Showing papers on "Policy analysis published in 1985"

Chapter 10 Comparative analysis of alternative policy instruments

Abstract: Publisher Summary This chapter accomplishes four specific goals of clarifying the contribution of economic analysis over the instruments of environmental policy. First, it describes the general situation in which environmental policy goals must be achieved. An appreciation of the complexity of this situation will provide a base from which to consider both past error and actual special cases. Second, it defines a set of dimensions along which policy instruments may usefully be judged. These include: static efficiency, centralized information and computation requirements, enforceability, dynamic incentive effects, flexibility in the face of exogenous change, and implications for goals other than efficiency. In the process, it intends to make explicit the irreducible political content of choices among policy instruments and thus the reasons that technical arguments on the other dimensions are not decisive in the political arena. Thirdly, it reviews both some major non-economic attempts to evade the complexity of the general case and the record of adoptions of explicitly economic prescriptions. Finally, it examines some of the economic complexities associated with a variety of instruments and problems.

Signposts for a Critical Educational Policy Analysis

Abstract: This paper criticizes current trends in educational policy analysis, drawing attention to: the vagueness of conceptualization; the inattention to values and ethical issues; the narrow role of the p...

Contextual orientation in policy analysis: The contribution of Harold D. Lasswell

Abstract: Criticized for its generally positivist and technocratic orientation, the literature of public policy analysis has begun to generate proposals that would create a convergence between the field and the wider movement for a post-positivist restructuring of social inquiry. Ironically, critics have often focused on “policy science” as the epitomy of positivism and technocracy, giving little attention to the actual position of the figure responsible for the term - Harold D. Lasswell. Centering on Lasswell's key concept of contextual orientation, this article argues that, despite positivist influences, he developed an approach to inquiry and a proposal for a policy science profession which together clearly transcend positivism and technocracy- which, indeed, anticipate recent post-positivist proposals. Implications for policy analysis of a project of contextual orientation are also considered, along with problems in Lasswell's focus on professionalization.

Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the Role of Informal Agreements

Abstract: For all their differences, the two leading economic theories of regulation share a preoccupation with the issue of monopoly. According to the populist or public interest view, government restrictions function to bring monopoly pricing under control. The Chicago school, though, regards industries as seeking and enforcing regulations in order to promote their own cartel purposes. This preoccupation with monopoly has given us an era of"all or nothing" policy prescriptions. Depending on which of the leading theories he or she subscribes to, the policy analyst turns out to be invariably for or invariably against regulation. The formula may be easy to remember, but the results are often disappointing. Fortunately, the emerging new institutional economics (Williamson, 1975; 1976; 1979; 1983; Goldberg; Klein et al.; Palay, 1984) provides an alternative approach to the study of regulation. Its policy prescription is "use it when it works" and it provides a theoretical framework for determining when that might be. The framework begins with an examination of the explicit or implicit contract needed to implement some objective. But rather than concentrate solely on contract terms, the new theory also turns its attention to the institutional arrangement-that is, the governance structure

Microeconomic Policy Analysis

Abstract: Course Description: This course emphasizes the nature of decision-making by consumers, firms, and governments, and the effect of these decisions on the allocation of resources--land, labor and capital. A central issue is to establish the meaning of "efficiency" in resource allocation, and to understand what is necessary if the resources in the economy are to be allocated efficiently. We will investigate the conditions under which a market economy is able to secure an efficient allocation of society’s resources, and explore how the public sector has an important role to play in a market economy like that of the U.S.. The role of the public sector is of central concern if private markets fail. We will study the ways in which private market failure exists, and the possible response of government to this failure.

The Fate of Policy Analysis in Congressional Decision Making: Three Types of Use in Committees

Abstract: TW A TITHIN the past two decades, Congress has dramatically enhanced its analytic capability, increasing the number and responsibilities of its professional staff (Malbin 1979; Salisbury and Shepsle 1981) and the quantity and quality of its analytic information (Commission on the Operation of the Senate 1976; Frantzich 1982). Two new congressional support agencies have been created, the Office of Technology Assessment and Congressional Budget Office, and the policy analysis components of the other two, the Congressional Research Service and General Accounting Office, have been significantly upgraded. The fate of policy analysis in congressional decision making, however, remains unclear. Research on the use of analytic information has focused almost exclusively on the executive branch, perhaps in response to suggestions that the potential for using policy analysis in Congress appeared to be quite limited (Davidson 1976; Jones 1976; Dreyfus 1977). In addition, research on congressional decision making has yet to produce models which explicitly connect floor voting choices, which are not likely to be directly influenced by policy analysis, with the activities which precede and structure those choices, activities in which the influence of analytic information is likely to be much stronger. This article is an attempt to provide some theoretical context and empirical underpinning to discussions of both the use of policy analysis in Congress and the implications of that use for congressional decision making. Such an endeavor contributes in two more general ways to a greater understanding of the role of analysis in public decision making. First, it extends the scope of research, which has been largely restricted to administrative organizations. Investigating the use of policy analysis in a legislative environment forces explicit attention to the political factors which affect use, something often ignored. Second, the legislative setting presents, in stark terms, the basic "difficulty of combining expert advice with democratic political institutions," which MacRae contends is "a major problem of contemporary democratic societies" (1976: 169). Congress, the institution once envisioned to be tied most closely to the common sense of the common man, is now being confronted with increasingly complex problems that appear to require considerable specialized knowledge. An

