Showing papers on "Legislature published in 2010"

Politics and Administration: A Study in Government

Abstract: The conventional model for explaining the uniqueness of American democracy is its division between executive, legislative, and judicial functions It was the great contribution of Frank J Goodnow to codify a less obvious, but no less profound element: the distinction between politics and policies, principles and operations He showed how the United States went beyond a nation based on government by gentlemen and then one based on the spoils system brought about by the Jacksonian revolt against the Eastern Establishment, into a government that separated political officials from civil administratorsGoodnow contends that the civil service reformers persuasively argued that the separation of administration from politics, far from destroying the democratic links with the people, actually served to enhance democracy While John Rohr, in his outstanding new introduction carefully notes loopholes in the theoretical scaffold of Goodnow's argument, he is also careful to express his appreciation of the pragmatic ground for this new sense of government as needing a partnership of the elected and the appointedGoodnow was profoundly influenced by European currents, especially the Hegelian As a result, the work aims at a political philosophy meant to move considerably beyond the purely pragmatic needs of government For it was the relationships, the need for national unity in a country that was devised to account for and accommodate pluralism and diversity, that attracted Goodnow's legal background and normative impulses alike That issues of legitimacy and power distribution were never entirely resolved by Goodnow does not alter the fact that this is perhaps the most important work, along with that of James Bryce, to emerge from this formative period to connect processes of governance with systems of democracy

The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress

Abstract: To what extent is party loyalty a liability for incumbent legislators? Past research on legislative voting and elections suggests that voters punish members who are ideologically “out of step” with their districts. In seeking to move beyond the emphasis in the literature on the effects of ideological extremity on legislative vote share, we examine how partisan loyalty can adversely affect legislators' electoral fortunes. Specifically, we estimate the effects of each legislator's party unity—the tendency of a member to vote with his or her party on salient issues that divide the two major parties—on vote margin when running for reelection. Our results suggest that party loyalty on divisive votes can indeed be a liability for incumbent House members. In fact, we find that voters are not punishing elected representatives for being too ideological; they are punishing them for being too partisan.

Legislative Malfeasance and Political Accountability

Abstract: Utilizing a unique data set from the Italian Ministry of Justice reporting the transmission to the Chamber of Deputies of more than the thousand requests for the removal of parliamentary immunity from deputies suspected of criminal wrongdoing, the authors analyze the political careers of members of the Chamber during the first eleven postwar legislatures (1948–94). They find that judicial investigation typically did not discourage deputies from standing for reelection in Italy's large multimember electoral districts. They also show that voters did not punish allegedly malfeasant legislators with loss of office until the last (Eleventh) legislature in the sample. To account for the dramatic change in voter behavior that occurred in the early 1990s, the investigation focuses on the roles of the judiciary and the press. The results are consistent with a theory that a vigilant and free press is a necessary condition for political accountability in democratic settings. An independent judiciary alone is ineffective in ensuring electoral accountability if the public is not informed of political malfeasance.

Constituents’ Responses to Congressional Roll‐Call Voting

Abstract: Do citizens hold their representatives accountable for policy decisions, as commonly assumed in theories of legislative politics? Previous research has failed to yield clear evidence on this question for two reasons: measurement error arising fromnoncomparableindicatorsoflegislators’andconstituents’preferencesandpotentialsimultaneitybetweenconstituents’ beliefs about and approval of their representatives. Two new national surveys address the measurement problem directly by asking respondents how they would vote and how they think their representatives voted on key roll-call votes. Using the actual votes, we can, in turn, construct instrumental variables that correct for simultaneity. We find that the American electorate responds strongly to substantive representation. (1) Nearly all respondents have preferences over important bills before Congress. (2) Most constituents hold beliefs about their legislators’ roll-call votes that reflect both the legislators’ actual behavior and the parties’ policy reputations. (3) Constituents use those beliefs to hold their legislators accountable.

Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament

Abstract: Recent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is to co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence in a national legislature. While co-option theory generates a number of predictions for delegate behavior within an authoritarian parliament, the opacity of such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem by exploiting the transcripts of query sessions in the Vietnamese National Assembly, where delegates question the Prime Minister and Cabinet Members on important issues of the day. Using a content analysis of queries, we offer the first empirical test of delegate behavior in non-democratic parliaments. We find that some delegates exhibit behavior consistent with co-option theory by actively participating in sessions, demonstrating criticism of authorities, and responding to the needs of local constituents. Such responsiveness, however, is parameterized by regime rules for nominating, electing, and assigning parliamentary responsibilities to individual delegates.

