Showing papers on "Managerial economics published in 2013"
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors review experimental studies that examine the influence of economic incentives on behavioral and experimental economics, and clarify the relationship of the research reviewed here to classical research in behavioral and Experimental economics.
Abstract: Mainstream analysis of economic behavior assumes that economic incentives can shape behavior even when individual agents have limited understanding of the environment (see related arguments in Nash2, 1950; Smith3, 1962). The shaping process in these cases is indirect: The economic incentives determine the agents’ experience, and this experience in turn drives future behavior. Consider, for example, an agent that has to decide whether to cross the road at a particular location and time. The agent (say a chicken) is not likely to understand the exact incentive structure and compute the implied equilibria. Rather, the agent is likely to rely on experience with similar situations. The economic environment shapes this decision because it determines the relevant experience. The current chapter reviews experimental studies that examine this shaping process. In order to clarify the relationship of the research reviewed here to classical research in behavioral and experimental economics it is constructive to consider the distinction
157 citations
TL;DR: System economics as mentioned in this paper is a new direction in economic theory based on a view of economic processes as the creation, operation, interaction and transformation of economic systems, which allows to represent economy functioning as a structural model of economic goods circulation.
Abstract: In this article the concept of system economics — a new direction in economic theory based on a view of economic processes as the creation, operation, interaction and transformation of economic systems — has been developed. The co-ordinated basic typology of economic systems, goods, processes, and management operations, which allows to represent economy functioning as a structural model of economic goods circulation, has been proposed. Potential directions of system economics application as a conceptual platform for progress in solving current tasks of modern economic theory have been defined.
36 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: Shogren et al. as discussed by the authors presented an overview of the relationships among the three subdisciplines of energy economics, resource economics, and environmental economics, which is the only reference work that can serve as a tool for unifying and systematizing research and analysis in business, universities, and government.
Abstract: Every decision about energy involves its price and cost. The price of gasoline and the cost of buying from foreign producers; the price of nuclear and hydroelectricity and the costs to our ecosystems; the price of electricity from coal-fired plants and the cost to the atmosphere. Giving life to inventions, lifestyle changes, geopolitical shifts, and things in-between, energy economics is of high interest to Academia, Corporations and Governments. For economists, energy economics is one of three subdisciplines which, taken together, compose an economic approach to the exploitation and preservation of natural resources: energy economics, which focuses on energy-related subjects such as renewable energy, hydropower, nuclear power, and the political economy of energy; resource economics, which covers subjects in land and water use, such as mining, fisheries, agriculture, and forests; and, environmental economics, which takes a broader view of natural resources through economic concepts such as risk, valuation, regulation, and distribution Although the three are closely related, they are not often presented as an integrated whole. This Encyclopedia has done just that by unifying these fields into a high-quality and unique overview. The only reference work that codifies the relationships among the three subdisciplines: energy economics, resource economics and environmental economics. Understanding these relationships just became simpler! Nobel Prize Winning Editor-in-Chief (joint recipient 2007 Peace Prize), Jason Shogren, has demonstrated excellent team work again, by coordinating and steering his Editorial Board to produce a cohesive work that guides the user seamlessly through the diverse topics. This work contains in equal parts information from and about business, academic, and government perspectives and is intended to serve as a tool for unifying and systematizing research and analysis in business, universities, and government.
32 citations
TL;DR: In a recent article using citation analysis Hoepner et al. as mentioned in this paper show that their work is biased by its framing, far from the non-subjective approach they claim and highly sensitive to minor data errors.
17 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used data from the Major League Baseball (MLB) to identify the manager who made the acquisition decision and observe the player retention decisions of the subsequent manager (the manager who did not acquire the player).
