotions, with social psychology, with development, with clinical analyses? Around that time, thinkers in linguistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, biology, and psychology were formulating the idea that just as overt behavior depends on the specifics of the body in action, so might cognition depend on the body. Here we characterize (some would say caricature) the strengths and weaknesses of cognitive psychology of that era, and then we describe what has come to be called embodied cognition: how cognition arises through the dynamic interplay of brain controlling bodily action controlling perception, which changes the brain. We focus on the importance of action and how action shapes perception, the self, and language. Having the body in action as a central consideration for theories of cognition promises, we believe, to help unify psychology.

Connectivism as a Digital Age Learning Theory

Abstract: George Siemens and Stephen Downes developed a theory for the digital age, called connectivism, denouncing boundaries of behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism. Their proposed learning theory has issued a debate over whether it is a learning theory or instructional theory or merely a pedagogical view. While the theory presented is important and valid, is it a tool to be used in the learning process for instruction or curriculum rather than a standalone learning theory? It has forced educators to look at what is being done in digital education and rethink, debate, and philosophize over how each part fits. Continually evaluating how each new generation learns with regard to instruction and curriculum serves to hold education to high standards. Certainly this theory is worth our thorough consideration.

Dynamics and Cognition

Abstract: Many who advocate dynamical systems approaches to cognitive science believe themselves committed to the thesis of extended cognition and to the rejection of representation. I argue that this belief is false. In part, this misapprehension rests on a warrantless re-conception of cognition as intelligent behavior. In part also, it rests on thinking that conceptual issues can be resolved empirically. Once these issues are sorted out, the way is cleared for a dynamical systems approach to cognition that is free to retain the standard conception of cognition as taking place in the head, and over representations.

Educational technology for teaching and learning

Abstract: Educational Technology in Teaching and Learning is an important and challenging aspect in higher education. The first theories on human behavior as behavior affected by technology are discussed in this essay. These learning theories are behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism. They provide a pedagogical and/or andragogical basis for understanding how students learn. Also, some of the approaches to teaching with technology, use of the best technological tools and appropriate type of instruction to enhance learning under Bloom's taxonomy are included. A general perspective is given of the advantages and disadvantages that technology offers for education.

Problems of Teaching the Behaviorist Perspective in the Cognitive Revolution

Abstract: This article offers some personal reflections on the difficulty of teaching the behaviorist perspective in the psychology classroom. The problems focus on the inadequacy of introductory textbooks—which mischaracterize behaviorism, only present the most extreme behaviorist positions, make no mention of the neobehaviorist perspective, fail to discuss that there is no accepted criteria for determining what type of behavior is cognitive, and provide a definition of cognition that is, not only inconsistent across texts, but so broad as to overshadow the behaviorist contributions. Suggestions are provided for instructors on how to present to their students an accurate portrayal of behaviorism.

Cognition is … Fundamentally Cultural

Abstract: A prevailing concept of cognition in psychology is inspired by the computer metaphor. Its focus on mental states that are generated and altered by information input, processing, storage and transmission invites a disregard for the cultural dimension of cognition, based on three (implicit) assumptions: cognition is internal, processing can be distinguished from content, and processing is independent of cultural background. Arguing against each of these assumptions, we point out how culture may affect cognitive processes in various ways, drawing on instances from numerical cognition, ethnobiological reasoning, and theory of mind. Given the pervasive cultural modulation of cognition—on all of Marr’s levels of description—we conclude that cognition is indeed fundamentally cultural, and that consideration of its cultural dimension is essential for a comprehensive understanding.