Political Power and Women's Representation in Latin America

Abstract: 1. Introduction: A Theory of Women's Political Representation 2. Descriptive Representation: Electing Women in Latin America 3. Preferences and Priorities: Gender and the Political Attitudes of Legislators 4. Making Policy: Bill Sponsorship, Cosponsorship, and Debates 5. Taking Charge: Leadership and Committees 6. Working in the District: Home Style 7. Symbolic Representation: Evoking Support for the Political System CONCLUSION: WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN LATIN AMERICAN LEGISLATURES APPENDIX A: DATA COLLECTION APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE APPENDIX C: VARIABLE CODING FOR SURVEY ANALYSES APPENDIX D: COMMITTEES IN ARGENTINA, COLOMBIA, AND COSTA RICA NOTES REFERENCES INDEX

Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament

Abstract: Recent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is to co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence in a national legislature. Although cooptation theory generates a number of predictions for delegate behavior within an authoritarian parliament, the opacity of such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem by exploiting the transcripts of query sessions in the Vietnamese National Assembly, where delegates question the prime minister and Cabinet members on important issues of the day. Using a content analysis of queries, we offer the first empirical test of delegate behavior in nondemocratic parliaments. We find that some delegates exhibit behavior consistent with cooptation theory by actively participating in sessions, demonstrating criticism of authorities, and responding to the needs of local constituents. Such responsiveness, however, is parameterized by regime rules for nominating, electing, and assigning parliamentary responsibilities to individual delegates.

A Theory of Military Dictatorships

Abstract: We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. The elite may build a strong military and make the concessions neces - sary for the military to behave as their perfect agent, or they may risk the military turning against them. Once the transition to democ - racy takes place, a strong military poses a threat against the nascent democratic regime until it is reformed. We study the role of income inequality and natural resources in the emergence of military dicta - torships and show how the national defense role of the military may facilitate democratic consolidation. (JEL D72, H56)

Legal Framework of the Water Sector in Vietnam

Abstract: Since 1986 and especially during the early 90s, environmental protection has become a constitutional principle in Vietnam as regulated by Articles 17 and 29 of the 1992 Constitution. The first Law on Environmental Protection, passed by the National Assembly on December 27, 1993 created a foundation for environmental legislation becoming an important field in Vietnam’s legal system. In the following, in January 1999, Vietnam enacted its very first Law on Water Resources (No. 08/1998/QH10) aiming to provide a foundational framework for managing the water sector in Vietnam. In recent years, the legislative framework on water resources management has further developed. Important water-related Government decrees, decisions and circulars on the guidance and implementation of the Law on Water Resources have been issued and often amended to meet the requirements of the country’s development, and its international integration. To date, Vietnam’s legislation on the water sector consists of a complex system of legal documents issued by different state agencies. Like in other legal fields, the groundwork of the legislation for the water sector is many-faceted. Though legislation of water sector management in Vietnam has greatly improved during the last decade, it has obviously not yet come to full fruition. Hence, this paper intends to analyze contradictions, gaps and overlaps of the current Law on Water Resources with other related laws/ordinances and secondary regulations that have bared themselves in the implementation process. Furthermore, the main aim of the study is to clarify and determine the need for a new comprehensive Law on Water Resources.

Women and States: Norms and Hierarchies in International Society

Abstract: Momentous changes in the relation between women and the state have advanced women's status around the globe. Women were barred from public affairs a century ago, yet almost every state now recognizes equal voting rights and exhibits a national policy bureau for the advancement of women. Sex quotas for national legislatures are increasingly common. Ann E. Towns explains these changes by providing a novel account of how norms work in international society. She argues that norms don't just provide standards for states, they rank them, providing comparative judgments which place states in hierarchical social orders. This focus on the link between norms and ranking hierarchies helps to account better for how a new policy, such as equality for women in public life, is spread around the world. Women and States thus offers a new view of the relationship between women and the state, and of the influence of norms in international politics.

