Showing papers on "Philosophy of mind published in 2016"

Grounding in the image of causation

Abstract: Grounding is often glossed as metaphysical causation, yet no current theory of grounding looks remotely like a plausible treatment of causation. I propose to take the analogy between grounding and causation seriously, by providing an account of grounding in the image of causation, on the template of structural equation models for causation.

What is a (social) structural explanation

Abstract: A philosophically useful account of social structure must accommodate the fact that social structures play an important role in structural explanation. But what is a structural explanation? How do structural explanations function in the social sciences? This paper offers a way of thinking about structural explanation and sketches an account of social structure that connects social structures with structural explanation.

Belief is weak

Abstract: It is tempting to posit an intimate relationship between belief and assertion. The speech act of assertion seems like a way of transferring the speaker’s belief to his or her audience. If this is right, then you might think that the evidential warrant required for asserting a proposition is just the same as the warrant for believing it. We call this thesis entitlement equality. We argue here that entitlement equality is false, because our everyday notion of belief is unambiguously a weak one. Believing something is true, we argue, is compatible with having relatively little confidence in it. Asserting something requires something closer to complete confidence. Specifically, we argue that believing a proposition merely requires thinking it likely, but that thinking that a proposition is likely does not entitle one to assert it. This conclusion conflict with a standard view that ‘full belief’ is the central commonsense non-factive attitude.

The Law of Mind

Abstract: The one primary and fundamental law of mental action consists in a tendency to generalization. Feeling tends to spread; connections between feelings awaken feelings; neighboring feelings become assimilated; ideas are apt to reproduce themselves. These are so many formulations of the one law of the growth of mind. When a disturbance of feeling takes place, we have a consciousness of gain, the gain of experience; and a new disturbance will be apt to assimilate itself to the one that preceded it. Feelings, by being excited, become more easily excited, especially in the ways in which they have previously been excited. The consciousness of such a habit constitutes a general conception.

Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition

Abstract: Philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010; Palermos 2014) have recently become increasingly receptive to the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which external artifacts such as our laptops and smartphones can—under appropriate circumstances—feature as material realizers of a person's cognitive processes. We argue that, to the extent that the hypothesis of extended cognition is correct, our legal and ethical theorizing and practice must be updated by broadening our conception of personal assault so as to include intentional harm toward gadgets that have been appropriately integrated. We next situate the theoretical case for extended personal assault within the context of some recent ethical and legal cases and close with critical discussion.

Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge

Abstract: Experimental restrictionists have challenged philosophers’ reliance on intuitions about thought experiment cases based on experimental findings. According to the expertise defense, only the intuitions of philosophical experts count—yet the bulk of experimental philosophy consists in studies with lay people. In this paper, we argue that direct (experimental) strategies for assessing the expertise defense are preferable to indirect (inductive) strategies. A direct argument in support of the expertise defense would have to show: first, that there is a significant difference between expert and lay intuitions; second, that expert intuitions are superior to lay intuitions; and third, that expert intuitions accord with the relevant philosophical consensus. At present, there is only little experimental evidence that bears on these issues. To advance the debate, we conducted two new experiments on intuitions about knowledge with experts and lay people. Our results suggest that the intuitions of epistemological experts are superior in some respects, but they also pose an unexpected challenge to the expertise defense. Most strikingly, we found that even epistemological experts tend to ascribe knowledge in fake-barn-style cases. This suggests that philosophy, as a discipline, might fail to adequately map the intuitions of its expert practitioners onto a disciplinary consensus.

Thinking the impossible

Abstract: The article looks at the structure of impossible worlds, and their deployment in the analysis of some intentional notions. In particular, it is argued that one can, in fact, conceive anything, whether or not it is impossible. Thus a semantics of conceivability requires impossible worlds.

