Showing papers on "Deterrence theory published in 1987"

Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs.

Abstract: In many markets consumers have transaction or learning "switching costs" between functionally undifferentiated brands. New entry into such markets may be deterred either by large customer bases and/or large switching costs, which deny customers to an entrant, or by small customer bases and/or small switching costs, which mean an incumbent will respond aggressively to an entrant. An incumbent threatened by entry may therefore price either lower or higher than otherwise. A firm with the right to enter early may make less profits over time than an otherwise identical firm that is unable to enter the market until later.

The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent

Abstract: A theoretical model of deterrence is studied in which the imposition of nonmonetary (as opposed to monetary) sanctions is socially costly It is therefore desirable that the system of sanctions be designed so that sanctions are imposed infrequently If courts possess perfect information, the optimal system is such that sanctions are never imposed-all who can be deterred will be--but, realistically, courts' information will be imperfect and sanctions will be imposed Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association

Nuclear deterrence, morality, and realism

Abstract: Nuclear deterrence deserves rigorous, objective ethical analysis. In providing it, the authors of this book face realities - the Soviet threat, possible nuclear holocaust, strategic imperatives - but they also unmask moral evasions - deterrence cannot be bluff, pure counterforce, the lesser (or greater) evil, or a step towards disarmament. They conclude that the deterrent is unjustifiable and examine the new questions of conscience that this raises for everyone.

The steps to war: Toward a Scientific Explanation of Correlates of War Findings

Abstract: Since its inception, the Correlates of War project has been in the forefront of the quantitative analysis of war. This review seeks to integrate some of the major findings of the project into an explanation that identifies the steps that regularly occur before war. The explanation must be seen as an artificial construct, based on inductive generalizations from existing evidence and clues, whose primary utility at this stage of inquiry is to see what patterns precede wars, what conditions are associated with peace, and what factors may be of causal significance. The findings and the explanation derived from them are relevant to assessing some common realist practices and policies of states such as alliance making, military build-ups, hard-line bargaining, balancing of power, peace-through-strength, and deterrence. It is argued that among equals, power-politics behavior does not avoid war, but leads political actors to take steps that bring them closer to war.

Silence is the real crime 1

Abstract: The nuclear arsenal of either Russia or America is enough to blow up the world many times over. And they both continue to develop and stockpile nuclear weapons and contend that this is needed for security. In a world of changing technology, this means constant research and upgrading of weapons and more and more powerful and destructive systems: the nuclear arms race. The idea of deterrence is to be stronger so as to frighten the enemy—to deter him from aggression. Psychoanalysis is very familiar with vicious circles of hatred and fear. It teaches psychoanalysts that in an individual, destructive and self-destructive drives can only be modified when the individual can get some insight into his motives and visualise the consequences to others and to himself of his action. September 11 2002 was a major trauma, which had powerful repercussions, particularly for the Western world.

Alliances and Collective Goods: A Reappraisal

Abstract: How are burdens shared within an alliance? How many and what kinds of armed forces are alliance members likely to purchase in support of their collective interest in deterrence and defense? These questions are the province of the economic theory of alliances, which has been widely accepted as offering an explanation for two tendencies often found within alliances: disproportionality in burden sharing and suboptimality in the amount of military spending. Proponents of the theory have marshalled an impressive body of evidence in support of propositions derived from it, but efforts to test the predictive power of the theory have relied exclusively on data derived from alliances after World War II. An examination of burden-sharing arrangements within seven pre-1945 alliances produces outcomes that cannot be adequately explained by the theory as it now stands. Consideration of the pre-1945 cases thus suggests additional refinements to the theory, the most important of which have to do with the degree of substi...

Moral paradoxes of nuclear deterrence

Abstract: Preface Introduction Part I. Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence: 1. Some paradoxes of deterrence 2. A paradox of deterrence revisited 3. Deterrence, utility and rational choice 4. Nuclear deterrence: some moral perplexities 5. Dilemmas of nuclear protest Part II. Alternative to Nuclear Deterrence: 6. Unilateral nuclear disarmament 7. World government 8. Strategic defense 9. Nuclear coercion 10. Mutual nuclear disarmament Notes Index.

Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis

Abstract: We develop a model of crisis stability based on a deterrence game. Players are assumed to be able to choose any level of initial cooperation or noncooperation; the more cooperative player (if there is one) may then choose to retaliate. In a crisis, players are assumed to have escalated their conflict and desire to stabilize it before it explodes. Players can, by threatening their opponent, stabilize the new status quo. In addition, points of threat escalation are identified at which neither player can prevent the opponent from escalating further without threatening the opponent more severely than before the crisis erupted, thereby heating up an already tense situation. Crisis stabilization is aided by being close to the full-cooperation position, though, paradoxically, both players may benefit from having created a crisis that only escalating threats may resolve. We discuss ways of avoiding threat escalation and the increased risk of war that it entails, especially in conflicts between the superpowers.

Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army 1978–87

Abstract: Introduction Since the late 1970s, when the current programmes seeking to modernize China's defence establishment began, issues of military doctrine, strategy and operations have remained at the forefront of China's quest for a defence capacity capable of being ranked among the world's great powers. As the Chinese leadership contemplated defence modernization, they could not but recognize the Janus-like quality of their armed forces. One face looked back on the people's war traditions that served them so well and for so long, while the other faced the complexities of conventional and strategic nuclear warfare and deterrence in the latter part of the 20th century.

Extended Deterrence in the Middle East: American Strategy Reconsidered

Abstract: WHEN leaders extend deterrence, they attempt to prevent a military attack against an ally by threatening retaliation should force be used against their protege. At present, most analysts locate extended deterrence at the intersection of nuclear and conventional force in Europe; the United States relies heavily on this strategy to protect its allies. The extension of deterrence to Europe, however, is only one among several possible applications of the strategy. It has been widely used by the United States, for example, to manage conflict in the Middle East. We propose to examine this wider extension of deterrence.

Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

Abstract: Game-theoretic models of deterrence and escalation, based on Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma, are developed in which two players can initially choose any level of preemption in a crisis (Deterrence Game) or escalation in an arms race (Deescalation Game). The greater this level, the more likely an opponent will interpret this choice as a noncooperative action and retaliate. Given that both players make noncooperative choices in these games-either initially or in retaliation-a probability of winding down is postulated whereby the players can escape either the mutually worst outcome in the Deterrence Game (which becomes the Winding-Down Game) or the mutually next-worst outcome in the Deescalation Game (which becomes the Arms-Reduction Game). In both games, as the probability of winding down increases, the threat of retaliation must also increase-and at an increasing rate-to preserve the stability of mutual deterrence and mutual deescalation. Implications of these findings, especially for encouraging mutual cooperation between the superpowers, via both deterrence and defense ("Star Wars'), are discussed.

Citizen gun ownership and criminal deterrence: theory, research, and policy

Abstract: Research on the general and specific deterrents emanating from citizenowned firearms is examined under assumptions about deterrence. Only slight and indirect empirical evidence for deterrence exists in the area of citizen gun ownership. The crime-reducing effects associated with public policies that support civilian gun ownership are balanced in light of other, negative public health factors associated with citizen-owned guns.

Medical malpractice in perspective. II--The implications for Britain.

Abstract: The "malpractice crisis" in the United States cannot be understood in isolation. Litigation is precipitated by features of the American health care and social security systems. Relative to the United Kingdom, there are fewer barriers of access to the courts, although the role of contingency fees has probably been exaggerated. Given the great institutional differences between the UK and the USA, the crisis seems unlikely to be replicated here unless there are further moves towards privatising both the costs of providing health care and the costs of its failures. It is concluded that a marginal change in the frequency or average cost of claims could have a serious impact on National Health Service resources, the medical defence societies, recruitment to specialties, and clinical practice. Debate over possible reforms is compromised by the dearth of good empirical data. Any changes, however, must address both the deterrence of bad practice and the compensation of injured patients.

Optimal Threats

Abstract: Many conflicts, ranging from biblical strife to modern superpower confrontations, are significantly affected by the threat of retaliation. We analyze the policy of tit-for-tat in a Threat Game based on Chicken, in which each player can initially choose any level of preemption or non-cooperation. If one player is more preemptive than the other, the less preemptive player can retaliate; if the players preempt at the same level, neither can retaliate. After these choices, the game terminates, with the players' payoffs based on both the payoffs of Chicken and their levels of preemption and retaliation. An analysis of Nash equilibria shows the Deterrence Equilibrium neither player preempts, but both threaten to retaliate if preempted to be the most compelling solution to this game; a player's choice of his strategy associated with this equilibrium renders any level of preemption by his opponent costly. Deterrence Equilibrium strategies entail, in some cases, more-than-proportionate threats of retaliation against low levels of preemption and less-than-proportionate threats against high levels. We consider the optimality of such threats in light of existing prescriptions and evidence on different conflicts, especially those that occur in the international arena and may involve nuclear threats.

