Showing papers on "Deterrence theory published in 2012"

Employee Misuse of Information Technology Resources: Testing a Contemporary Deterrence Model

Abstract: Recent research in information systems and operations management has considered the positive impacts of information technology (IT). However, an undesirable side effect of firms’ increasing reliance on IT to support the distribution and delivery of goods and services to customers is a greater exposure to a diverse set of IT security risks. One such risk is intentional employee misuse of technology resources. In this article, we draw upon modern deterrence frameworks to develop a predictive model of technology misuse intention that incorporates formal and informal sanctions as well as employment context factors. The model specifies previously untested relationships between formal and informal sanctions, thereby providing fresh insight into the role of sanctions in deterring technology misuse in organizations. Our results suggest that a predisposition toward the need for social approval and moral beliefs regarding the behavior are key determinants of technology misuse. Contrary to criminological research that has questioned the relative importance of formal sanctions in the deterrence process, we also found that the threat of formal sanctions has both direct and indirect influences on technology misuse intention. Further, from an employment context standpoint, employees who spend more working days away from the office (i.e., “virtual” mode) appear more inclined to misuse their organization's technology resources. The findings have implications for the research and practice of technology management.

Cyber Security without Cyber War

Abstract: Which government agency should have primary responsibility for the Internet? The USA seems to have decided this question in favour of the military—the US military today has the largest concentration of expertise and legal authority with respect to cyberspace. Those in the legal community who support this develop- ment are divided as to the appropriate legal rules to guide the military in its oversight of the Internet. Specialists on the international law on the use of force argue that with analogy and interpretation, current international law can be applied in a way that allows great freedom without sending the message that the USA is acting lawlessly when it comes to the Internet. Others reject this argument as unnecessary and potentially too restrictive. The USA need not ob- serve international law rules, especially not with respect to the Internet. The way forward is to follow the Cold War strategy of threatening enemies with over- whelming force and preparing to act on these threats. This article also questions the application of international law on the use of force to the Internet. Rather than rejecting international law in general, however, the thesis here is that inter- national law rules governing economic activity and communications are the rele- vant ones for activity on the Internet. Moving away from military analogy in general and Cold War deterrence in particular, will result in the identification and application of rules with a far better chance of keeping the Internet open and safer for all.

Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail

Abstract: Do nuclear weapons offer coercive advantages in international crisis bargaining? Almost seventy years into the nuclear age, we still lack a complete answer to this question. While scholars have devoted significant attention to questions about nuclear deterrence, we know comparatively little about whether nuclear weapons can help compel states to change their behavior. This study argues that, despite their extraordinary power, nuclear weapons are uniquely poor instruments of compellence. Compellent threats are more likely to be effective under two conditions: first, if a challenger can credibly threaten to seize the item in dispute, and second, if enacting the threat would entail few costs to the challenger. Nuclear weapons, however, meet neither of these conditions. They are neither useful tools of conquest nor low-cost tools of punishment. Using a new dataset of more than 200 militarized compellent threats from 1918 to 2001, we find strong support for our theory: compellent threats from nuclear states are no more likely to succeed, even after accounting for possible selection effects in the data. While nuclear weapons may carry coercive weight as instruments of deterrence, it appears that these effects do not extend to compellence.

Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court

Abstract: The International Criminal Court (ICC) has the mandate to “end impunity” for serious international crimes around the world but the budget to prosecute only a few cases per year. This high degree of selectivity represents one of the greatest threats to the Court’s legitimacy. Every selection decision the Court makes is scrutinized and many have been strongly condemned. States that supported the creation of the Court have become critical and one has threatened to withdraw from the regime. Unlike national courts, which are expected to prosecute most serious crimes, the ICC’s legitimacy rests on perceptions of relevant audiences that it is selecting the “right” crimes and defendants for prosecution. The scholarly and advocacy discourse surrounding the problem of the ICC’s selectivity currently focuses on the role of politics in selections, with critics charging that the prosecutor is improperly influenced by political considerations and the prosecutor protesting that his decisions are apolitical. This Article argues that such debates miss the ICC’s fundamental problem: that its creators failed to endow it with goals and priorities to undergird its choices. In light of this deficiency, current efforts to address the ICC’s selectivity by ensuring good process through independence, impartiality, objectivity, and transparency are bound to fail. Instead, what is needed is sustained dialogue among the ICC’s various constitutive communities about what the institution should be seeking to accomplish. This Article contributes to that process by proposing an expressive theory of ICC selection. While the dominant theories of ICC action – retribution, deterrence, and restorative justice – provide partial justifications for its work, such theories are inadequate as rationales for selection decisions. Instead, the ICC should select crimes and defendants for prosecution according to their ability to maximize its expressive impact. Through a dialogic process of norm expression, reaction, and adjustment, the Court will ideally generate increased consensus around its work over time. If it fails to do so, the ICC’s demise will at least result from the inability of the international community to agree about the Court’s core mission rather than its failure to conceptualize fully an agenda for the institution.

Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Abstract: The economic theory of crime deterrence predicts that the conviction of an innocent individual (type I error) is as detrimental to deterrence as the acquittal of a guilty individual (type II error). In this paper, we qualify this result theoretically, showing that in the presence of risk aversion, loss aversion, or type I error aversion, type I errors have a stronger effect on deterrence than type II errors. We test these predictions with two experimental studies in which participants choose whether to steal from other individuals, under alternative combinations of probabilities of judicial errors. The results indicate that both types of errors have a significant impact on deterrence. As predicted, type I errors have a stronger impact on deterrence than type II errors. This asymmetry is entirely explained by differences in the expected utility gains from crime, whereas nonexpected utility factors do not play a significant role.

Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court

Abstract: id=l 148907##. 204. See JULIE MERTUS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 56-57 (undated), available at http://www.cla.purdue.edu/history/ facstaff/Ingrao/si/Report-10g.pdf (observing differing national views of "commensurability of guilt" provide grounds for controversy in the ICTY, specifically noting that Croats were surprised at the number of Croatian defendants indicted because the Croatian perspective saw the war as a "matter of Serb aggression against innocent parties"). 205. See, e.g., Interview by U.N. News Centre with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor for the Int'l Criminal Court (June 5, 2009), http://www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers .asp?NewsID=13 (explaining importance of Bashir's prosecution because he was leader of a "massive campaign orchestrated against the citizens"). 206. See Jalloh, supra note 2, at 462-63 (quoting African politicians and scholars who consider the ICC akin to "colonialism" and "imperialism"). Similarly, when the ICTR prosecutor's decision to engage in one-sided prosecutions is articulated as an assessment of relative Winter 20121 Michigan Journal of International Law 2. Deterrence Deterrence theory emanates from utilitarian moral philosophy, 27 which holds that actions should be evaluated according to their tendencies to maximize happiness, either average or aggregate. 208 Specific deterrence, along with the related concept of incapacitation, seeks to avoid repeated criminal conduct by a particular offender.209 General deterrence looks to avert criminality in the public at large. 210 The dominant model of deterrence theorizes that punishment can effectuate deterrence in economic terms. Criminal law is thus conceived as precipitating a cost-benefit analysis in the minds of rationally calculating prospective criminals. 211 Deterrence theorists believe that by shaping criminal law rules they can affect individuals' decisions about whether to commit crimes. Such decisions are said to be based on an assessment of the likelihood of apprehension and the cost of conviction-usually in terms of length of imprisonment. 212 The theory asserts that optimal deterrence can be achieved by manipulating these factors. Many criminal law theorists, including many retributivists, accept that the existence of a criminal law system has some deterrent effect.213 The principal debates about deterrence center around: (1) whether it is a legitimate justification for punishment given that it treats offenders as desert, it engenders controversy in light of the very serious crimes committed by the other side. See Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 49, 50-51 (2011) (criticizing the ICTR's decision not to prosecute war crimes committed

Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard

Abstract: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments 2. A typology of third-party commitments 3. Time consistency and entrapment 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances 5. A theory of commitment design 6. Testing the implications for alliance design 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia 8. Constructing security in today's world.