Selection Effects in Roll Call Votes

Abstract: An increasing number of studies comparing legislatures relies on analyses of roll call votes. These analyses are used to infer characteristics of the way in which the legislature works and how their members vote. These inferences are problematic, however, if not all votes in parliament are recorded or the recorded votes are systematically distinct from the rest of the votes. Neglecting the way in which roll call votes are triggered or decided may result in selection bias. In this paper I discuss these problems of selection bias regarding various rules employed in legislatures which may lead to roll call votes. I then present evidence for these selection biases from a unique source of electronically recorded votes, namely all votes decided on between 1995 and 2003 in the Swiss lower house. A careful analysis illustrates to what extent commonly used figures on party discipline are biased because of the selective nature of roll call votes. I also propose a simple way how to correct for these biases, which performs adequately well.

Medicare Hospital Readmissions: Issues, Policy Options and PPACA

Abstract: Reductions in hospital readmissions (also referred to as rehospitalizations) have been identified by Congress and President Obama as a source for reducing Medicare spending. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) reported that in 2005, 17.6% of hospital admissions resulted in readmissions within 30 days of discharge, 11.3% within 15 days, and 6.2% within 7 days. In addition, variation in readmission rates by hospital and geographic region suggests that some hospitals and geographic areas are better than others at containing readmission rates. People who are readmitted to the hospital tend, among other things, to be older and have multiple chronic illnesses. Yet much is unknown about which patient characteristics result in a higher probability of a hospital readmission. Some policy researchers and health care practitioners assert that the relatively high readmission rates for patients with chronic illness and others may be due to various factors, such as (1) an inadequate relay of information by hospital discharge planners to patients, caregivers, and post-acute care providers; (2) poor patient compliance with care instructions; (3) inadequate follow-up care from post-acute and long-term care providers; (4) variation in hospital bed supply; (5) insufficient reliance on family caregivers; (6) the deterioration of a patient's clinical condition; and (7) medical errors. Although readmitting a patient to a hospital may be appropriate in some cases, some policy makers and researchers agree that reducing readmission rates could help contain Medicare costs and improve the quality of patient care. Although several entities have attempted to define just how many readmissions might be prevented, no consensus exists on how to distinguish among those readmissions that might be avoided and those that might not. Different approaches result in different potentially preventable readmission (PPR) rates. The legislation contains a number of provisions that make changes to Medicare. Among these are provisions intended to reduce preventable hospital readmissions by reducing Medicare payments to certain hospitals with relatively high preventable readmissions rates. Other provisions include demonstrations and pilots that test reforms to the Medicare payment system for hospitals and other providers. And still others test improvements to patient care for people with chronic illnesses during the initial hospital stay, as patients transition out of the hospital, and while patients reside in home, community-based, Medicare post-acute care, and long-term care settings. Some service delivery and financing reform strategies have the potential to improve the quality of care delivered to Medicare beneficiaries with chronic conditions, and may …

The Informal Politics of Legislation: Explaining Secluded Decision-Making in the European Union

Abstract: This paper investigates a widespread yet understudied trend in EU politics: the de facto shift of legislative decision-making from public inclusive to informal secluded arenas, and the subsequent adoption of legislation at first reading. Since its formal introduction in 1999, “fast-track legislation” has become ever more frequent, accounting for 72% of adopted codecision files in the last parliamentary term. Our paper analyses this puzzling trend and explains under what conditions informal decision-making is likely to occur. Competing and equifinal expectations are drawn from rational choice and sociological institutionalism. Based on institutionalist delegation theory and power-based distributive bargaining, we argue that informalisation saves the transaction costs of multi-party negotiation, and hinges on a legislative act’s issue-properties. By contrast, based on sociological institutionalism, we argue that informal decision-making results from the emulation of tested decision-rules, and from socialisation into habitual procedural choice and inter-organisational cooperation. We test our hypotheses on a data set of all 797 codecision files negotiated between mid-1999 and mid-2009. First, our analysis suggests that informalisation and seclusion are systematically related to an increase in participants, legislative workload and issue complexity. These findings back a functionalist argument, emphasising the transaction costs of intra-organisational coordination and information-gathering. Second, given that even redistributive and salient acts are regularly decided informally, we find little support for a rationalist argument, stressing the role of public interest in, and political opposition to, a legislative file. Finally, we find strong evidence for the impact of the time fast-track legislation has been in use. This finding confirms the sociological expectation that links informal and secluded decision-making to local positive feedback at the intra-organisational level, and to sustained cooperation at the inter-organisational level.