Deterrence Failure Revisited

Abstract: John Orme's article, "Deterrence Failures: A Second Look," is a spirited attack on my book Between Peace and War.' A principal finding of this study is that deterrence is most often defeated by the flawed calculations of the challenger. Orme insists that deterrence only fails when it is executed poorly. In the rebuttal that follows I will show that Orme's historical analysis fails to address, let alone refute, the substance of my criticisms of deterrence. Our dispute is significant because of its implications for conflict management. Chapter four of Between Peace and War analyzed a class of acute international crisis, brinkmanship, whose defining characteristic is the challenger's expectation that its adversary would back away from its commitment. In eight of my sample of thirteen cases, challenges were made in the absence of any good evidence indicating that the adversaries in question lacked either the capability or resolve to defend their commitments. The evidence available at the time pointed to the opposite conclusion. The commitments that were challenged appeared to meet the four essential conditions for successful deterrence. They were clearly defined and repeatedly publicized. The wouldbe deterrers also possessed the military capability to defend them or subsequently punish a challenger, and gave every indication of their resolve to do so. Not surprisingly, most of these challenges resulted in setbacks for the initiators; in all but three cases, the initiators were forced to go to war or back away from their challenge. I found that brinkmanship could generally be traced to the existence of grave foreign and domestic problems which leaders believed could only be surmounted by a successful challenge of an adversary's commitment. By far the most important incentive for brinkmanship was the belief that a dramatic negative shift was imminent in the international balance of political or military power. Leaders conceived of brinkmanship as a forceful response to acute and impending danger, as a means of safeguarding vital national and

A theorem on the existence of zones of initiation and deterrence in Intriligator-Brito arms race models

Abstract: We should be clear what this paper has demonstrated and what it has not demonstrated. It has provided one case for a two party arms race in which a zone of deterrence does not exist and a zone of war initiation occupies the central region of the arms race plane. It has shown that the sufficient conditions for a multi-party arms race become progressively more implausible as more parties enter the race. The failure of these sufficient conditions is not a failure of necessary conditions: it has not been shown that it is impossible for zones of deterrence to exist in multi-party arms race. However, unless sufficient conditions can be satisfied it is impossible to assert that they will always exist for plausible values of the parameters. Counter examples to the existence hypothesis can readily be produced for sufficiently high counterforce efficiencies and sufficiently many participants.

An Enhanced Non-Provocative Defense in Europe: Attrition of Aggressive Armored Forces by Local Militias

Abstract: The two part system -- NATO and WTO -- is presently locked into a mutually provoked escalating arms race. The result is economically and socially wasteful and a mortal threat to both as well as the rest of the earth's inhabitants. Given the mutual distrust, a form of defense must be found which is both non-provocative and effective and which can be established unilaterally, if necessary. Such a possible scheme for the 'tinder-box' region of Central Europe, where the two powers confront each other, consists of one or two 'depletion zones': strips parallel to the inter-zone frontier depleted of heavy, conventional, necessarily provocative, offensive military systems but saturated with widely dispersed, effectively armed, civilian militia groups. If aggression should occur, in spite of such a deterrence posture, the invader would suffer significant attrition losses in attempting to penetrate the zone(s) before battle could be joined with the defender's conventional military forces. Additional stopping power comes from lightly armed frontier defenses and long-range, locally guided anti-tank missiles. The results depend both upon the new technologies of fixed, hidden, long-range and man-portable, short-range, precision guided missiles and upon 'new' forms of incorporation and organization of the civilian population for defense. Aside from bemg effective and non-provocative, such a European security stance is economically and socially viable, functions as a clear cut decision making mechanism in a turbulent political world, allows the citizens of the European democracies to feel significantly responsible for their own security and well-being, and serves as a positive political signal to the rest of the world.