A Wittgensteinian perspective on the use of conceptual analysis in psychology

Abstract: Foreword: Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology as a Critical Instrument for the Psychological Sciences Peter M. S. Hacker 1. Psychology's Inescapable Need for Conceptual Clarification Daniel D. Hutto 2. Wittgenstein's Method of Conceptual Investigation and Concept Formation in Psychology Oskari Kuusela 3. Pictures of the Soul Joachim Schulte 4. Aspect Seeing in Wittgenstein and in Psychology Nicole Hausen and Michel ter Hark 5. Parallels in the Foundations of Mathematics and Psychology Meredith Williams 6. Animal Minds: Philosophical and Scientific Aspects Hans-Johann Glock 7. Realism, But Not empiricism: Wittgenstein Versus Searle Daniele Moyal-Sharrock 8. Can a Robot Smile? Wittgenstein on Facial Expression Diane Proudfoot 9. A Return to 'The Inner' in Social Theory: Archer's 'Internal Conversation' Wes Sharrock and Leonidas Tsilipakos 10. Reducing the Effort in Effortful Control Stuart G. Shanker and Devin M. Casenhiser 11. The Concepts of Suicidology Michael D. Maraun 12. The Neuroscientific Case for a Representative Theory of Perception John Preston and Severin Schroeder 13. Terror Management, Meaning Maintenance and the Concept of Psychological Meaning Timothy P. Racine and Kathleen L. Slaney 14. A Conceptual Investigation of Inferences Drawn from Infant Habituation Research Michael A. Tissaw 15. The Unconscious Theory in Modern Cognitivism Alan Costall

Neurophenomenological Praxis: Its Applications to Learning and Pedagogy

Abstract: This chapter summarily reviews learning theories as well as the methodologies that have shaped neurophenomenology in order to demonstrate its applicability to understanding adult transformative learning as embodied, enactive, and situated. Examples of pedagogical praxes are presented, which will elucidate the use of, and advocacy for, a neurophenomenological portfolio assessment. Proposed is a portfolio assessment, which includes phenomenological observations, teacher auto-ethnographies, and first-person (student) narratives of experiential learning that can be front-loaded into third-person, neuro-experimental research. Ultimately, this work provides liberation of these aforementioned ways of learning from educational subjugation when formal education and brain-based education remain steeped in Cartesianism and cognitivism.

Demystifying instructional innovation: The case of teaching with case studies

Abstract: Issues emerging from instructional innovation are inevitable, yet basing any curriculum shift on a theoretical framework is paramount. This paper grounds the case-based pedagogy in three learning theories: behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism. The three theories are described and situated in relation to the case study method. An in-depth exploration of the assumptions of each theory helped to identify and analyze several issues that emerged upon the implementation of the case-based pedagogy in a nursing curriculum. In line with the three pedagogical standpoints, and after an extensive literature review, measures are proposed to improve the quality of student learning in a case-based curriculum, and principles are derived to support educators in their teaching with case studies. The application of the three learning theories may be especially useful to educators and instructional leaders when shifting paradigms. By describing the key challenges that educators may face with instructional innovation and the usefulness of the cognitivist, behaviorist, and constructivist perspectives in providing explanations and recommendations, provides a beginning research base for improving pedagogies. Failure to employ theories of learning in similar educational shifts may hinder the progress of any intended curriculum transformation.

The extent of cognitivism

Abstract: In this article, cognitivism is understood as the view that the engine of human (individual and collective) action is the intentional, dispositional, or other mental capacities of the brain or the mind Cognitivism has been criticized for considering the essence of human action to reside in its alleged source in mental processes at the expense of the social surroundings of the action, criticism that has often been inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy This article explores the logical extent of the critique of cognitivism, arguing that by positing collectively shared knowledge of criteria as the engine of human action many such critiques themselves display latent cognitivism

Embodied cognition and religion

Abstract: It is argued that there are good scientific grounds for accepting that cognition functions in a way that reflects embodiment. This represents a more holistic, systemic way of thinking about human beings, and contributes to the coordination of scientific assumptions about mind and body with those of the faith traditions, moving us beyond sterile debates about reductionism. It has been claimed by Francisco Varela and others that there is an affinity between Buddhism and embodied cognition, though it is argued here that they are less closely aligned than is sometimes assumed. Embodied cognition also accords well with the holistic strand of thinking about human nature in Judeo-Christian thinking. While accepting the persuasiveness of the general case for cognition being embodied it is suggested here that some forms of cognition are more embodied than others, and that it may be one of the distinctive features of humans that they have developed a capacity for relatively nonembodied forms of cognition.