Abstract: I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION Previous research indicates that management changes are important events for organizations, partly because they lead to reversals of poor prior decisions, (1) However, this research begs the question of why it may be necessary to replace the manager in order to bring about such changes. In this article, we test for evidence of loss aversion and distinguish between loss aversion and agency costs as explanations for why managers "hang on" to poorly performing assets or employees they were instrumental in acquiring or hiring. The study contributes to the literature on managerial decisions and to the sports economics literature. It may be necessary to replace managers if their investment decisions are affected by loss aversion. As Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2010) point out, avoiding admission of mistakes is a common human trait. Once we have committed time or energy to a cause, it seems to be nearly impossible to convince us that the cause is unworthy. Psychological aversion to admitting mistakes is related to loss aversion and reflects a cognitive bias. The manager fails to see the problem or discounts negative experience as non-representative. Agency costs provide an alternative explanation for why it may be necessary to replace managers to rectify prior mistakes. Agency costs arise when an agent (e.g., a manager) acts in his/her own interest but not in the interest of the principal (e.g., the firm owner). In the presence of asymmetric information, managers may have incentives to disguise or conceal poor decisions to avoid negative consequences such as reduced marketability as a manager, demotion, or termination. This concern with career and reputation can lead to overlooking inefficiencies, including asset underperformance and overpayment for the underperforming assets. Using three decades of data on managerial and player turnover in Major League Baseball (MLB), we: (1) estimate the tendency of incumbent managers to hold on to low-performing players rather than divest them; (2)test the hypothesis that new managers unwind the mistakes of previous managers; and (3) distinguish between loss aversion and agency costs as alternative explanations for retention of poor-performing players. Our empirical analysis focuses on poor-performing players who were hired by previous managers. This is because either loss aversion or agency cost may have induced the prior manager to hang onto poor-performing players. New managers can be expected to move quickly to address these types of problems; hence, we can use new manager retention decisions to determine if the decisions are affected by whether or not the poor performer was hired by a previous manager. Failure of the acquiring manager to divest poor-performing players could be consistent with either the manager's aversion to loss (a cognitive bias) or the manager's unwillingness to admit mistakes (agency costs in the form of career concerns). To distinguish between these, we follow the career concerns literature and reason that experienced managers are less likely to suffer reputational harm if they terminate poor performers whom they hired. Loss aversion, in contrast, does not suggest a relationship between managerial experience and failure to terminate poor performers. There are several advantages to using baseball data for this study. The empirical design holds industry and competitive conditions constant and allows us to directly observe the performance of acquired assets (players) and how managers react to their performance once it is revealed. We are able to identify the manager who made the acquisition decision and can measure the performance of individual players. We also observe the player retention decisions of the subsequent manager (the manager who did not acquire the player). Hence, we can evaluate how the acquiring manager's behavior differs from that of the manager who inherits poor-performing players, some who were acquired by the prior manager and others who were hired by even earlier managers. …
15 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that mainstream economics has neglected the complexity of systemic interactions and behavioural factors underlying modern economies, as well as the systemic dependence of economies on natural resources and ecosystem services.
Abstract: This viewpoint argues that the financial crisis has also highlighted the failings of mainstream economic thinking, at both micro and macro-economic levels, in providing adequate and appropriate understanding of how economies work. As a result, it cannot inform well decisions by policy-makers. In particular, mainstream economics has neglected the complexity of systemic interactions and behavioural factors underlying modern economies, as well as the systemic dependence of economies on natural resources and ecosystem services. This piece discusses four heterodox economic approaches that could contribute to the development of a new economics. By focussing on what these approaches tell us about particular problems, a more realistic and useful economics can be developed, which can address the current economic challenges in ways consistent with realising a transition to a sustainable future.
15 citations
TL;DR: The economics of happiness as discussed by the authors argues that the measurable concepts of happiness or life satisfaction allow us to proxy the theoretical concept of utility in a satisfactory way, and suggests new policies that significantly deviate from what has been proposed so far.
Abstract: Within economics a remarkable new development is underway: the theoretical and empirical economic analysis of individual well-being or happiness. This development transcends the borders of standard economics in various ways. The economics of happiness argues that the measurable concepts of happiness or life satisfaction allow us to proxy the theoretical concept of utility in a satisfactory way. This approach provides new insights into how human beings value goods and services and more general social and economic conditions, and suggests new policies that significantly deviate from what has been proposed so far. These developments could even be called "revolutionary" in that they change the way society is looked at from an economics point of view (Frey, 2008). Happiness economics has the potential to change economics substantially in the future, both with respect to analysis of economic problems and the policy recommendations intended to solve them. Our argument rests on three pillars: measurement, new insights, and policy consequences.
