Showing papers on "Counterfactual conditional published in 1993"
TL;DR: The authors investigated the spontaneous generation of both upward counterfactuals, which improve on reality, and downward counterfactually, which worsen reality, in a computer-simulated blackjack game, where the outcome was framed as either a win, a neutral event or a loss.
540 citations
TL;DR: This article investigated the structure of counterfactual thoughts (evaluations of past outcomes based on'might have been' alternatives) and found that subtractive structures (which delete elements to reconstruct reality) were more likely after success whereas additive structures (additional structures, which add new elements to re-construct reality) are more likely following failure, when the failure was framed by a history of past failures.
Abstract: The structure of counterfactual thoughts (evaluations of past outcomes based on 'might have been" alternatives) was investigated. Subjects read stories describing a student preparing for an exam, with the outcome (success vs. failure) and past record of the student (good vs. poor) manipulated. Subjects then 'undid" the outcome by altering (mutating) events that preceded it. Outcome valence significantly predicted the structure of counterfactual alternatives, such that subtractive structures (which delete elements to reconstruct reality) were more likely after success whereas additive structures (which add new elements to reconstruct reality) were more likely after failure. Additive structures were even more predominant when the failure was framed by a history of past failures. No main effect of outcome valence was found on the total number of counterfactual thoughts recorded. These findings point to the utility of differentiating counterfactuals on the basis of structural types.
142 citations
TL;DR: The structure of counterfactuals was influenced by outcome valence but not by self-esteem: Subtractive structures were elicited by success, whereas additive structures (in which antecedents are added) were eliciting by failure.
Abstract: Two studies examined the relation between self-esteem and counterfactual thinking (consideration of "might-have-been" alternatives to reality). Ss imagined themselves in scenarios with another actor that resulted in either success or failure. Ss then "undid" the outcome by altering events that preceded the outcome. Following success, high self-esteem (HSE) Ss were more likely than low self-esteem (LSE) Ss to mutate their own actions. Following failure, LSE Ss were more likely than HSE Ss to mutate their own actions. Also, the structure of counterfactuals was influenced by outcome valence but not by self-esteem: Subtractive structures (in which antecedents are removed) were elicited by success, whereas additive structures (in which antecedents are added) were elicited by failure. The importance of the self and individual differences in self-esteem to counterfactual thinking is discussed.
109 citations
01 Jan 1993
TL;DR: The authors suggest that there was at least a very distant cause in late antique logic for the appearance of the Liar and its relatives in the twelfth century, and that two-century logicians devised the paradoxes for themselves and that their solutions were all their own work.
Abstract: The best efforts of some of the best historians of logic have failed to find a clear source in material inherited from the ancient world for the earliest mediaeval discussions of the Liar paradox.1 The obvious candidates, and most importantly Aristotle’s reference to the puzzles of oath-breakers and liars in the Sophistical Refutations, seem to have been of little importance in the first theorising about insolubilia.2 Despite this I would like to suggest that there was at least a very distant cause in late antique logic for the appearance of the Liar and its relatives in the twelfth century. It cannot be emphasized enough, however, that twelfth century logicians devised the paradoxes for themselves and that their solutions were all their own work.
28 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that the existence of both mental and physical explanations for behavior would seem to violate the principle that we can never have more than one complete and independent explanation for a single event, and proposed an alternate understanding of supervenient causation which preserves the advantages of Kim's account while avoiding the problems.
Abstract: Kim argues that we can never have more than one complete and independent explanation for a single event. The existence of both mental and physical explanations for behavior would seem to violate this principle. We can avoid violating it only if we suppose that mental causal relationships supervene on physical causal relationships. I argue that although his solution is attractive in many respects, it will not do as it stands. I propose an alternate understanding of supervenient causation which preserves the advantages of Kim's account while avoiding the problems. My analysis involves appeal to counterfactuals. Any counterfactual analysis must confront the problem that mental states appear to be ‘screened off’ from causal relevance by physical states. I argue that screening off is not a problem, because cases in which mental states appear to be screened off are cases in which background conditions are not held constant.
