Showing papers on "Economic Justice published in 1978"

Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey

Abstract: Politically and economically, few matters are as important as the taxes people pay to their government. Justice Holmes once described taxes as a mark of the privilege of citizenship in a civilized society, but for most of us it is an unwelcomed burden to be endured. Remote and intangible governmental benefits, vast as they may be, are less likely to be appreciated than the immediate benefits individuals receive for their money in the private market. The issue of the tyranny of taxation without representation provided a significant momentum for the political movement which led to the Declaration of Independence and subsequent formation of the union. The revoluntionaries of the day, with diverse regional, economic, and political backgrounds, were united in their opposition to the new taxes which the British Parliament attempted to impose on the colonies. Two hundred years of population growth accompanied by industrialization, urbanization, and wars have produced crushing tax burdens at a time when the nation and its people are suffering from both high unemployment and high inflation. Randy Hamilton, past president of the American Society for Public Administration, warned the Society's members that as the nation's tax burden approaches 35 per cent of the Gross National Product, the United States should anticipate the same sort of massive taxpayer revolt now being experienced in certain European countries.' The complexities of the tax laws, which leave even the better educated taxpayer confused and bewildered, have added insult to injury. Economists have long been exploring various economic aspects of taxation, including tolerable and maximum levels of taxation; its effects on price stability, economic growth, and unemployment; and the distribution of tax burdens among various groups of taxpayers. This study, on the other hand, is an attempt to explore the tax attitudes of the people who pay taxes to government-directly or indirectly, knowingly or, in some cases, unknowingly. Abstract economic analyses are undoubtedly important to an understanding of tax systems, but of equal importance in a democratic system is the taxpayer's perception, evaluation and compliance with the tax laws.

On the Justice of Earnings: A New Specification of the Justice Evaluation Function

Abstract: This paper describes a new specification of the justice evaluation function. It predicts precisely and unambiguously the kind of injustice (i.e., underreward or overreward) and the degree of injustice associated with given departures from perfect justice. The new justice evaluation function was inducted from extensive analyses of survey data on the perceived justice or injustice of earnings. It is directly generalizable to cover all socially distributed goods, and hence I propose it as a candidate for a universal Law of Justice Evaluation in distributional matters. Finally, I suggest that such a Law of Justice Evaluation performs one of the three tasks essential to a scientific theory of distributive justice.

... and the Desert Shall Rejoice: Conflict, Growth, and Justice in Arid Environments

Abstract: ..".and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose," prophesied Isaiah (35:1), and so it came to pass through the irrigation of arid lands, the diversion of waters, the damming of great rivers. The fruits of the earth have been brought forth in great abundance well beyond the regions known to Isaiah: This book examines irrigation communities in southeastern Spain and in the western United States. The authors' investigation covers past and present water resource institutions and procedures in the "huertas" of Valencia, Murcia-Orihuela, and Alicante in Spain; and in the Kings River service area of the Central Valley of California, northeastern Colorado, and the Utah Valley of teh United States.The book delineates all these settlements in a comparative framework in terms of how they approach such goals as successful conflict resolution, popular participation, local control, economic growth, justice in income distribution, and equity. In some communities these goals are largely complementary and can be pursued as aspects of a single objective. But in most the objectives are competitive, and the authors note the tradeoffs among them that define the distinctive character of the various irrigation communities. Water distribution policies, for example, may in some cases be based on time (seniority of settlement), in others on place (position along the stream). Or such policies may be based on firm legal precedents of long standing or on open community-adopted rules that can fluctuate as widely as the water level itself.More surprising than these differences, however, are the similarities among all these communities, similarities that transcend the passage of time, cultural patterns, technological level, and political ideology. In particular, all these communities have been able to circumvent the imposition of central control by the national government, even though it alone had the capital resources and technical expertise necessary to construct large-scale hydraulic public works. The organized farmers have retained much of their collective independence, whether they were Spaniards defying authoritarian fiats (if not--as in connection with the operation of the Generalisimo Dam near Valencia--dictating their terms), or western Americans finessing federal regulations controlling the use of river waters. As the authors write, "With important variations to be sure, local control has been the dominant characteristic of irrigation in these regions.... In this realm of public activity--and one wonders how many others--formal centralization of authority, where it has occurred, has not meant substantive loss of local control de facto. General administrative, legislative, and judicial norms laid down by higher authorities have not negated customary procedures. The norms have either been too general to accomplish this or they have been ignored by local organizations.... The users, if they are organized, can pretty well call the tune, even where the central government has built the works."The techniques the authors use to compare irrigation operating procedures in these areas today--principally a highly sophisticated computer simulation--enable them to measure the costs and benefits of building water storage and distribution works (which is of special interest to engineers), and of different schedules and methods for applying water to a variety of crops (which is of interest to agricultural scientists).