14 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors survey research on the regulation of the energy sector that applies the methodology of Comparative Law and Economics or provides insights on how to improve it and discuss the pitfalls surrounding the design of indicators of institutional quality and the selection of regulatory best practices.
Abstract: This chapter surveys research on the regulation of the energy sector that applies the methodology of Comparative Law and Economics or provides insights on how to improve it It begins with a discussion of the notion of economic efficiency in the context of energy markets liberalization and restructuring Then the chapter goes on with a critical discussion of the pitfalls surrounding the design of indicators of institutional quality and the selection of regulatory best practices Examples include indicators proposed by World Bank researchers and the monitoring of physical and financial energy markets in the US and the EU The next methodological issue is the description, explanation and planning of the process leading to legal transplants Two examples are discussed: emissions trading systems and feed-in tariffs The last section of the chapter deals with behavioural approaches to energy regulation and the possibility to connect the comparative dimension to such analyses The overall conclusion is that in the energy sector comparative law and economic theory have not achieved a satisfactory level of integration A large share of the benefits stemming from this interdisciplinary collaboration still lies before us
14 citations
TL;DR: This paper compares the effectiveness of online and paper-based assignments and tutorials using summative assessment results to suggest that paper assignments were generally more effective than online assignments in preparing students to answer exam questions.
13 citations
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, an overview of economic theories about ecosystem services, distinguishing between pre-classical economics, classical economics, neoclassical economics and modern economics, is presented, and specific attention is given to two special branches of economics: (i) natural resource and environmental economics and (ii) ecological economics.
Abstract: to help determine the different values of ecosystems. Ecosystem services are usually divided into four categories: provisioning services, regulating services, cultural services and habitat services (previously denoted as supporting services). This overview highlights economic theories about ecosystem services, distinguishing between pre-classical economics, classical economics, neoclassical economics and modern economics. In addition, specific attention is given to two special branches of economics: (i) natural resource and environmental economics and (ii) ecological economics. Natural resource and environmental economics basically deals with a welfare economics analysis of natural resource and environmental issues, such as pollution control, natural (i.e. renewable and non-renewable) resource exploitation, and global environmental problems such as climate change. The more recent discipline of ecological economics was launched as a new paradigm with closer ties to the natural sciences. Whereas environmental economics focuses on value dimensions (i.e., utility and welfare in theory, and costs and benefits in practice), ecological economics – as a heterodox, non-coherent school of economics – is inclined to add ecological criteria to these dimensions, to cover aspects such as productivity, stability and resilience of ecosystems. Since a proper pricing system for many ecosystem services simply does not exist, various non-market valuation techniques have been developed to elicit the value of these services. Monetary valuation of ecosystem services remains problematic however, for one thing because of the hidden value of the ecosystem structure that supports the different ecosystem services (the ‘glue value’). Finally, the issue of policy analysis and design is addressed. The rationale for regulation with regard to nature and ecosystem services is that adverse risks, such as overexploitation, are not adequately priced in markets. Welfare economics tools for evaluating policies and projects include cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. From an ecological economics standpoint, multicriteria analysis, the precautionary principle and the method of safe minimum standards are topical issues. The latter two policy tools suggest that we should err on the side of caution in the face of ecological uncertainty. The advancement of knowledge in this field requires further interdisciplinary cooperation between the natural and social sciences. Key words: ecosystem services, history of economic thought, welfare theory, market failures, policy failures, economic valuation, cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, multicriteria analysis, precautionary principle, safe minimum standards
12 citations
TL;DR: The authors discuss meta-analyses of the employment effect of the minimum wage, efficiency wages, the natural rate hypothesis and unemployment hysteresis, the last two of which provide a rigorous, empirical falsification of the natural-rate hypothesis.