Legislative Success in a Small World: Social Network Analysis and the Dynamics of Congressional Legislation

Abstract: We examine the social network structure of Congress from 1973 to 2004. We treat two Members of Congress as directly linked if they have cosponsored at least one bill together. We then construct explicit networks for each year using data from all forms of legislation, including resolutions, public and private bills, and amendments. We show that Congress exemplifies the characteristics of a “small world” network and that the varying small-world properties during this time period are related to the number of important bills passed.

Managing Dissent in a Post-genocide Environment: The Challenge of Political Space in Rwanda

Abstract: This article analyses how political space, defined here as the ability of actors other than the government to critically engage in debate on government policy and practice, is being constituted in post-genocide Rwanda. Using evidence from interviews with civil society activists and examples from the Rwandan Government's post-genocide policies, it explores the kind of political space which results from an interplay of potentially competing influences. These include the promotion of a liberal approach to democracy, favoured by many of Rwanda's donors, and a more tightly-managed and limited transition which is both preferred by and beneficial for the RPF Government. The article shows that although space could be seen in some areas as opening, this trend is hampered by government actions, including legislative and shadow methods, by donor reluctance to pressure the ruling RPF and by fear within civil society of tackling politically sensitive issues. In conclusion, the author suggests that this fear is reinforced by government policies which narrow perceptions of political space, exacerbated by perceived abandonment of civil society by donors, and that in combination these factors pose a long-term challenge to more openly contested politics in Rwanda.

Private Members' Bills in the UK Parliament: Is There an ‘Electoral Connection’?

Abstract: Private Members' Bills are a small but significant part of the UK parliament's legislative work. Many are proposed but few pass into law. This article argues that Private Members' legislation has a broad analogy to constituency service behaviour. In making legislative proposals MPs can cast themselves as active and caring representatives and, in consequence, MPs who make proposals receive a small but significant increase in vote share. This electoral connection also prompts MPs from more marginal seats to be more active in proposing Private Members' Bills.

Government Spending and Legislative Organization: Quasi-experimental Evidence from Germany

Abstract: In this paper we present empirical evidence that council size has a positive efiect on government spending. We use data of 2056 municipalities in the German state of Bavaria over a time period of 22 years. In particular, we make use of law-induced changes in the council size, triggered by slight changes in population size (\one more inhabitant"), to identify a causal relationship between council size and spending. The regressiondiscontinuity design, thereby, circumvents problems of endogeneity of previous studies. The paper also shows that (i) politically strong mayors do not break the relationship between the size of government and council size, (ii) municipalities rely on property taxes (rather than public debt) to flnance pork-barrel spending, and (iii) political fragmentation does not magnify the pro-spending bias inherent to legislature size.

Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State

Abstract: The implications of European integration for national democracy and constitutionalism are well known. Nevertheless, as the events of the last decade made clear, the EU's complex system of governance has been unable to achieve a democratic or constitutional legitimacy in its own right. In Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation-State, Peter L. Lindseth traces the roots of this paradox to integration's dependence on the postwar constitutional settlement of administrative governance on the national level. Supranational policymaking has relied on various forms of oversight from national constitutional bodies, following models that were first developed in the administrative state and then translated into the European context. These national oversight mechanisms (executive, legislative, and judicial) have over the last half-century developed to address the central disconnect in the integration process: between the need for supranational regulatory power, on the one hand, and the persistence of national constitutional legitimacy, on the other. In defining the ways European public law has sought to reconcile these two conflicting demands, Professor Lindseth lays the foundation for a better understanding of the "administrative, not constitutional" nature of European governance going forward.

Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions

Abstract: Modern legislatures delegate policy-making authority to the bureaucracy because bureaucrats possess greater capacity to engineer solutions to complex policy problems than lawmakers (Bawn 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002). Scholarship on the lawmaking system in the United States emphasizes that such delegation creates problems for the U.S. Congress when it comes to maintaining control over public policy. In particular, when an agency creates a policy that is different from what a majority of lawmakers in Congress intended when delegating authority, antimajoritarian rules in the U.S. Constitution, as well as antimajoritarian congressional procedures, usually make it impossible for congressional majorities to force agencies to alter the policy (Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989). Therefore, Congress is viewed as potentially sacrificing influence over policy to the executive branch in exchange for technical expertise. Of course, members of Congress pursue strategies to limit the loss of control over policy. Through oversight (Aberbach 1990), the limitation of discretion (Huber and Shipan 2002), and the design of the circumstances under which bureaucrats make policy decisions (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987; Moe 1989)— especially when there is policy disagreement between Congress and the president (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Lewis 2003; Wood and Bohte 2004)— lawmak