Writing the History of the Mind: Philosophy and Science in France, 1900 to 1960s

Abstract: From the Series Editor's Introduction: For much of the twentieth century, French intellectual life was dominated by theoreticians and historians of mentalite. Traditionally, the study of the mind and of its limits and capabilities was the domain of philosophy, however in the first decades of the twentieth century practitioners of the emergent human and social sciences were increasingly competing with philosophers in this field: ethnologists, sociologists, psychologists and historians of science were all claiming to study 'how people think'. Scholars, including Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, Leon Brunschvicg, Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Lucien Febvre, Abel Rey, Alexandre Koyre and Helene Metzger were all investigating the mind historically and participating in shared research projects. Yet, as they have since been appropriated by the different disciplines, literature on their findings has so far failed to recognise the connections between their research and their importance in intellectual history.In this exemplary book, Cristina Chimisso reconstructs the world of these intellectuals and the key debates in the philosophy of mind, particularly between those who studied specific mentalities by employing prevalently historical and philological methods, and those who thought it possible to write a history of the mind, outlining the evolution of ways of thinking that had produced the modern mentality. Dr Chimisso situates the key French scholars in their historical context and shows how their ideas and agendas were indissolubly linked with their social and institutional positions, such as their political and religious allegiances, their status in academia, and their familial situation.The author employs a vast range of original research, using philosophical and scientific texts as well as archive documents, correspondence and seminar minutes from the period covered, to recreate the milieu in which these relatively neglected scholars made advances in the history of philosophy and science, and produced ideas that would greatly influence later intellectuals such as Foucault, Derrida and Bourdieu. This book will appeal to historians of science and philosophy, particularly Continental philosophy, and those with interest in the history of ideas and the historiography of the disciplines of the social sciences.

Are affordances normative

Abstract: In this paper we explore in what sense we can claim that affordances, the objects of perception for ecological psychology, are related to normativity First, we offer an account of normativity and provide some examples of how it is understood in the specialized literature Affordances, we claim, lack correctness criteria and, hence, the possibility of error is not among their necessary conditions For this reason we will oppose Chemero’s (2009) normative theory of affordances Finally, we will show that there is a way in which taking advantage of affordances could be considered as possessing a normative character, but only when they are evaluated within the framework of social normative standards in particular situations This reinforces our claim that affordances, per se, lack normativity and can only be taken to be rule-governed in relation to established normative practices

Identity criteria and ground

Abstract: I propose formulating identity criteria as generic statements of ground, thereby avoiding objections that have been made to the more usual formulations.

The epistemic significance of experience

Abstract: According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended.

Why Kant Is Not a Kantian

Abstract: A central debate in early modern philosophy, between empiricism and rationalism, turned on the question which of two cognitive faculties—sensibility or understanding—should be accorded logical priority in an account of the epistemic credentials of knowledge. As against both the empiricist and the rationalist, Kant wants to argue that the terms of their debate rest on a shared common assumption: namely that the capacities here in question—qua cognitive capacities—are self-standingly intelligible. The paper terms this assumption the Layer-Cake Conception of Human Mindedness and focuses on Kant’s argument against the empiricist version of the assumption, in particular, as that argument is developed in the B version of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason . The paper seeks to show how a proper understanding of the structure of the B Deduction reveals its aim to be one of making sense of each of these two capacities (sensibility and understanding) in the light of the other. For the front of the argument that is directed against the empiricist, this means coming to see how a reading of the text that is informed by the layer-cake conception (and which therefore takes the Transcendental Aesthetic to furnish us with the full story about the nature of our faculty for sensory apprehension) is mistaken. For the front of the argument which is directed against the rationalist, this requires coming to see how a mere inversion of the central claim of such a reading would be equally wrong. It would require seeing how a discursive faculty of understanding able to traffic in nothing more than empty concepts would no more amount to a genuinely cognitive power than would a faculty of intuition able to traffic in nothing more than blind intuitions. That is, it requires seeing how each of these faculties depends on its relation to the other to be the sort of faculty that it is in a finite rational being.

The intuition deniers

Abstract: ‘Intuition deniers’ are those who—like Timothy Williamson, Max Deutsch, Herman Cappelen and a few others—reject the claim that philosophers centrally rely on intuitions as evidence. This ‘Centrality’ hypothesis, as Cappelen (2012, Philosophy without intuitions. Oxford University Press, Oxford) terms it, is standardly endorsed both by traditionalists and by experimental philosophers. Yet the intuition deniers claim that Centrality is false—and they generally also suggest that this undermines the significance of experimental philosophy. Three primary types of anti-Centrality argument have cross-cut the literature thus far. These arguments, I’ll claim, have differing potential consequences on metaphilosophical debate. The first sort of argument centers on worries about the term ‘intuition’—for instance, worries about whether it has clear application, or whether anything actually falls under it. Call this the Argument from Unclear Application. The second argument type involves the claim that evidence in philosophy consists not of facts (or propositions or what have you) about intuitions, but of facts about e.g. knowledge and causation. Call this the Argument from Antipsychologism. The third type involves an attempt to demonstrate that philosophers support their claims not via bald appeal to intuition, but via argumentation. Call this the Argument from Argumentation. Although these three arguments have merit, none of them undermines the importance of experimental philosophy. Nonetheless, they do have significant consequences for the methodological debates that dominate meta-philosophy, and for experimental philosophy in particular.