Abstract: Meta-analysis is the statistical analysis of an entire empirical literature. It seeks to summarize, evaluate and analyse what we know about a given empirical question, phenomenon, or effect. Meta-regression analysis (MRA) is meta-econometrics, uses the very tools that produce economics research, and provides a rigorous, objective alternative to conventional narrative reviews in economics. MRA often reveals surprising truths about economics. To illustrate these methods, I discuss meta-analyses of the employment effect of the minimum wage, efficiency wages, the natural rate hypothesis and unemployment hysteresis, the last two of which provide a rigorous, empirical falsification of the natural rate hypothesis.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the gift exchange as a missed opportunity for economics and show that by refusing to tackle the complexity of the gift, economics has not only lost an opportunity to develop a method suitable for the analysis of complex problems, but has voluntarily chosen not to follow a path which would have prevented it from colonizing other disciplines.
Abstract: There is growing awareness of the need for interdisciplinary research on complex issues, but also of the obstacles that historical boundaries between social disciplines pose to such dialogue. It is increasingly recognized that the somewhat constitutive autonomy, the progressive autonomization, and finally the “imperialism” of economics have severely reduced the possibility of interdisciplinary discussion. This paper is to be considered as an introduction to a research programme on the foundations of a non-imperialist economics. It investigates gift exchange as a missed opportunity for economics. It aims at showing that, by refusing to tackle the complexity of the gift, economics has not only lost an opportunity to develop a method suitable for the analysis of complex problems, but has voluntarily chosen not to follow a path which would have prevented it from colonizing other disciplines. Reintroducing the concept of gift into the economic discourse may thus represent a required precondition to produce an innovating discourse on economics.
12 Dec 2013
TL;DR: In this article, evidence-based decisions and economics, evidence-base decision making and economics are discussed, where the authors propose evidence based decision making as an alternative to traditional decision-making.
Abstract: Evidence- Based decisions and economics , Evidence- Based decisions and economics , کتابخانه دیجیتال جندی شاپور اهواز
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse the students' attendance at the Faculty of Business and Economics at South East European University in Tetovo and find that students have other excuses for absence from lectures and practical hours such as conditions, management and methods of teaching.
Abstract: The aim of this research is to analyse the students’ attendance at the Faculty of Business and Economics. The study is divided into two parts: the first part analyses why some students are not motivated to attend lectures and practical hours while the second part analyses the impact of students’ attendance (motivation, bonus) in lectures and practical hours and their final success. This paper provides results of a survey completed at the beginning of the summer semester and results of the final success in three courses for the academic year 2010/11 (Business Mathematics, Statistics and Managerial Economics) with first, second and third-year students at the Faculty of Business and Economics, at South East European University in Tetovo. This paper uses logical regression to give an overview of the impact of students’ attendance (motivation, bonus) at lectures and practical hours in their final success. Results show that, besides other daily engagements during studies, students have other excuses for absence from lectures and practical hours such as conditions, management and methods of teaching in the Faculty. Final results of three subjects which are considered as more practical show that attendance of students have a big influence in students’ final success. The software MedCalc was used for the elaboration of data.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine how moral failure shaped the global financial crisis with particular attention to the role of neoclassical economics theory, and they call for greater consideration of Buddhist economics in business decision making in the 21st century.
Abstract: The aim of this paper is examine how moral failure shaped the global financial crisis with particular attention to the role of neoclassical economics theory. The paper compares the premises and characteristics of Schumacher’s (1973) Buddhist economics with the prevailing neoclassical economics, illustrating the narrowness of the current perspective and highlighting the critical issues. Expanding on the Buddhist economics (BE), the paper explicates how such a theory can be integrated with neoclassical economics to facilitate moral and ethical values in society. The paper considers the lessons to be learnt from the global financial crisis and calls for greater consideration of Buddhist economics in business decision making in the 21st century. A synthesis of the two-neoclassical economics perspective and BE may create a holistic view of management and economics which recognises that people matter. This may go in some length to avoid a further financial crisis of the kind we experienced recently.
TL;DR: The nature, scope, and future of Managerial Economics is discussed in this article. But the authors focus on the management of the firm and do not address the issues of time, risk, and uncertainty in modern managerial economics.