Democracy and good governance: Nigerias dilemma

Abstract: Despite its enormous resources and huge potentialities, Nigeria remains grossly undeveloped. Consequently, political instability, abject poverty, acute youth unemployment, heightened crime rate, poor health prospects and widespread malnourishment have been the main features of Nigeria’s political economy. The development tragedy in Nigeria fits into the trends of political instability for which Africa has become infamous for in the past three decades. This further lends credence to the arguments by some students of African politics that governance is one of the major problems in Africa. This paper argues that the problem of development in Nigeria is a problem of governance; when defined in term of the proper, fair and equitable allocation of resources for the achievement of the end or purposes of the state, which is the promotion of the common good. The paper submits that for good governance to be feasible in Nigeria, sound anti-corruption policies devoid of mere speeches must be put in place. Furthermore, the paper recommends a functional legislature, a viable and independent judiciary, and the attitudinal transformation on the part of the political elite, the absence of which good governance and development will continue to be a mirage. Key words: Corruption, instability, underdevelopment, democracy, good governance.

Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European Parliament committees:

Abstract: This paper explains how institutional conditions in the European Parliament’s committees shape lobbyists’ strategic behaviour. Committees’ informal organization and formal procedures structure both the distribution of legislative influence and the opportunity to obtain advocacy. It is demonstrated how influence and, by implication, lobbying activity are skewed in favour of a committee elite. Here new evidence is provided to highlight the significant impact that open amendments play in a committee’s final report. The theory also emphasizes the role that message quality plays in the decision about who to lobby, and defines the limits to lobbyists’ preference to obtain advocacy from friendly legislators. Analysis is carried out on data obtained from 94 structured interviews combined with a unique data set of committee-stage voting outcomes.

Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament

Abstract: preferences, we explore the hypothesis that backbenchers’ preferences constrain the ministerial selection process in a manner that mitigates agency problems. Specifically, promotion is distributed preferentially to members whose own policy preferences are proximate to the uncovered set of all party members’ preferences. Our analysis of ministerial appointments in the contemporary British Parliament supports this view. For both the Labour and Conservative parties, front bench appointments are more sensitive to the collective preferences of backbenchers in each party as measured by the party uncovered set than to the preferences of the parties’ leaders. M odern parliamentary government is at once cabinet government and party government. It is cabinet government in that the legislative agenda is set by majority party leaders negotiating in private rather than by members voting on the chamber floor. It is party government in that backbenchers generally operate as members of disciplined and programmatic organizations, not as free agents. These two aspects of parliamentary government are intimately

A Bridge to Somewhere: Mapping State and Congressional Ideology on a Cross-institutional Common Space

Abstract: second, even when such data exist, scaling ideal points within a single state is an inadequate approach. No comparisons can be made between these estimates and those for other state legislatures or for Congress. our project provides a solution. We exploit a new comparative dataset of state legislative roll calls to generate ideal points for legislators. taking advantage of the fact that state legislators sometimes go on to serve in Congress, we create a common ideological scale. Using these bridge actors, we estimate state legislative ideal points in congressional common space for 11 states. We present our results and illustrate how these scores can be used to address important topics in state and legislative politics.

Bicameral Politics in the European Union

Abstract: The literature on legislative decision-making and bargaining in the EU has reached a common conclusion that the European Parliament (Parliament) and the Council of the European Union (Council) are on an equal footing in the main legislative procedure, the co-decision procedure. We present theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that this is not the case. First, our analysis of the formal rules reveals that the Council has conditional agenda-setting power due to a change in the majority thresholds for adopting legislation from the first to the second reading in the Parliament. This change has important implications for the internal dynamics of the Parliament and its institutional powers vis-a-vis the Council. Testing these analytical considerations of the formal decision rules against voting data on all co-decision legislation adopted in the two institutions between 1999 and 2004, our empirical findings show that: first, from 1999 to 2004 coalition formation in the Council fell predominantly along the traditional left–right political dimensions when negotiating co-decision proposals. Second, when disagreement over legislation is recorded in the Council, a strong divide can also be found in the Parliament. Third, when the Parliament is divided along party political lines, it is less likely to be able to meet the absolute majority requirement for amending the proposal adopted by the Council. Lastly, Parliament amendments are most likely to be adopted when a decision by voting is requested by a party group associated with the main ideological contingency in the Council.