13 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that Stapp's argument is fallacious, without commitment to any particular formal analysis of truth conditions for counterfactuals nor to conditions for world similarity.
8 citations
Proceedings Article•
28 Aug 1993TL;DR: The computational complexity of evaluating nested counterfactuals over a propositional knowledge base is considered and it is shown that statements of the form p1 >(p2 > ...(pn > q)...) intuitively correspond to hypothetical queries involving a sequence of revisions.
Abstract: We consider the computational complexity of evaluating nested counterfactuals over a propositional knowledge base. Counterfactual implication p > q models a statement "if p, then q," where p is known or expected to be false, and is different from material implication p ⇒ q A nested counterfactual is a counterfactual statement where the conclusion q is a (possibly negated) counterfactual. Statements of the form p1 >(p2 > ...(pn > q)...) intuitively correspond to hypothetical queries involving a sequence of revisions. We show that evaluating such statements is Π2p complete, and that this task becomes PSPACE-cornplete if negation is allowed in the nesting. We also consider nesting a counterfactual in the premise, i.e.(p > q) > r and show that evaluating such statements is most likely much harder than evaluating p > (q > r).
7 citations
TL;DR: A framework of modal logic is used to reason about both defaults and counterfactuals, in which one can express certainties, possibilities, actualities and (preferred or practical) beliefs in a distinct manner.
Abstract: We show how defaults can be used for counterfactual reasoning. We use a framework of modal logic to reason about both defaults and counterfactuals, in which one can express certainties, possibilities, actualities and (preferred or practical) beliefs in a distinct manner. Firstly, we discuss some properties of our approach in relation to other approaches in the literature.
7 citations
01 Jan 1993
TL;DR: In this article, the authors make explicit their assumptions connecting causal structure with probability, counterfactuals and manipulations, and they advocate no definition of causation, but they try to make their usage systematic.
Abstract: Views about the nature of causation divide very roughly into those that analyze causal influence as some sort of probabilistic relation, those that analyze causal influence as some sort of counterfactual relation (sometimes a counterfactual relation having to do with manipulations or interventions), and those that prefer not to talk of causation at all. We advocate no definition of causation, but in this chapter we try to make our usage systematic, and to make explicit our assumptions connecting causal structure with probability, counterfactuals and manipulations. With suitable metaphysical gyrations the assumptions could be endorsed from any of these points of view, perhaps including even the last.
5 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that the existence of persons can be indeterminate in science-fictional circumstances, and that any such counterfactual is false, since it cannot establish its conclusion.
Abstract: Both arguments are based on the breakdown of normal criteria of identity in certain science-fictional circumstances. In one case, normal criteria would support the identity of person A with each of two other persons, B and C; and it is argued that, in the imagined circumstances, ‘A=B’ and ‘A=C’ have no truth value. In the other, a series or ‘spectrum’ of cases is tailored to a sorites argument. At one end of the spectrum, persons A and B are such that ‘A=B’ is clearly true; at the other end, A and B are such that the identity is clearly false. In between, normal criteria of identity leave the truth or falsehood of ‘A=B’ undecided, and it is argued that in these circumstances ‘A=B’ has no truth value. These arguments are to be understood counterfactually. My claim is that, so understood, neither establishes its conclusion. The first involves a pair of counterfactual situations that are equally possible or ‘tied’. If ‘A=B’ and ‘A=C’ have no truth value, a counterfactual conditional with one of them as consequent and an antecedent that is true in circumstances in which either is true should have no truth value. Intuitively, however, any such counterfactual is false. The second argument can be seen to invite an analogous response. If this is right, however, there is an important disanalogy between this and the classical paradox of the heap. If the disanalogy is only apparent, the argument shows at most that the existence of persons can be indeterminate.
3 citations