Chivalry and Paternalism: Disparities of Treatment in the Criminal Justice System:

Abstract: QUALITY of treatment by law, as symbolized by the image of a blindfolded woman balancing the scales of justice, is among the most fundamental principles of American democracy. Equality as a matter of practice, however, has fallen far short of the ideal for much of the criminal justice system in the United States. Differential treatment, based on race, sex, class, education, age, geographical region, or physical appearance, has been accorded individuals and entire groups by the criminal justice system. The two groups that seem to have been most studied as victims of potential and actual discriminatory treatment by the criminal justice system have been racial minorities and the poor. Dramatic inequities related to race and poverty have been especially troubling to the American public in recent years, and a substantial amount of research has been conducted as a result of these concerns.

The Basic Structure as Subject

Abstract: An essential feature of the contractarian conception of justice is that the basic structure of society is the first subject of justice. The contract view begins by trying to work out a theory of justice for this special but plainly very important case; and the conception of justice that results has a certain regulative primacy with respect to the principles and standards appropriate for other cases. The basic structure is understood as the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation. Thus the political constitution, the legally recognized forms of property, and the organization of the economy, and the nature of the family, all belong to the basic structure. The initial objective of the theory is to find a conception, the first principles of which provide reasonable guidelines for the classical and familiar questions of social justice in connection with this complex of institutions. These questions define the data, so to speak, for which the theory seeks an account. There is no attempt to formulate first principles that apply equally to all subjects. Rather, on this view, a theory must develop principles for the relevant subjects step by step in some appropriate sequence.

An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law

Abstract: IN a comprehensive analysis of common law doctrines, Richard Posner1 argues that the precedents established in the law of property, law of contracts, and the law of torts reflect the standard of economic efficiency. This is a surprising finding in view of the vagaries of individual cases and the disparate motives of the judges involved. It is more surprising still when one considers that judicial decisions were couched in the language of morality, fairness, and justice without explicit reference to anything resembling the modern conception of economic efficiency. Two explanations have been offered to account for this phenomenon. The first, relating to judicial motivation, argues either that common law judges tended to prefer efficiency or, at least, that there was no other plausible motivation which could produce an inefficiency bias.2 The chief limitation of this argument is that, while it may be true, it is largely a conjecture about facts that are somewhat difficult to verify. The second explanation looks upon the evolution of common law as a process of natural selection in which efficient rules survive because they will be less prone to challenge by repeated litigation. The argument, made by Rubin3 and amplified by Priest,4 is that the more inefficient a legal rule, the greater the social cost it imposes and, thus, the greater the probability that it will be challenged through litigation since the benefits of litigation versus

Justice and economic distribution

Abstract: I. MAJOR APPROACHES. 1. The Social Contract: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 2. Libertarianism: Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia. 3. Utilitarianism. II. CRITICISMS AND ALTERNATIVES. 4. Merit and Contribution. 5. Property and the Market. 6. Liberalism and Community.

Selecting Cases for Supreme Court Review: An Underdog Model*

Abstract: In making review decisions, Supreme Court justices are predisposed to support underdogs and upperdogs. disproportionately but, also, are motivated to hide any "bias" that may be at work in determining votes.In balancing these two values, justices may be expected to vote their "bias" more frequently (1) when that vote will determine outcome, and (2) when the "bias" will be harder to detect. The latter goal may be served by voting the "bias" more frequently in close cases and less frequently otherwise.In an analysis of the voting patterns of five justices in the decade 1947–56, I found that two liberal and two conservative justices conformed to these expectations. A fifth, or control justice, defined as neither liberal nor conservative, did not pattern his votes in the manner predicted for liberals and conservatives. This relationship held when four projected intervening variables were controlled individually and collectively.