Psychology Unified: From Folk Psychology to Radical Enactivism:

Abstract: A properly radical enactivism—one that eschews the idea that all mentality is necessarily contentful and representational—has better prospects of unifying psychology than does traditional cognitivi...

Theories of Concepts and Ethics

Abstract: Theories of Concepts and Ethics by John Jung Park Department of Philosophy Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ David Wong, Supervisor ___________________________ Karen Neander ___________________________ Wayne Norman ___________________________ Daniel Weiskopf An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University

Appetitive besires and the fuss about fit

Abstract: Some motivational cognitivists believe that there are besires—cognitive mental states (typically moral beliefs) that share the key feature of desire (typically desire’s ‘direction of fit’) in virtue of which they are capable of being directly motivational. Besires have been criticized by Humeans and cognitivists alike as philosophically extravagant, incoherent, ad hoc, and incompatible with folk psychology. I provide a response to these standard objections to besires—one motivated independently of common anti-Humean intuitions about the motivational efficacy of moral judgments. I proceed by examining a hypothesis about the nature of appetitive desires—that these paradigmatic motivational attitudes are a mode of perceptual experience—and argue that this hypothesis is committed to the existence of besires. However, despite its commitment to besires, this hypothesis is not extravagant, incoherent, ad hoc, or incompatible with folk psychology. In other words, the standard complaints about besires all fail. The upshot is that there is nothing bizarre about besires, and motivational cognitivism takes on no additional costs by positing them.

Fictionalism about folk psychology

Abstract: For nothing is actually removed from existence by being labeled ... appearance . . . What appears is there, and must be dealt with; but materialism has no rational way of dealing with appearance.-BradleyAppearance and Reality, 1930, 12.1. IntroductionFictionalists avoid commitment-full-fledged ontological commitment, that is. To be a fictionalist about a given domain is to adopt a strategy of taking discourse about the domain seriously while at the same time stopping short of accepting that such discourse entails any, potentially embarrassing, ontological commitments. Endorsing fictionalism about some domain is thus meant to provide a way of taking a less-thanfully realist stance towards the domain's entities without rejecting the value or usefulness of discourse about the domain altogether. Sainsbury highlights this as the main motivation of fictionalism:the starting point for fictionalism is some kind of ontological scruple: one cannot bring oneself to believe in moral values, nonactual things, unobservable things, or abstract things. But one has somehow to do justice to the fact that one cannot simply throw away the related regions of discourse: morality, modality, elementary physics, or mathematics. Fictionalism to the rescue. (2010, 2)This paper argues that fictionalism about folk psychology, FaF, is ill motivated in any domain. It is not a successful way of dealing with eliminativist threats aimed at classical cognitivist theories-theories which predict that folk-psychological constructs, understood subpersonally, will be vindicated by a mature cognitive science. Nor would FaF be an appropriate response to worries about the ontological status of mental states and the determinacy of their content, where such mental states are understood as featuring in reason explanations about the actions of people. The paper's moral? Friends of folk psychology are best advised to expose such threats as empty rather than by making fictionalist ontological concessions.The case against FaF is made in the following steps. It is argued that there is no advantage in trying to vindicate folk psychology by treating the constructs of classical cognitivism-viz. subpersonal mental representations-as useful fictions as opposed to serious scientific posits or as serving as the basis for philosophical explanations. Both scientific and philosophical considerations point to the conclusion that subpersonal representations of the sort that classical cognitivism posits should be eliminated, not preserved by our best science of mind (Section 1). Yet there is no need to assume that folk-psychological explanations are subpersonally based. It is possible and plausible that such explanations are based, just as they appear to be, in nonscientific interpretative, narrative practices. A recent attempt to motivate FaF based on this assumption is examined and rejected (Section 2). Then a more compelling, Dennettstyle rationale for adopting a FaFish line based on worries about the indeterminacy of folk-psychological attributions is considered. Dennett endorses FaF, broadly construed, in arguing that while folk-psychological phenomena exhibit objective patterns they are nevertheless, at best, mildly real (Section 3). The final section offers three considerations that should encourage the reader to resist such FaFish conclusions (Section 4).1. Fictionalism about Folk Psychology: Take OneClassical cognitivism characterizes subpersonal cognitive states in a way that is deeply indebted to our everyday, folk-psychological conception of mind. Ramsey (2007) exposes classical cognitivism's commitment on this front, showing how it gives "rise to an outlook on representation that amounts to a sort of merger between classical computational theory and folk psychology" (Ramsey 2007, 38). Why so? What's the connection? On the one hand, cognitivism embraces the view that "cognition is computation, which [is] . . . understood as a form of quasi-linguisticsymbol manipulation done in accordance with specifiable rules" (39). …