Abstract: Part 1: Nature, Scope, and Future of Managerial Economics 1. Managerial economics: Introduction and overview 2. Managerial economics: present and future Part 2: Managing Demand and Cost Conditions 3. Estimating market power and strategies 4. Advances in production and cost frontier analysis of the firm 5. Supply chain design and risk management 6. Combinatorial Auctions Part 3: Analytical Foundations of Modern Managerial Economics 7. Game and information theory in modern managerial economics 8. Issues in analysis of time, risk, and uncertainty 9. Behavioral economics and managerial decision making Part 4: Pricing and Marketing Tactics and Strategies 10. Advances in pricing strategy and tactics 11. Product development and promotion Part 5: Strategy and Business Competition 12. Market imperfections and sustainable competitive advantage 13. The new managerial economics of firm growth: the role of intangible assets and capabilities 14. Strategies for network industries 15. Internalization theory as the general theory of international strategic management: past, present and future 16. Competitive strategy in the nonprofit sector Part 6: Firm Boundaries and Organizational Architecture 17. Organizational design and firm performance 18. Design and implementation of pay for performance 19. Vertical merger 20. The evolving modern theory of the firm Part 7: Financial Structure, Incentives, and Governance 21. Financing the business firm 22. Corporate governance and organizational performance Part 8: Public Policy for Managers 23. Managing workplace safety and health 24. Merger strategies and antitrust concerns 25. On the profitability of corporate environmentalism
TL;DR: This article argued that classical and neoclassical economics' significance for affinity and convergence with sociological theory is low because the first is inconsistent with or divergent from the latter, notably theoretical economic sociology.
Abstract: This paper reconsiders classical and neoclassical economics’ significance for or affinity and convergence with sociological theory The paper identifies certain types or elements of classical and neoclassical economics that are potentially significant or convergent with sociological theory: pure market economics, the economics of society cum the “rational choice model”, and social or sociological economics First, it argues that as pure economics economic theory’s significance for or affinity and convergence with sociological theory is low because the first is inconsistent with or divergent from the latter, notably theoretical economic sociology Second, the paper suggests that as the economics of society economic theory’s significance for or affinity and convergence with sociological theory is non-existent or minimal, because the “rational choice model” is missing or an exception within conventional economics Third, the paper proposes and demonstrates that classical and neoclassical economics’ main significance for or affinity and convergence with sociological theory lies in social economics as its second ingredient, alongside market economics The paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between economic and sociological theory and economics and sociology overall
01 Jul 2013
30 Dec 2013
TL;DR: In this article, the contribution of three heterodox economics disciplines to the knowledge of business co-operation is explored, including economic geography, institutional economics, and economic sociology, and it is shown that many relevant aspects of business cooperation have been proposed by these three disciplines.
Abstract: Purpose- Economics and business have evolved as sciences in order to accommodate more of ‘real world’ solutions for the problems approached. In many cases, both business and economics have been supported by other disciplines in order to obtain a more complete framework for the study of complex issues. The aim of this paper is to explore the contribution of three heterodox economics disciplines to the knowledge of business co-operation. Design/methodology/approach- This approach is theoretical and it shows that many relevant aspects of business co-operation have been proposed by economic geography, institutional economics, and economic sociology.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, an uninformed decision maker (DM) communicates with a partially informed speaker (S) through cheap talk, and the agents' ex-ante rankings over projects do not coincide, and this conflict of interest can reduce S's incentive to pander and hence facilitate information transmission.
Abstract: Consider an uninformed decision maker (DM) who communicates with a partially informed speaker (S) through cheap talk. DM can choose a project to implement or the outside option of no project. We show that if the agents’ ex-ante rankings over projects do not coincide, then this conflict of interest can reduce S’s incentive to pander and hence facilitate information transmission. Intuitively, S’s ex-ante bias and the incentive to pander affect S’s information revelation in opposite directions and hence offset each other. We also explore the relationship between information transmission and managerial issues such as delegation, disclosure, and interpersonal authority.
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: The authors examined the extent to which Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in corporate governance codes and corporate annual reports and found that both Logics coexist, as distinct from compete, in the discourse on executive remuneration.