Rawlsian Growth: Dynamic Programming of Capital and Wealth for Intergeneration “Maximin” Justice

Abstract: In modern economics, the traditional standard of justice is undoubtedly utilitarianism. This chapter discusses the Ramsey–Weizsacker model of utilitarian accumulation, which closely resembles Fisher's theory of household saving under zero time preference. If initial capital is short of the capital-saturation Golden Rule path, the normal case, the best available path of equalized utilities would be a stationary state that leaves positive the social rate of return to investment. Then, the sacrifice of a util by the present generation could (be made to) yield an increment of more than a util to any future generation—a utilitarian gain. For an optimum, there must be saving, generation after generation, to drive the capital stock toward the Golden Rule level. Under typical conditions, the necessary consumption restraint will require the austerity of budgetary surpluses—the initial shortfall of capital being, in part, a result of the displacement effect or burden of past deficits or insufficient surpluses.

Aristotle and Theories of Justice

Abstract: Today it is all the rage for political theorists and even philosophers to have theories of justice. Looking back on the history of political thought, we cannot help but notice that not all previous philosophers have taken justice and theories of justice so seriously. Among those who did not was Aristotle. To be sure, he had a theory of justice, and from this fact we might infer that he thought it necessary to have one. But I shall presently argue, primarily from Aristotle's treatment of the problem in the Nicomachean Ethics, that Aristotle thought all theories of justice, including his own, to be unsatisfactory. In his opinion, a politics that understands its highest purpose as justice and a political science that attempts to comprehend all political phenomena within a theory of justice are practically and theoretically unsound.

Machiavelli's Unchristian Charity*

Abstract: The central theoretical chapters of the Prince(chapters 15 ff.) yield forgotten justifications of the road the West has traveled. Machiavelli relieves us of our qualms; in chapter 16, over dangling the carrot; in chapter 17, over brandishing the stick. He thereby lays the moral foundations for societies based, as all modem societies have been, on collective aggrandizement recognizing no limits in principle, and on justice understood as the enforcement of “equal (but otherwise boundless) opportunity.”

Entrepreneurship, Entitlement, and Economic Justice

Abstract: Nozick's entitlement theory of justice plays a crucial role in his carefully and brilliantly crafted case for the minimal state. Acceptance of the theory, it appears, sweeps away with one stroke all those demands for state interference with the market that rest on the claims of distributive justice. The persuasive elegance with which Nozick develops his position can leave few thoughtful, moralist critics of un curbed capitalism unimpressed, at least, by the strong claims which Nozick advances, precisely on the grounds of economic justice, for the free market. It will be the thesis of this paper, how ever, that Nozick's theory of entitlement, im portant though it undoubtedly is for any de fense of the morality of laissez faire, does not at least without significant reformulation solve all the difficulties that may be alleged to exist in respect of the justice of the market. Pursuing this theme, we will offer a suggestion for supplementing (or perhaps reformulating) Nozick's theory which may not only equip it to handle the difficulties to which the paper draws attention, but may, in fact, render its defense of the morality of the market even more straightforward and subject to fewer qualifica tions than Nozick apparently believes to be necessary. Nozick's theory depends, in its application to the market, largely on the view that with few definite exceptions, the market reflects ad herence to the principles of justice both in the original acquisition of holdings (from the natu ral state) and in subsequent transfers of holdings in market transactions. The difficulties to which this paper draws attention pertain to the claim that the market is fully consistent with the principles of justice in transfer. This claim carries conviction, it will be shown, only if we are prepared to incorporate into our entitlement theory certain somewhat novel views concern ing the morality of the entrepreneurial role. But, we will then argue, recognition of this aspect of the entrepreneurial role makes it no longer useful to distinguish, as sharply as Nozick does, between justice in original acquisition, on the one hand, and justice in transfer on the other. So that, while the entitlement theory may, it will turn out, indeed be deployed to defend the morality of the market?and with fewer reservations, perhaps, than in Nozick's own statement?this will have been achieved only through a fairly substantial reformulation of that theory.