Common security, non-provocative defence, and the future of Western Europe

Abstract: Over the last few years the term common security has come into widespread use in debates about military policy. To date, however, this potentially important concept has not acquired any clear or generally accepted meaning. It is used by a variety of writers with quite different purposes in mind, and is therefore in danger of degenerating into an empty phrase. This article tries to bring common security into sharper focus. It starts by examining the general meaning of common security in terms of its core insight that the security of states in the contemporary international system is fundamentally interdependent. It goes on to test this meaning against the contents of four recent books all of which specifically address the idea. The discussion centres on the possible linkages between common security as an overall policy objective on the one hand, and a variety of specific policies for implementing it—including disarmament, arms control, minimum deterrence, and non-provocative defence–on the other. The next section makes the argument that a combination of minimum deterrence and non-provocative defence provides the most logically convincing implementation strategy for common security.

A formal treatment of threats: A note on the economics of deterrence

Abstract: To discuss and clarify a theory of deterrence this article focusses on military and economic inputs of the international exchange system and uses traditional microeconomic tools. It acknowledges the stochastic character of international threat situations and the influence of the attitude towards risk. The results of this approach suggest that the impact of neither economic and military deterrents nor unconditional rewards can be established apriori and, consequently, stress the importance of minimizing the potential yield of international misconduct and the use of positive sanctions (conditional rewards) as instruments to contain undesirable behaviour amongst nations.

Troublesome people : enemies of war, 1916-1986

Abstract: not alter her fundamental view that their country remained a threat to Britain and others. In her view, "the new brooms in the Soviet Union will not be used to sweep away Communism, only to make it more efficient.55 The speeches here assembled provide a convenient guide to Margaret Thatchers basic political beliefs, revealing a leader firm in her defense of free enterprise, dedicated to strength and deterrence as safeguards against the Soviet threat. These are her words and her thoughts; it is left to the reader to assess them. Fellow conservatives like Butt will find much to cheer

Nuclear Deterrence: An Alternative Model

Abstract: Deterrence is often described as two armed opponents facing each other but neither attacking because of the threat of retaliation by the other. This mistake lies in an imagery that sees the opposing parties as though each were individual persons or small groups. This article views strategic conflict as emerging from large-scale systems containing many individuals performing many different roles. By examining the adaptive tendencies of these systems, an alternate perception of moral and rational deterrence is developed.

More Is Not Better

Abstract: Given the size, composition, and essential missions of our current strategic force, I believe that we do not now need a new ICBM. At present, it is only necessary to proceed with an ICBM technology program. We can then begin full-scale engineering development if and when the specific needs for deployment become more evident. Our strategic arsenal will be more than adequate if we assume that it will be augmented by the currently programmed 50 MX missiles in fixed silos and 100 B-lBs, that the Trident procurement continues, and that we proceed with the development of a Stealth bomber and a second generation of air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). The pressure to increase our nuclear forces arises from our tendency to assume that military strength derives from numbers and details of weapons performance. Marginal differences in technical capability of weapons for conventional warfare can substantially affect the outcome of battles and of wars. But marginal differences in the strategic nuclear capabilities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union are inconsequential, except politically. Most would agree that by far the most important role of the U.S. strategic force is to deter a nuclear attack by an adversary. A degree of flexibility in the way that force can be used also provides deterrence against extreme nonnuclear provocations. But beyond a certain point, the idea of broadening the utility of nuclear weapons by being able to fight nuclear wars of varying intensity and to prevail in protracted nuclear wars is more problematic. It seems almost superfluous to point out yet again that the current retaliatory capability and the flexibility of use of nuclear weapons of each superpower is more than adequate for basic deterrence and can be readily maintained. Only if it totally neglected its nuclear forces-an unimaginable situation-could either side lose its retaliatory capability and the flexibility sufficient to extend deterrence. In fact, the pursuit of ever greater flexibility, of longer and specialized target lists, and of superiority in every imaginable level of nuclear conflict

Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy: Unfinished Business

Abstract: Acronyms Introduction Part I: The Balance of Terror: Steady or Precarious? Assured or Delicate Deterrence? Cities and Deterrence Assured Coercion: Bridging Past and Future Part II: Strategic Revisionism: Thrusts against Orthodoxy Soviet Military Doctrine and Stable Deterrence The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative: A Prospectus of Uncertainty Is a Soviet "Bolt from the Blue" Impossible? Part III: Strategic Command and Control: Missions and Limitation Protracted Conflict and Strategic C3: Missing Links Reciprocal Command Survivability and Superpower Strategy Part IV: Improving Extended Deterrence: Roles for Conventional and Nuclear Forces Theater Nuclear and Conventional Force Improvements The U.S. Maritime Strategy: Escalation and War Termination Part V: Pulling it All Together War Termination and U.S. Strategic Concepts: The Missing Endgame Conclusions and Reflections Selected Bibliography Index