Abstract: Purpose: Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are the two dominant institutional logics of corporate governance in Anglo-Saxon countries (Lok, 2010; Zajac and Westphal, 2004). Corporate Logic portrays executives as trustworthy professionals that will voluntarily act in the best interests of shareholders. On the other hand, Investor Logic portrays executives as self-interested agents, who are capable of maximising shareholder value, but only if incentives schemes are used to align their interests with those of shareholders. Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have opposing implications for executive remuneration. However, prior research has only studied a few aspects of executive remuneration (Zajac and Westphal, 2004). This research examines executive remuneration, in a holistic manner, in order to determine the extent to which Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in corporate governance codes and corporate annual reports. Approach: Drawing on interpretive structuralism (Phillips and Hardy, 2002), a discourse analysis is used to deconstruct and elucidate the discourse on executive remuneration that is embedded in codes and corporate annual reports. The sample includes 55 codes and 75 annual reports produced between 1991 and 2010 in the UK, Australia (AU) and New Zealand (NZ). Multiple features of the texts are examined to ascertain how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the discourse. These features included 6 remuneration principles and 8 (broad) remuneration practices. Findings: Code issuers and companies draw on multiple remuneration principles to justify their remuneration practices, and these principles and practices are consistent with both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. Consistent with Corporate Logic, the human resources and market principles are tied to base salaries and recruitment and retention schemes. Consistent with Investor Logic, the agency, motivation and pay-for-performance principles are tied to shortand long-term incentive schemes. As a set, these principles and practices represent what is deemed legitimate and rational, despite Corporate Logic and Investor Logic being theoretically incompatible. By drawing on both Logics, code issuers and companies are afforded much flexibility; that is, the prevailing institutional logics enable, rather than constrain, their discourse. Theoretical implications: Unlike prior research, this research recognises that the discourse on executive remuneration is highly nuanced and cannot be easily understood through a reductionist content analysis. While Zajac and Westphal (2004) evidenced a transition from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic, this research’s discourse analysis shows that both Logics coexist, as distinct from compete, in the discourse on executive remuneration. Practical implications: As both Logics coexist in the discourse, producers (e.g. code issuers and companies) and consumers (e.g. investors) of the discourse have to cope with much ambiguity and tension inherent in the remuneration principles and practices that constitute the standard remuneration package for executives. For companies, this means their executive remuneration practices cannot be easily challenged and their legitimacy can be maintained through the symbolic use of remuneration principles and practices. To enhance accountability, code issuers, investors and others should exert pressure on companies to simplify their executive remuneration practices and disclosure. Institutional Logics Perspective on Executive Remuneration Page 2
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed curricula from all 61 Canadian undergraduate business programs and found that business schools that contain economics departments, business schools with higher mathematics and statistics requirements, and those that have received Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business accreditation are more likely to require additional economics courses beyond the standard introductory level microeconomics and macroeconomics.
Abstract: The authors analyzed curricula from all 61 Canadian undergraduate business programs and found that business schools that contain economics departments, business schools with higher mathematics and statistics requirements, and business schools that have received Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business accreditation are more likely to require additional economics courses beyond the standard introductory level microeconomics and macroeconomics. Among those schools that require one or more additional economics courses, managerial economics is the preferred requirement. The authors also found that many specialized business programs, such as human resources, finance, and international management, include either required or optional economics courses beyond those already required in the school's general business degree program. Based on the findings, the authors make recommendations for business school curriculum development.
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this paper, the principal-supervisor-agent model was used to investigate whether information technologies play an enabling or inhibiting role on adoption of performance-based management in U.S. state governments.
Abstract: We theorize and empirically confirm whether information technologies play an enabling or inhibiting role on adoption of performance-based management. The literature suggests that IT can be a facilitator for implementation of performance-based management, as it enables organizations to measure and collect detailed and accurate performance information with lower costs in a timely manner. However, drawing on the principal-supervisor-agent model from managerial economics, we hypothesize that IT in fact hampers performance-based management. The agency model predicts that in a setting in which a supervisor evaluates an agent’s performance on behalf of a principal, the supervisor has an incentive to collude with the agent by concealing true performance information to the principal. We test this hypothesis using data on IT spending and performance-based management in U.S. state governments. Our estimation shows that as expected by the agency model, internal IT investments are negatively associated with implementation of performance-based management in state governments.
01 Jul 2013
Book•
15 Sep 2013
TL;DR: Table of Contents: Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Supply and Demand Chapter 3 Empirical Methods Chapter 4 Consumer Choice Chapter 5 Production Chapter 6 Costs Chapter 7 Firm Organization and Market Structure Chapter 8 Competitive Firms and Markets Chapter 9 Monopoly Chapter 10 Pricing with Market Power.