Plato and Common Morality

Abstract: In the Republic, Socrates undertakes to defend justice as being in itself a benefit to its possessor. Does he do this, or does he change the subject? In a well-known article, David Sachs pointed out that there seems to be a shift in what Plato is defending. The challenge to Socrates is put by Thrasymachus, who admires the successful unjust man, and by Glaucon and Adeimantus, who do not, but are worried that justice has no adequate defence against Thrasymachus. In all these passages justice is discussed in terms of the non-performance of actions which are regarded as unjust according to common morality; Sachs calls this common concept of ordinary justice ‘vulgar justice’.

Justice for the Underprivileged: The Ombudsman Tradition of Iran

Abstract: FEW societies have placed the ideal of justice on so high a pedestal as has Iran. From Achaemenid through Sasanian and Islamic times it has been extolled as a major, if not the supreme, virtue in a ruler; promptness of retribution and redress has been stipulated as a primary duty, and the equitable treatment of all classes of society has constantly been advanced as the foundation of the economic and political stability of the state. This principle, the \"Circle of Justice,\" is the keynote of the Mirrors for Princes literature,1 which furnishes innumerable examples of the ruler (usually Nushirawan the Just, i.e., Chosroes I, A.D. 531-79) not only as the fountainhead of justice in general, but as the redresser of particular wrongs and the protector of the rights of the individual subject against the transgressions of the powerful and of his own administrators. For every unjust action committed in his name, whether he was aware of it or not, was a dereliction of his divinely delegated responsibility, to be made good before the Supreme Judge should call him to account; he was thus expected not only to tolerate but positively to welcome the advice of a minister on how best to govern, and the implied criticism of a wronged subject appealing for redress. This noble theory is obviously fallible in practice. The ruler cannot be everywhere at once; he cannot be expected to burrow through impacted bureaucratic strata to ferret out an unfair subordinate or system, and the subject himself may be prevented from appealing in person by ignorance or intimidation. In the words of the late Edward Kracke: \"In most cultures the myths of royal justice seem to precede the practical petitioning devices for which they prepared the way.\"2 One such early device was a drum, or more commonly a bell, set up outside the ruler's court so that any petitioner could call attention to his case. Such arrangements are reported of China in the second century B.C.; of Iran under the Sasanian kings; and later in India, Japan, and Thailand.3 But this smacks rather of a public relations stunt than a practical and universal mechanism of appeal. A similar device also widely attested-the sealed complaints box, with a slot for written petitions-is open to abuse by becoming a receptacle for malicious anonymous denunciations.4 A truly practical and impartial appeals system requires an intermediary official or officials to encourage, verify, assess, and present complaints. Such a system did evolve in China, from a corps of imperial investigators concerned with

Dike as a Moral Term in Homer and Hesiod

Abstract: M UCH has been written about the meaning of the word dike in early Greek poetry, but there is no agreement about its meaning. One feature common to a number of very different accounts of the meaning of the term, however, is the belief that dike and adikia and their cognates are devoid of moral significance. Thus Kurt Latte says that the term is not employed for moral evaluation in Homer.' Lionel Pearson in his Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece says of the words themis and dike in Homer: "The language of the Homeric poems ... definitely forbids the conclusion that the words mean anything like 'natural law' or 'self-evident justice.' In due time, as later literature shows, these concrete words become abstract and acquire ethical implications."2 E. A. Havelock, in a paper whose thesis is that the term dikaiosune was introduced into Greek in the mid-fifth century, writes that the appearance of the word "marks the beginning of the internalization of a moral conception hitherto viewed from a purely social and external point of view."3 On this thesis, dike is not a moral term. In two articles tracing the history of the word dike from Homer to the early fifth century, Michael Gagarin has argued that in Homer and Hesiod dike can mean "characteristic" or "characteristic behavior" or "settlement" or "legal process," and that the word remains primarily a legal term without general moral application at least until 480 B.C.4 An even more radical analysis of the meaning of (like and (likaios is that of V. A. Rodgers, who maintains that, until Plato, (like is that which avoids disaster and the (likaios is the man who avoids disaster.5 It is the belief that (like, adikia, and their cognates are devoid of moral significance in Homer and Hesiod against which I wish to argue in this article. My strategy will be to set out what seem to me to be the two main theoretical objections to (like's having moral significance, to counter them, and then to examine a number of passages in Homer and Hesiod in which, I shall argue, dike should properly be translated by "justice" or "righteousness." In so doing I shall try to demonstrate that Gagarin's assertion that dike in these passages means "settlement" or "legal process" is mistaken. Finally, I shall address the fallacy on which Rodgers' conclusions about the meaning of dike and dikaios rest.