A Cyberwar of Ideas? Deterrence and Norms in Cyberspace

Abstract: This article relates American efforts to develop strategic ‘cyber deterrence’ as a means to deter adversarial actions in and through global cyberspace. Thus far, interests- based cyber deterrence theory has failed to translate into effective American policy and strategy, due to a divergence between the operational idiosyncrasies of cyberspace and an over-reliance on Cold War models of deterrence. Even while explicit cyber deterrence strategy falters, the United States is pursuing a normsbased approach to cyber strategy generally, and hopes to derive deterrent effects from its attempts to broker international agreements pertaining to the ‘rules of the road’ for the proper and productive use of cyberspace. The United States is not the only norm entrepreneur in this policy space, however, and this article examines how a range of other state and non-state actors are complicating efforts to develop normative regimes that might reduce risks to and from cyberspace. The article concludes that a norms-based approa...

Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime Pays

Abstract: This article is the first to analyze whether cartel sanctions are optimal. The conventional wisdom is that the current level of sanctions is adequate or excessive. The article demonstrates, however, that the combined level of current United States cartel sanctions is only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. Consequently, the average level of United States anti-cartel sanctions should be approximately quintupled. The United States imposes a diverse arsenal of sanctions against collusion: criminal fines and restitution payments for the firms involved and prison, house arrest and fines for the corporate officials involved. Both direct and indirect victims can sue for mandatory treble damages and attorney's fees. This multiplicity of sanctions has helped give rise to the strongly held - but until now never seriously examined - conventional wisdom in the antitrust field that these sanctions are not just adequate to deter collusion, but that they are excessive. We analyze this issue using the standard optimal deterrence approach. This model is predicated upon the belief that corporations and individuals contemplating illegal collusion will be deterred only if expected rewards are less than expected costs, adjusted by the probability the illegal activity will be detected and sanctioned. To undertake this analysis we first calculate the expected rewards from cartelization using a new and unique database containing 75 cartel cases. We survey the literature to ascertain the probability cartels are detected and the probability detected cartels are sanctioned. We calculate the size of the sanctions involved for each case in our sample. These include corporate fines, individual fines, payouts in private damage actions, and the equivalent value (or disvalue) of imprisonment or house arrest for the individuals convicted. Our analysis shows that, overall, United States' cartel sanctions are only 9% to 21% as large as they should be to protect potential victims of cartelization optimally. This means that, despite the existing sanctions, collusion remains a rational business strategy. Cartelization is a crime that on average pays. In fact, it pays very well. Accordingly, our concluding section suggests specific ways cartel sanctions should be increased to become more nearly optimal. This should save consumers many billions of dollars each year.

Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement

Abstract: This article shows the limitations to the optimal deterrence-inspired cartel enforcement policy currently used by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. This article employs both quantitative and qualitative survey evidence of cartel practitioners to shed light upon the realities of US cartel enforcement policy. The empirical evidence provided by the practitioner surveys challenges the traditional assumptions behind the success of the DOJ’s cartel program. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that firms regularly game the leniency program to punish their competitors. For various reasons, firms and the DOJ have strong incentives to settle rather than to litigate cases in which the legality of cartel conduct may be in doubt. The surveys also expose limitations to the optimal deterrence framework for firms and individuals regarding incentives and behavior. These findings suggest the need for an enforcement focus on sub-units within the firm as well as various processes to change behavior that would improve enforcement and deterrence. Finally, the surveys suggest certain structural limitations in organizational behavior within firms that have prevented antitrust compliance programs from becoming embedded in a way that would reduce cartel activity. Additionally, this article provides an analysis of media coverage of cartel enforcement from 1990-2009. The analysis suggests that successful enforcement has not created sufficient awareness of cartel behavior among the public. Relative to other types of financial crimes, such as accounting fraud, the public seems unaware or uninterested in cartel activity. The conclusion summarizes the article’s findings and outlines potential future steps in cartel research.

Deterrence beyond the State: The Israeli Experience

Abstract: Israel's experience with deterrence is unique: it is older, more diverse, and more experimental than that of any other state. How did Israel's strategy of deterrence evolve? How was it adapted to fit the non-state threat? And what is its utility? This article argues that Israel's experience with deterrence beyond the state can best be understood through the conceptual lenses provided by the other grand deterrence debate, that in the philosophy of law, not international relations. Israel's use of military force against non-state enemies does not fit the classic concepts of strategy. It is not just one act of force to compel one actor to fulfil one specific political goal at one given time; deterrence consists of a series of acts of force to create – and maintain – general norms of behaviour for many political actors over an extended period of time. Using force, consequently, does not represent a principal failure of deterrence but its maintenance through swift, certain, but measured responses. The inquiry ...