The Unconscious Theory in Modern Cognitivism

Abstract: Many of the conceptual confusions fundamental to modern cognitivist theory had already been identified and widely recognized before the ‘cognitive revolution’ of the 1960s. Yet, whenever such confusions are pointed out, they are either fleetingly acknowledged, only to be quickly forgotten, or, more usually, emphatically denied. And, as I have found to my own cost, cognitive psychologists become outraged if you suggest that they may even be dualists.

Choosing Learning Methods Suitable for Teaching and Learning in Computer Science.

Abstract: Our aim is to determine which teaching methods students in Computer Science and Information Systems prefer. There are in total 5 different paradigms (behaviorism, cognitivism, constructivism, design-based and humanism) with 32 models between them. Each model is unique and states different learning methods. Recommendations are made on methods that can be used in the teaching and learning of Computer Science and Information Systems. Learning can differ greatly from person to person. Clearly a teacher cannot possibly meet every single students needs when it comes to optimal learning. The best and maybe the only possible outcome is to try to determine what methods or combination of methods a teacher should apply to suit the biggest percentage in a class. Students have fundamentally changed with regards to their intellectual, social, motivational, and emotional needs. The modern student not only uses technology on a daily basis, but has become dependent on it. Elements of all theories need to be incorporated into a paradigm that will be sufficient to educate the Computer Science students of today. Technology must be used in the most optimal way to engage with students and to keep them interested.

On the extent of cognitivism A response to Michael Tissaw

Abstract: I would like to begin by thanking Michael Tissaw for his critical commentary (Tissaw, 2013) and this journal for publishing my original article (Arponen, 2013), for printing a critical response to it, and for giving me this opportunity to respond. I shall endeavour to make it worth the time and space devoted to the issue. Tissaw’s critical response focuses upon one relatively small part of my original article, namely, my treatment of Peter Hacker. Tissaw accuses me of distorting Hacker in various ways. For example, I cast Hacker as talking of concept possession as knowledge of criteria even though, in the passages that I quote, Hacker does not even use the word ‘knowledge’. The more serious underlying issue is, Tissaw argues, that I cast Hacker as arguing that this knowledge is the mental source of human action even though Hacker explicitly denies this. In defence of my treatment of Hacker, in my original article I was, I believe, particularly clear that I was going to be associating Peter Hacker with views that he has explicitly denied. I sought, as I put it in the article, ‘to inspect more closely whether there might be internal tensions in Hacker’s views’, which had to do with his explicit rejection of cognitivism and the simultaneous latent compatibility of his views with it. I approached this by acknowledging that there is an ‘undeniable non-cognitivist thrust to Hacker’s views’ before going on to show why some of Hacker’s views might nonetheless be seen as latently cognitivist (Arponen, 2013: 9). From the very beginning, then, it was clear that I was going to reach beyond Hacker’s own words in trying to tease out the latent cognitivism that I had identified in his views. After all, I was in the business of exposing something latent. I, therefore, do not feel like I need to blush as Tissaw produces passages from (Baker and) Hacker that explicitly deny cognitivism. These are not hard to find and include such passages cited by Tissaw