Look who’s talking: Parliamentary debate in the European Union:

Abstract: Legislative speeches are an important part of parliamentary activity in the European Parliament (EP). Using a new dataset on EP speeches, this paper offers an explanation for participation in legislative debates. We argue that floor speeches partially serve as a communication tool between members of parliament, their national parties, and their European political groups. EP group dissidents often go on record by taking the floor when there is a conflict between their national party and their European political group. In this instance, members give speeches for two reasons: to explain their national party’s position to other members of their EP political group, and to create a positive record for themselves in the eyes of the national party to serve their own reelection purposes.

When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey’s Iraq Decision

Abstract: Turkey’s decision on its role in the Iraq war in 2003 illustrates the power—and limits—of parliaments as actors in foreign policy Traditionally, assemblies are not seen as important players in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies Instead, cabinets are generally considered the chief policymaking authorities If the government enjoys a parliamentary majority, legislatures typically support the cabinet, if they are brought into the process at all The March 1, 2003 vote by the Turkish parliament to not allow the United States to use Turkey as a base for the Iraq invasion challenges this conventional wisdom on parliamentary influence (in addition to many interest-based explanations of foreign policy) This paper examines this decision in the context of the role of parliaments in foreign policies and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intraparty politics, and public opinion

After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War

Abstract: When the United States goes to war, the nation's attention focuses on the president. As commander in chief, a president reaches the zenith of power, while Congress is supposedly shunted to the sidelines once troops have been deployed abroad. Because of Congress's repeated failure to exercise its legislative powers to rein in presidents, many have proclaimed its irrelevance in military matters. After the Rubicon challenges this conventional wisdom by illuminating the diverse ways in which legislators influence the conduct of military affairs. Douglas L. Kriner reveals that even in politically sensitive wartime environments, individual members of Congress frequently propose legislation, hold investigative hearings, and engage in national policy debates in the public sphere. These actions influence the president's strategic decisions as he weighs the political costs of pursuing his preferred military course. Marshalling a wealth of quantitative and historical evidence, Kriner expertly demonstrates the full extent to which Congress materially shapes the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions and sheds new light on the timely issue of interbranch relations.

Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process

Abstract: In parliamentary democracies, the transfer of power from one government to the next is sometimes characterized by long periods of negotiations in which party leaders bargain over the composition and policy objectives of a new cabinet. Although these delays can have substantial political and economic consequences, surprisingly little is known about their determinants. Moreover, the few studies that exist reach contradictory conclusions. In this article, the author examines how factors relating to uncertainty and bargaining complexity influence the duration of the government formation process in 16 West European countries from 1944 to 1998. In line with the article’s theoretical expectations, the author finds that factors increasing uncertainty over the type of cabinet that is acceptable always lead to delays in forming governments but that factors increasing bargaining complexity, such as the number of parties and ideological polarization in the legislature, only do so when there is sufficient uncertainty ...

Governors and "Their" Deputies: New Legislative Principals in Mexico

Abstract: Many studies on legislatures around the world have not detected a regional voting dimension. Yet governors are often important political figures and can exert strong influence on state politicians. From an analysis of the Mexican legislature, I determine that governors hold important resources that ambitious politicians need in a system with no consecutive reelection. Mexican governors use their power over federal deputies to prod their agents, the caucus leaders, into working for their states' interests on fiscally relevant issues, especially the annual budget. On all other issues, the governors delegate their deputies' votes to the party's legislative leadership.

Unified Government, Bill Approval, and the Legislative Weight of the President

Abstract: This article proposes a new approach to measuring the legislative weight of the president and Congress based on the approval of each actor’s legislative agenda. The authors focus on presidential systems where presidents possess both formal authority to introduce their own bills and a variety of prerogatives to influence the passage of legislation. The authors argue that the legislative weight of the president varies over time in response to contextual political variables. After devising a general model to measure changes in the legislative weight of the president vis-a-vis Congress, the authors empirically test their propositions using data from Argentina. The results indicate that the policy and productivity weights of the president actually increase in the absence of unified government.