The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today

Abstract: In comparison with the Cold War era, deterrence in international politics has changed significantly, even though many of the basic components of that deterrence still exist and continue to have an impact. Deterrence is now less salient in national security policies and international security management, more recessed, particularly nuclear deterrence. This is primarily due to the huge changes in international politics ushered in by the end of the Cold War, particularly in great-power political relationships, and which are continuing to unfold. Important developments are underway with respect to nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, collective actor deterrence, and other aspects of international system security. While many old topics pertaining to deterrence continue to be studied and generate continuing controversies, often along the same lines as in the past, some important investigations and theoretical analyses have also emerged on pivotal deterrence, the deterrence of cyberattacks, terrorism, and in...

How to Deter Terrorism

Abstract: For more than 50 years during the Cold War, deterrence was a cornerstone of U.S. strategy. The United States aimed to prevent the Soviet Union from attacking the West by threatening to retaliate wi...

Perceptual Deterrence Theory

Abstract: Any deterrent effect of the criminal justice system ultimately operates through the public’s perceptions of the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment. This “process of perceptual deterrence” has two legs—one on the formation of perceptions and the second on how perceptions once formed impact behavior. To date, little is known little about how perceptions of sanction threats are formed, though people do update their prior perceptions in light of new information in a way consistent with deterrence assumptions. The extant evidence also suggests that perceived sanction threats have a modest impact on a person’s behavior. While the perceived severity of punishment has a negligible effect on criminal offending, researchers consistently find evidence of a slight direct deterrent effect for perceived certainty and find a stronger indirect effect when formal sanctions trigger informal sanctions. Very little research has been directed at the celerity of punishment, although more interest is being shown in how the swiftness of punishment works. To enrich their inquiry, criminologists are beginning to borrow knowledge on decision-making from other disciplines, notably cognitive psychology and behavioral economics. Indeed, the substantive area of offender decision-making will likely be very fertile ground for researchers for years to come.

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

Abstract: This report discusses Pakistan's efforts to produce fissile material and other issues related to nuclear proliferation and improving its nuclear arsenal. It also discusses the steps Pakistan has taken to increase international confidence in its nuclear security. However, continued instability in Pakistan has caused some to question the effectiveness of its nuclear security reforms.

Security assurances and nuclear nonproliferation

Abstract: While policy makers and scholars have long devoted considerable attention to strategies like deterrence, which threaten others with unacceptable consequences, such threat-based strategies are not always the best option. In some cases, a state may be better off seeking to give others a greater sense of security, rather than by holding their security at risk. The most prominent use of these security assurances has been in conjunction with efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Ongoing concerns about the nuclear activities of countries like Iran and North Korea, and the possible reactions of other states in their regions, have catapulted this topic into high profile. This book represents the first study to explore the overall utility of assurance strategies, to evaluate their effectiveness as a tool for preventing nuclear proliferation, and to identify conditions under which they are more or less likely to be effective.

Illegal Refugees: Competing Policy Ideas and the Rise of the Regime of Deterrence in American Asylum Politics

Abstract: Many authors have commented on the increasing resistance of Western States to accepting large numbers of asylum seekers. However, the literature lacks a coherent theory about the specific mechanisms behind the rise of deterrence policies in individual States. Based on 52 interviews and a media database of 444 articles, I examine the arc of American asylum policy over many decades. I argue that when the Cold War ended, the anti-communist hold on the American asylum programme was loosened, and the early 1990s ushered in a flurry of reforms designed to expand the programme and make the decision-making process more rich and transparent. However, these changes coincided with an asylum boom that placed heavy administrative costs on receiving States just as the power of granting asylum to people in exile lost its strategic geo-political appeal. The regime that eventually developed became closely aligned with the domestic politics of border control, as opposed to either foreign policy concerns or the guidelines of international law. Thus, both institutional and ideological strains led to the sudden demise of the dominant policy-making regime, and made room temporarily for another, only to be quickly trumped by a third – the regime of deterrence.