Abstract: Table of Contents: Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Supply and Demand Chapter 3 Empirical Methods Chapter 4 Consumer Choice Chapter 5 Production Chapter 6 Costs Chapter 7 Firm Organization and Market Structure Chapter 8 Competitive Firms and Markets Chapter 9 Monopoly Chapter 10 Pricing with Market Power Chapter 11 Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition Chapter 12 Game Theory and Business Strategy Chapter 13 Strategies Over Time Chapter 14 Uncertainty Chapter 15 Asymmetric Information and Contracts Chapter 16 Government and Business Chapter 17 Global Business
Book•
05 Mar 2013
TL;DR: The economics for investment decision makers as mentioned in this paper is a concise introduction to economics geared specifically to the concerns of investment professionals, which provides an overview of key economics concepts, terms, principles, and practices clearly defined and explained in plain English.
Abstract: Written by a team of distinguished academics and practitioners, chosen for their acknowledged expertise in their fields, and guided by CFA Institute, Economics for Investment Decision Makers fills you in on all the economics terms, concepts, principles and practices investment professionals need to know to make the most informed investment decisions. From supply and demand to monetary and fiscal policy, business cycles to currency exchange rates, Economics for Investment Decision Makers brings the “dismal science” down to earth with clear, jargon-free explanations and an abundance of illustrative examples. This concise introduction to economics is geared specifically to the concerns of investment professionals. The text is a unique, plain-English guide that requires no prior background in economics and delivers: Key economics concepts, terms, principles, and practices clearly defined and simply explained in plain English In-depth coverage of both the micro- and macroeconomic realities that drive the globa...
TL;DR: The fundamental equation of economics (FEOE) as mentioned in this paper was derived from physics laws of social science (PLSS), which is the one mathematical equation that governs all observed economic phenomena.
Abstract: Recent experience of the great recession of 2008 has renewed one of the oldest debates in economics: whether economics could ever become a scientific discipline like physics. This paper proves that economics is truly a branch of physics by establishing for the first time a fundamental equation of economics (FEOE), which is similar to many fundamental equations governing other subfields of physics, for example, Maxwell’s Equations for electromagnetism. From recently established physics laws of social science (PLSS), this paper derives a fundamental equation of economics, which is the one mathematic equation that governs all observed economic phenomena. FEOE establishes a common entry point to solve all economic problems without any exception. We show that establishing FEOE clarifies many open questions regarding the foundation of economics. For example, the number one question for all economists ought to be what can be forecasted and what cannot be forecasted in economics. Without FEOE and PLSS, this number one question cannot be answered scientifically within the existing framework of economics. While FEOE re-affirms many existing economic theories, we also have found that many other popular economic theories are not compatible with FEOE, and we conclude that FEOE comes with its own version of microeconomics and macroeconomics. In microeconomics, the framework of laws of supply and demand and market equilibrium, which is traditionally assumed by most economists as the foundation of economics, is replaced by a new model called indeterministic supply demand pricing (ISDP) model. ISDP model is far more precise and universal mathematical abstraction of market reality than the framework of Marshall’s market equilibrium and laws of supply and demand. In macroeconomics, a new macroeconomic model called indeterministic balance sheet plus (IBS+) model can be derived from FEOE. Unlike the popular DSGE and Agent-based Computational Economic (ACE) models, the IBS+ model is universally applicable in any kind of economy, empirically falsifiable, making forecasts with reasonable accuracy, truthful abstraction of reality, capturing macroeconomic dynamics accurately, and most importantly based on a sound theoretical foundation. In conclusion, this paper shows that FEOE provides a solid physics foundation for both theoretical and practical economics. Therefore, after establishing the fundamental equation of economics in this paper, there should be no doubt that economics is simply a branch of quantum physics in parallel with chemistry and optics. Over last four hundred years, there are many schools of thoughts emerged in economics while there is only one school of thought by Newton-Einstein-Bohr survived the experimental and theoretical scrutiny in physics over the same period. The logic conclusion is that there must be only one school of thought allowed in economics as a subfield of physics.