The Routledge handbook of philosophy of information

Abstract: Introduction - Mapping the Philosophy of Information Luciano Floridi Part 1: Basic Ideas Physics and Information Nathan Harshman Probability and Information Peter Milne Computation and Information Gualtiero Piccinini & Andrea Scarantino Mathematical Theory of Information (Shannon) Olimpia I Lombardi Algorithmic Information Theory (Kolmogorov) Alexander Shen Semantic Information Luciano Floridi The Method of Levels of Abstraction Luciano Floridi Part 2: Quantitative and Formal Aspects The Logic of Information Patrick Allo Information Processing and Instructional Information Marty Wolf & Nir Fresco Information in the Philosophy of Computer Science Giuseppe Primiero Information in the Philosophy of AI and the Symbol Grounding Problem Selmer Bringsjord The Philosophy of Distributed Information (social information, announcements, testimony) Vincent Hendricks & Rasmus Rendsvig Modelling Information (philosophy of simulation/model) Patrick Grim The Decisional Value of Information (choice/decision theory, phil of economics, game theory) Martin Peterson The Philosophy of Mathematical Information Marcello D'Agostino Bayesianism and information Jon Williamson & Michael Wilde Part 3: Natural and Physical Aspects The Philosophy of Data and Evidence Sabina Leonelli Informational Metaphysics (the informational nature of reality) Terry Bynum The Philosophy of Quantum Information Chris Timpson Causality and Information Phyllis Illari & Federica Russo Philosophy of Science and Information Ioannis Votsis Teleosemantics and Ecological Information John Symons The Philosophy of Biological Information Barton Moffatt The Philosophy of Semiotic Information Sara Cannizzaro The Philosophy of Communication and Information Ulrich Stegmann Part 4: Human and Semantic Aspects The Epistemic Value of Information (information, cognition, and knowledge) Frederick Adams Mis- and Dis-information (lying, propaganda etc) Don Fallis Information-theoretic Philosophy of Mind William Bechtel & Jason Winning The Moral Value of Information and Information Ethics Mariarosaria Taddeo The Aesthetic Value of Information and Information-based Art Katherine Thomson-Jones The Interpretative Value of Information (hermeneutics, phenomenology) Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis The Philosophy of Law in an Information Society Ugo Pagallo & Massimo Durante The Spiritual Value of Information (Informational Approaches to Theology and/or Philosophy of Religion) George Medley

Revisiting the Early Modern Philosophical Canon

Abstract: I reflect critically on the early modern philosophical canon in light of the entrenchment and homogeneity of the lineup of seven core figures: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant After distinguishing three elements of a philosophical canon—a causal story, a set of core philosophical questions, and a set of distinctively philosophical works—I argue that recent efforts contextualizing the history of philosophy within the history of science subtly shift the central philosophical questions and allow for a greater range of figures to be philosophically central However, the history of science is but one context in which to situate philosophical works Looking at the historical context of seventeenth-century philosophy of mind, one that weaves together questions of consciousness, rationality, and education, does more than shift the central questions—it brings new ones to light It also shows that a range of genres can be properly philosophical and seamlessly diversifies the central philosophers of the period

Subjective Probability as Sampling Propensity

Abstract: Subjective probability plays an increasingly important role in many fields concerned with human cognition and behavior. Yet there have been significant criticisms of the idea that probabilities could actually be represented in the mind. This paper presents and elaborates a view of subjective probability as a kind of sampling propensity associated with internally represented generative models. The resulting view answers to some of the most well known criticisms of subjective probability, and is also supported by empirical work in neuroscience and behavioral psychology. The repercussions of the view for how we conceive of many ordinary instances of subjective probability, and how it relates to more traditional conceptions of subjective probability, are discussed in some detail.

Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry

Abstract: According to many commentators, Davidson’s earlier work on philosophy of action and truth-theoretic semantics is the basis for his reputation, and his later forays into broader metaphysical and epistemological issues, and eventually into what became known as the triangulation argument, are much less successful. This book by two of his former students aims to change that perception. In Part One, Verheggen begins by providing an explanation and defense of the triangulation argument, then explores its implications for questions concerning semantic normativity and reductionism, the social character of language and thought, and skepticism about the external world. In Part Two, Myers considers what the argument can tell us about reasons for action, and whether it can overcome skeptical worries based on claims about the nature of motivation, the sources of normativity and the demands of morality. The book reveals Davidson’s later writings to be full of innovative and important ideas that deserve much more attention than they are currently receiving.

The unity of consciousness, within subjects and between subjects

Abstract: The unity of consciousness has so far been studied only as a relation holding among the many experiences of a single subject. I investigate whether this relation could hold between the experiences of distinct subjects, considering three major arguments against the possibility of such ‘between-subjects unity’. The first argument, based on the popular idea that unity implies subsumption by a composite experience, can be deflected by allowing for limited forms of ‘experience-sharing’, in which the same token experience belongs to more than one subject. The second argument, based on the phenomenological claim that unified experiences have interdependent phenomenal characters, I show to rest on an equivocation. Finally, the third argument accuses between-subjects unity of being unimaginable, or more broadly a formal possibility corresponding to nothing we can make sense of. I argue that the familiar experience of perceptual co-presentation gives us an adequate phenomenological grasp on what between-subjects unity might be like.

Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity

Abstract: For many epistemologists and normativity theorists, epistemic norms necessarily entail normative reasons. Why or in virtue of what do epistemic norms have this necessary normative authority? According to what I call epistemic constitutivism, it is ultimately because belief constitutively aims at truth. In this paper, I examine various versions of the aim of belief thesis and argue that none of them can plausibly ground the normative authority of epistemic norms. I conclude that epistemic constitutivism is not a promising strategy for grounding epistemic normativity.

The General Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment

Abstract: In this paper, I articulate and argue for a new truthmaker view of ontological commitment, which I call the “General Truthmaker View”: when one affirms a sentence, one is ontologically committed to there being something (or some things) that makes (or make) true the proposition expressed by the sentence This view comes apart from Quinean orthodoxy in that we are not ontologically committed to the things over which we quantify, and it comes apart from extant truthmaker views of ontological commitment in that we are not ontologically committed to the truthmakers of our sentences

There is no special problem with metaphysics

Abstract: I argue for the claim in the title. Along the way, I also address an independently interesting question: what is metaphysics, anyway? I think that the typical characterizations of metaphysics are inadequate, that a better one is available, and that the better one helps explain why metaphysics is no more problematic than the rest of philosophy.

Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind

Abstract: This material was originally published in Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives edited by Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, and has been reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.001.0001 and http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.001.0001/acprof-9780199359943. Under embargo until 3 November 2018. For permission to reuse this material, please visit http://global.oup.com/academic/rights. Sam Coleman, ‘Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind’, in Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, eds. Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), ISBN: 9780199359943 © Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

The unplanned obsolescence of psychological science and an argument for its revival.

Abstract: I examine some of the key scientific precommitments of modern psychology, and argue that their adoption has the unintended consequence of rendering a purely psychological analysis of mind indistinguishable from a purely biological treatment. And, because these precommitments sanction an “authority of the biological,” explanation of phenomena traditionally considered the purview of psychological analysis is fully subsumed under the biological. I next evaluate the epistemic warrant of these precommitments and suggest that there are good reasons to question their applicability to psychological science. I conclude that experiential aspects of reality (reflected in mental construct terms such as memory, belief, thought, and desire) give us reason to remain open to the need for psychological explanation in the treatment of mind.

Investigating Psychology: Sciences of the Mind After Wittgenstein

Abstract: The essays in this volume were written by philosophers who are convinced that Wittgenstein's investigations in philosophical psychology are of direct relevance to current experimental psychology. Rather than reflecting on the nature of psychological theory at a high level of abstraction, they have examined leading theories and controversies in the experimental study of vision and of language in order to reveal the conceptual problems that they raise and the philosophical theories which have exerted an influence upon them. Under the section headings of "Language and Behaviour" and "Perception and Representation", the essays examine the work of Chomsky, Gregory, Marr, Weiskrantz and others, and discuss problems ranging from artificial intelligence to animal communications, from blindsight to machine visions. The collection aims to demonstrate that philosophical investigations can contribute to psychological science by extirpating conceptual confusions which have been woven into the fabric of empirical research. This book should be of interest to advanced students and teachers of the philosophy of mind.