International Relations and the Psychology of Time Horizons

Abstract: Theories of international relations have often incorporated assumptions about time horizons—a metaphor for how heavily actors value the future relative to the present. However, they have not built on a growing body of experimental research that studies how human beings actually make intertemporal tradeoffs. In this article, we present relevant findings from psychology and behavioral economics, notably those of “construal level theory” (CLT), and explore these findings’ implications for three classic questions—international cooperation, preventive war, and coercion. We argue that experimental evidence regarding how people discount future value and construe future events challenges the conventional wisdom on international cooperation. We further maintain that CLT helps explain a longstanding puzzle about preventive wars—namely why they are often initiated too late by declining powers but too soon by rising competitors. Finally, we rely on these findings to explain who wins coercive contests and why compellence is often, but not always, harder than deterrence. Scholars of international relations often embed in their theories crucial assumptions about time horizons, and this article seeks to show what differences it makes if we ground these assumptions in what we know about actual human decision making.

How Can We Deter Cyber Terrorism

Abstract: In order to deter cyber terrorism, it is important to identify the terrorists, since punishment may not deter them. The identification probability relies heavily on tracking cyber terrorists. However, there are legal and technical challenges to tracking terrorists. This paper proposes suggestions and insights on overcoming these challenges. Three types of infrastructures must be present in order to deter cyber terrorism: technical, policy, and legal. We list some of the key items that academics as well as practitioners need to focus on to improve cyber-terrorism deterrence.

Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy

Abstract: Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The author reviews the history of nuclear deterrence and calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of concepts such as first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers, smaller nuclear powers, and nonstate actors.

Cyber society and digital policies: Challenges to evaluation?

Abstract: In this article, the authors explore the relationship between (impact) evaluations and cyber society, in particular digital policies. There appears to be a gap between the pace at which internet an...

Managing India's Nuclear Forces

Abstract: India is now enmeshed in the deterrence game --actively with its traditional adversary Pakistan, and potentially with China. At the same time it is finding easier access to fissile materials and strategic technologies. In order to deal with these developments safely and wisely, the nation needs a much more sophisticated and multidisciplinary understanding of the strategic, technological, operational, and cost issues involved in nuclear matters. In this important book, Indian strategic analyst Verghese Koithara explains and evaluates India's nuclear force management, encouraging a broad public conversation that may act as a catalyst for positive change before the subcontinent experiences unthinkable carnage. The defence management system of a nuclear power absolutely needs to be sound and thorough. In addition to the considerable demands of managing its nuclear forces, it also must control conventional forces in a manner that forestalls nuclear escalation of a conflict by either side. Expanding and upgrading nuclear forces without enhancing deterrence is dangerous and should be avoided. India's nuclear force management system is grafted onto a woefully inadequate overall system of defense management. Koithara dissects all of these issues and suggests a way forward, drawing on recent developments in deterrence theory around the world.

China's Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control and Campaign Planning

Abstract: : The major insights in this monograph come from exploiting sections of a doctrinal text published for People's Liberation Army (PLA) institutions of higher military education by the Chinese National Defense University, A Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory (Zhanyi Lilun Xuexi Zhinan). This book is an unclassified study guide for PLA officers on how to understand and apply doctrine in a restricted PLA book on campaign doctrine in warfare, The Science of Campaigns. Other recent books by PLA or Chinese government controlled publishing houses validate the insights in the monograph and demonstrate how the PLA is going about achieving its vision for modern war fighting. These materials provide new insights into China s Second Artillery Corps, the Strategic Rocket Forces. Chinese strategists believe that China must be prepared to fight in, and if necessary, control space; which explains the 2006 laser attack on a U.S. satellite from China and the 2007 anti-satellite missile test by the Chinese. PLA officers also believe that U.S. satellite reconnaissance from space could constitute a threat to China s nuclear deterrent. China s leaders and military thinkers see the United States as a major potential threat to the PLA and China s interests primarily because of American military capabilities, but also because of U.S. security relationships in Asia. To respond to these perceived threats, China s military thinkers are examining the relationships between conventional and nuclear ballistic missile units in war and developing new doctrine for missile employment. There are explicit discussions in PLA military literature and scientific journals on how to use ballistic missiles to attack deployed U.S. naval battle groups, particularly aircraft carriers. Indeed, the Second Artillery Corps is developing a new class of maneuvering reentry vehicles with this mission in mind.