Foreign Language Didactics Encounters Cognitive Science

Abstract: The choice of the topic stems from the fact that Professor Waldemar Marton is the intellectual pioneer who introduced cognitive thought into Poland and developed it further while conducting his own research on foreign/second language learning and teaching within this framework Since his first account of David Ausubel’s (1968) cognitive views in educational psychology, cognitive conceptions have proliferated in the field of foreign language learning and teaching Their potential and actual impact on our understanding of non-primary language learning cannot be overestimated After all, language learning is cognitive by definition Needless to say, in the past decades cognitivism has spread like fire not only in psychology, but also in philosophy, epistemology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, linguistics, psycholinguistics, translation studies, psychology of communication, sociology of cognition, cultural anthropology and second language acquisition research We are witnessing a cognitive turn in these fields and an emergence of an interdisciplinary cognitive science The question arises as to whether or not foreign language didactics (FLD) can (or should) become a member of this alliance and if so, on what terms and bases? For one thing, the encounter mentioned in the title immediately evokes what for foreign language didactics still constitutes a sensitive issue of identity To make matters worse, not all of the developments in the cognitive sciences are equally relevant to the concerns of foreign language didactics For this reason, the paper aims to determine the nature of this relationship on the basis of substantive (subject matter) criteria; in other words, it is intended to: (a) discern the aspects and level of magnitude of cognitive processes investigated by the potentially relevant cognitive sciences, and (b) to discern the aspect of cognition of relevance to foreign language didactics, understood as an autonomous empirical discipline, constituted in accordance with the cognitive conception of science For this purpose, it is necessary to identify the fundamental unity underlying human cognitive phenomena of interest to the cognitive sciences, including FLD, and discern their specific aspect which justifies a relative autonomy of FLD within the cognitive alliance

Cognition and Body: A Perspective from Theoretical Psychology

Abstract: With the approach of theoretical psychology, this paper is to explore the possible relations between cognition and body in light of embodiment thesis. According to present author, Dualist viewpoints of mind-body relationship, until recently, have been in dominant position in western culture. The denial of the body in consideration of human mind has been a heritage of the western intellectual zeitgeist since the time of the ancient Greeks. Plato put the body in the position of distraction in intellectual life, and separated the human soul from the body. He is the earliest representative of dualism. In the 17th century, a philosopher of France, Rene Descartes, epistemologically, demonstrated the existence of the dualist world, and distinguished between physical substances and thinking substance. According to Descartes, physical substances ("res extensa")could be measured and divided, and occupied a physical space, while the thinking substance ("res cogitans") could not be divided, and was unextended into physical space. Following in Descartes’ footsteps, traditional cognitive science took the metaphor, the MIND IS A COMPUTER. Human mind has been modeled as a digital computer, and cognition was considered as an autonomous, logical, and disembodied process. There was a sharp line between human physical capacities and its intellectual abilities. This kind of dualist viewpoints has been challenged, however, in recent decades in cognitive science. One of the most recent developments that has implications for understanding the relationship between cognition and body is that of embodied mind. According to proponents of theoretical models of embodiment, cognition is body’s cognition, and body is the subject rather than the object of cognition. In author’s opinion, the dependence of cognition on body can be in the following aspects: (1) an agent’s body in action is a powerful constraint on how the agent conceive their environments. Because of its bodily shape and structure, some forms of cognition tend to be easier, and some kinds of cognition tend to be difficult even impossible. (2) an agent’s body can function to distribute cognitive tasks between brain and body, and between body and environment. This means that the mind extends beyond the skull and skin into the outer physical environment, and cognitive systems may loop into the world and hence constitute hybrid systems consisting of both neural and non-neural parts of the body. (3) an agent’s body can regulate cognitive activity and influence mental processes. Nodding our heads result in more positive evaluations, while shaking our heads result in more negative evaluations. This indicate our body’s influence on our mind. Generally speaking, body and mind are not separated but unified. The interaction between body and the world made the mind become possible.