A Critique of Diversionary Juvenile Justice

Abstract: The increasingly zealous support today for diversion of youth from the juvenile justice system is a consequence of several widely held notions: (1) Traditional strategies for dealing with juvenile offenders have not worked; ( 2) informal diversion is used both widely and effectively now; and (3) the most humane treatment of troubled youth is based upon the parens patriae philosophy of justice. Yet, the authors contend, diversion may be seen as potentially dangerous and harmful, and they present several arguments against expansion of diversionary services: (1) The concept's ambiguity allows many to promote expansion of the juvenile justice system in the form of diversion "to" other programs, while true diversion "from" the system is nonexistent; (2) the goals of diversionary programs-such as elimination of stigmatizing labels and formal duplica tion of existing informal processes-are unattainable; (3) formal diversion is incompatible with due process ideals. Until these difficulties have been resolved, div...

Anarchy and Social Choice: Reflections on the International Polity

Abstract: The concept “social choice” provides a means of injecting new life into systemic analyses of the international polity. Bargaining, organized warfare, and coercive diplomacy are the most important mechanisms of social choice in the international polity. Third-party settlement is of lesser importance, though not irrelevant. Each of these mechanisms is evaluated in terms of criteria such as decisiveness, efficiency, justice, and the production of externalities. Systems of rights and rules serve to constrain processes of social choice, but they are also apt to become focal points of such processes themselves.

The Chief Justices and Self-Assignment of Majority Opinions: a Research Note

Abstract: T HE IMPORTANCE of the phenomenon of judicial opinion assignment has often been alluded to by jurists and public law scholars, yet opinion assignment decisions have only rarely been subjected to empirical investigation.' Nevertheless, it is in the majority opinions of the Supreme Court where controlling constitutional principles are established and broader policy directives beyond the immediate case are often fashioned. The answer to the question of, "Who speaks for the Court?" has myriad implications beyond the most obvious issue of what is the status of a lower court decision. "Should the Court's opinion be placed on one ground rather than another, or upon two grounds instead of one? Should the opinion deal narrowly with the issues, disposing of the case and doing no more? Or should it survey the issues with depth and breadth implanting seed from which new constitutional and legal doctrine can grow?"2 In assigning majority opinions in all cases in which he votes with the majority, the Chief Justice is in a unique position to affect the content of the opinions that emerge by choosing the Court's spokesman. Beyond the Chiefs ability to structure the opportunities of his colleagues, however, his potential for self-assignment of "desirable" cases augments his power even further. The exercise of this potential power for self-assignment is, in fact, encouraged by the Chiefs colleagues because of the symbolic nature of the Chieftainship. Thus, as Justice John H. Clarke put it a few years after his retirement, "The great cases are written, as they should be, by the Chief Justice."3 Similarly, Felix Frankfurter asserted more recently that the Chief Justice must recognize '... the importance of the Chief Justiceship as a symbol. For there are occasions when an opinion should carry the extra weight which pronouncement by the Chief Justice gives."4 The Chief Justice's opinion assignment prerogative and the potential for selfassignment of desirable cases fit squarely in the theoretical framework of a "policy oriented Justice" as described by Walter Murphy. "By this term I mean a Justice who is aware of the impact which judicial decisions can have on public policy, realizes the leeway for discretion which his office permits, and is willing to take advantage of this power and leeway to further particular policy aims."5 Clearly, an

The normative foundations of social theory: An essay on the criteria defining social economics *

Abstract: All economic theorists believe their theories to be oriented toward explanations of human economic behavior. And since human beings are always and everywhere found only in social groups, all econom...