Star Wars and Star Peace

Abstract: The Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI, commonly called Star Wars, is here critically analysed. The almost inconceivable destruction caused by nuclear war and the following nuclear winter are described, along with the various difficulties of intercepting Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, ICBMS, are discussed in technical detail. Reference is made to battle stations in space, the use of lasers from space and from Earth, pop-up defence; and the major issues of deterrence, computer power and the alternative delivery of nuclear weapons are emphasised. The alternative to Space War, Space Peace, can only come through trust and truth, and it is concluded that the noncommitted nations should combine to form an International Monitoring Satellite Agency to launch 'PEACESATS'. The information from these satellites, available to all nations, would bring about an Age of Transparency and an end to nuclear war.

NUCLEAR CRASH. The U.S. Economy After Small Nuclear Attacks

Abstract: : The effects of a nuclear attack on a country's society and economy have been the subject of numerous studies based on data from the nuclear bombs used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, from nuclear tests, and from conventional-bomb damage data (1). Even though these studies have focused on quantitative calculations of the physical damage and have presented only qualitative extrapolations of the effects of this damage on the fate of the survivors, they were instrumental in establishing the fact that a nuclear exchange between two warring nations would result in tremendous devastation. From this fact comes the conclusion that the only actual use for nuclear explosives is to maintain deterrence, that is, to insure that a nuclear opponent does not use his nuclear arsenal against you. Most of these studies have had one of two purposes: either to snow that a nuclear war is unwinnable; or to guide military planners in determining the size of their country's nuclear arsenal. Even though many studies indicated that deterrence could be supported by a relatively small nuclear arsenal, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union now approaches 50,000. Dissatisfaction with this development has prompted two reactions in this country. The first is a move to limit the nuclear explosives in each arsenal to the number that would securely deter an opponent that is, towards reduction of the number of nuclear explosives. The other is to try to develop a defensive system that would effectively protect the society and economy of the U.S. regardless of the number of nuclear weapons deployed by the Soviet Union.

Political considerations of studying tax compliance

Abstract: Given the recent interest of the Internal Revenue Service in having academic social scientists do research on the problem of tax noncompliance, it is important to consider the political and administrative context in which such research would occur. While the IRS offers a tremendous opportunity in the form of data and expertise, its tax enforcement mission and political environment play an important role in shaping the research agenda. Specifically, the academic social scientists, wishing to avail themselves of the opportunity, must be able to demonstrate the practical application of their research, something that researchers of the so-called “underground economy” did not do. Moreover, the research must not perpetuate the notion that the ability or efficiency of the IRS to enforce the tax laws is being widely eroded. The criminal deterrence doctrine is an area of basic research having particular interest to the IRS. There is a discussion of how research on the deterrence of tax crime might develop.

Road safety enforcement: a literature review

Abstract: The report examines the application of resources and means of maximising enforcement strategies for road safety. Human factors, the law, policing, and mechanical design are analysed as part of the road safety system. Contributions from police in Australia and other countries are included. The results of the analysis identify the complex interactions between human factors and the road environment, and the conclusions list a number of strategies for the development of road safety enforcement policy which takes these into account.

Economic Considerations in the Comparison Between Assured Destruction and Assured Survival

Abstract: One consequence of the Reagan Administration’s intensified RD (ii) how new, defensive-oriented cost and technology might influence the stability of the arms race; and (iii) how new cost and technology structures might influence strategic doctrines or objectives including incentives to refrain from striking first. Emphasis is placed on the relative costs of deterrence versus defence plus the degree of technological jointness in the production of these two capabilities as crucial determinants of the incentive structure of interest. Costs matter, both as positive predictors of potential future behaviour of great powers, and as normative criteria for strategic decision. The paper derives alternative cost measures for comparing offensive vs defensive effectiveness.

Naval forces and western security

Abstract: This book discusses the role of US forces in overall NATO planning, with special reference to the incongruence of the doctrines that characterize US maritime strategy and NATO's deterrence posture.