Testing Deterrence Theory with Offenders: The Empirical Validity of Stafford and Warr's Model

Abstract: Stafford and Warr (1993) reconceptualized general and specific deterrence into a single theory in which individuals' propensities to engage in crime are based on a combination of personal and vicarious experiences with being punished and avoiding punishment. The current study extends prior tests of this conceptualization of deterrence by expanding the definition of vicarious experience, analyzing extralegal as well as legal consequences, examining multiple types of offending behavior, and drawing its data from a sample of work release facility inmates. The results fail to support legal deterrence as an explanation of offending for this sample but suggest the importance of extralegal consequences.

Conventional Deterrence and the Challenge of Credibility

Abstract: The concept of ‘credibility’ is a central component of deterrence theory. In this article, credibility is used as a lens through which to examine the effectiveness of conventional force as a deterrent. An advantage that conventional force enjoys over its nuclear counterpart is that it can be used with much greater discrimination. Conventional threats can, therefore, be considered more politically credible than nuclear threats under all but the most extreme circumstances. Conversely, the relatively modest power of conventional weapons renders their effects ‘interpretable’ to a problematic degree by potential aggressors. Thus, such threats are less likely to be as technically credible as their nuclear equivalents. A range of communicative efforts may serve to reduce the scope for interpreting the effects possible to conventional weapons, although efforts of this kind risk being hampered by cultural obstacles. In consequence, success with conventional deterrence will turn on the ability to identify the speci...

Deterring Conventional Terrorism: From Punishment to Denial and Resilience

Abstract: This article considers the developing role of deterrence in countering conventional terrorist threats, tracing the post-9/11 rejection and later rediscovery of deterrence as a tool of counter-terrorism. Why do so many policymakers assume that the ‘new’ terrorism represented such a break with the past? Why was deterrence neglected as a consequence, under the belief that few terrorists do not aspire to be strategic in their campaigns? To the contrary, this analysis shows that most terrorists are open to attempts at coercion and in particular can be influenced by denial-based strategies. In the case of the United Kingdom, denial-based strategies successfully diverted a potentially crippling campaign of economic dislocation in the 1990s, with lessons for today's challenges. A reinvigorated focus on resilience – physical and societal – as part of a denial-based approach to deterring terrorist attacks, particularly those involving home-grown activists, is recommended. This offers the prospect of time and space ...

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and popular support: counterterrorism towards an insurgency nature

Abstract: The PKK has been a prolonged problem in Turkey, and various measures have been adopted to diminish and end the violence. In addition to the impacts on violence, these policies have also had an impact on public opinion and ethnic awareness of Kurds in Turkey. This article analyzes these policies and their effects on electoral support for the PKK by examining the vote shares of the pro-PKK political parties in national and local elections. It concludes that Turkey has conceptualized the issue solely as a problem of terrorism, but the goal, strategy, organization, and format of violence used by the PKK reflect the nature of an insurgency. Therefore, it is argued that Turkey, by ignoring the insurgency features, has disregarded the legitimate parts of the cause and related popular support, and thus has responded mostly with deterrent measures apart from the reforms of recent years. Results have shown that policies of deterrence culminated in a steady level of support for the PKK indicating that low level of l...

Hybrid Threats, Cyber Warfare and NATO’s Comprehensive Approach for Countering 21st Century Threats – Mapping the New Frontier of Global Risk and Security Management

Abstract: The end of the so-called "Cold War" has seen a change in the nature of present threats and with it to the overall role and mission of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991 also removed the original raison d’etre of the Alliance: the prospect of having to repel a Soviet led attack by the Warsaw Pact on the West.Multimodal, low intensity, kinetic as well as non-kinetic threats to international peace and security including cyber war, low intensity asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, resources security, retrenchment from globalization and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were identified by NATO as so called "Hybrid Threats" (cf BI-SC Input for a New NATO Capstone Concept for The Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Enclosure 1 to 1500/CPPCAM/FCR/10-270038 and 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040, dated 25 August 2010). Having identified this kind of emerging threat, NATO is working on a comprehensive conceptual framework, (the Capstone Concept) which provides the framework for identifying and discussing such threats and possible multi-stakeholder responses. In essence, Hybrid Threats faced by NATO and its non-military partners require a comprehensive approach allowing a wide spectrum of responses, kinetic and non-kinetic by military and non-military actors (see "Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach," dated 4 March 2011, p 1-10, paragraph 1).This short article introduces the reader to a new form of global threat scenario and the possibilities of response and deterrence within their wider legal and political context.