El enfoque cognitivista en la fraseología

Abstract: In this paper we will try to answer the following questions, among others: What is the role of Cognitive grammar in phraseology acquisition processes? Is it possible to describe the idiomaticity of a language by means of Cognitive grammar? These issues, together with other relevant ones, seem to gain importance in phraseological research; therefore, in the first place, we will review the state of the art of cognitive perspectives in phraseology research try. Cognitivism has started to develop some strategies that apply to phraseology based, among others, on the concepts of metonymy, metaphor and encyclopedic knowledge. In our study we shall try to determine up to what point these concepts are useful to explain compositionality. In general, phraseological units (PU) tend to be meaningful when interpreting its constituents. That is the reason why in our study we will tackle and try to solve the question of how cognitive strategies as well as Cognitive grammar can shed some light on interpretation and subsequent learning/acquisition of PU.

Tutorial: Cognitive Psychology as a Radical Behaviorist Views It

Abstract: Cognitive psychology is the name for a class of positions that embrace mentalism: appeals to explicitly nonbehavioral states, mechanisms, processes, structures, and the like, operating in an explicitly nonbehavioral dimension of the mind, as causally effective antecedents in explanations of behavior. The present article reviews the background and nature of cognitive psychology, especially as contrasted with behaviorism. Of particular interest are the theoretical and philosophical differences between cognitive psychology and behaviorism, for instance, as those differences concern their respective explanatory practices. We conclude that cognitive psychology has conceptual affinities with mediational neobehaviorism, and that the radical behaviorism of B. F. Skinner differs from them both.

Evaluating the correspondence of educational software to learning theories

Abstract: As new technologies emerge, more and more people depend on them for a variety of purposes. Now more than ever there is a tendency for technological implications to substitute for face-to-face communication and education. In this paper we attempt to investigate whether the usability and pedagogical factors for quality educational platforms meet the expectations of three dominant learning theories of the past century, which, namely are: behaviorism, cognitivism and constructivism. We assign specific factors derived from 9 evaluation models to the 3 learning theories. A list of 15 questions was produced to help evaluators in the assessment of the educational software. Then we evaluated 11 educational websites that aim to help anglophone students improve their language skills e.g. through grammar and spelling exercises. The results show the level of correspondence of these educational websites to the learning theories.

Exploration of the Functional Properties of Interaction: Computer Models and Pointers for Theory

Abstract: Context: Constructivist approaches to cognition have mostly been descriptive, and now face the challenge of specifying the mechanisms that may support the acquisition of knowledge. Departing from cognitivism, however, requires the development of a new functional framework that will support causal, powerful and goal-directed behavior in the context of the interaction between the organism and the environment. Problem: The properties affecting the computational power of this interaction are, however, unclear, and may include partial information from the environment, exploration, distributed processing and aggregation of information, emergence of knowledge and directedness towards relevant information. Method: We posit that one path towards such a framework may be grounded in these properties, supported by dynamical systems. To assess this hypothesis, we describe computational models inspired from swarm intelligence, which we use as a metaphor to explore the practical implications of the properties highlighted. Results: Our results demonstrate that these properties may serve as the basis for complex operations, yielding the elaboration of knowledge and goal-directed behavior. Implications: This work highlights aspects of interaction that we believe ought to be taken into account when characterizing the possible mechanisms underlying cognition. The scope of the models we describe cannot go beyond that of a metaphor, however, and future work, theoretical and experimental, is required for further insight into the functional role of interaction with the environment for the elaboration of complex behavior. Constructivist content: Inspiration for this work stems from the constructivist impetus to account for knowledge acquisition based on interaction