A Rational Expectations Framework for Short Run Policy Analysis

Abstract: There is increasing recognition that Lucas’s [1976] critique of econometric policy evaluation, at least under its usual interpretation, is logically flawed. The point has been made forcefully recently by Sargent [1984] and by Cooley, Leroy and Rahman [1984] (henceforth referred to as CLR), as well as in my own paper [1982]. The problem is that if the parameters of the policy “rule” are subject to change, as they must be if it makes sense to evaluate changes in them, then the public must recognize this fact and have a probability distribution over the parameters of the rule. But then these “parameters” are themselves “policy variables”, taking on a time series of values drawn from some probability law. Predicting how the economy will behave if we set the parameters of the rule at some value and keep them there is logically equivalent to predicting the behavior of the economy conditional on a certain path of a policy variable. Yet this is just the kind of exercise which Lucas claimed to be meaningless. It is also evident that the methods of policy evaluation which Lucas criticized are still in wide use nine years after the appearance of his paper. During discussions of monetary and fiscal policy, statistical models prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, the Federal Reserve Board, numerous other agencies, and by private entities are used to prepare predictions of the likely future path of the economy conditional on various possible paths for policy variables. These conditional projections influence policy-makers’ views of the likely consequences of the choices they must make. Though Lucas suggested an alternative paradigm for policy analysis, it is still little used. Nonetheless, we are not quite to the point where well-trained young macroeconomists collaborate in preparing and interpreting conditional projections of the effects of alternative paths for policy variables without feeling queasy. Sargent, while clearly explaining the problems with the rational expectations paradigm for policy analysis and finding no way around them, claims we must ignore them if we are to avoid the conclusion that policy recommendations of any kind are meaningless. CLR show that projections of the future path of the economy conditional on paths of policy variables are not meaningless, even in the presence of shifts in

Staking out the terrain: Power differentials among natural resource management agencies (SUNY series in environmental public policy)

Abstract: This study's synthesis of several methodologies - policy analysis, historical development, the case study, and budgetary analysis - provides a fresh approach to the study of bureaucratic behavior in the area of environmental conservation A model of agency power focussing on the ability of agencies to expand resources and jurisdiction for environmental control is formulated, and a detailed analysis of seven federal agencies - the US Army Corps of Engineers, the US Forest Service, the Bureau of Reclamation, the National Park Service, and the US Fish and Wildlife Service - is offered in support of the model

The feedback view of business policy and strategy

Abstract: A combination of administrative theory and traditional system dynamics modeling promises a flexible model-based tool to assist businesses in designing policies and programs to support new strategic moves. Administrative theory helps clarify the firm's organization and decision-making structure. System dynamics highlights feedback loops in the decision-making structure and shows how structure is related to business behavior. With this dual conceptual framework, a business policy modeling project divides into two distinct phases, each of which has a value in policy analysis. Phase 1 is a descriptive survey of the firm's decision-making structure, rather like traditional conceptualization but made richer by use of administrative theory. Phase 2 is conventional simulation modeling that builds on the phase 1 survey. Several business cases illustrate the kinds of policy insights that a phase 1 survey can provide. The article also comments on the value that a full-fledged simulation model adds to the phase 1 analysis.

The use of optimization methods for policy design in a system dynamics model

Abstract: Optimization methods have the potential to improve the processes of policy analysis and design in system dynamics models. To demonstrate the use of optimization approaches, this article applies routines developed by Keloharju to a simple model of unstable inventory dynamics. Policies derived from the optimization approach are compared with policies obtained in earlier, more intuitive analyses. The results suggest that optimization methods could significantly improve both the speed and power of policy analysis in formal models.

Macroeconomic Policies in the OECD and Ldc External Adjustmemt

Abstract: In this paper, the authors describe a simulation model for analyzing the effects of macroeconomic policies in the OECD on global macroeconomic equilibrium. Particular attention is paid to the effects on developing countries of alternative mixes of monetary and fiscal policies in the OECD.Though the model is quite small, it has several properties which make it attractive for policy analysis. First, the important stock-flow relationships and intertemporal budget constraints are carefully observed, so that the modelis useful for short-run and long-run analysis. Budget deficits, for example,cumulate into a stock of public debt which must be serviced, while current account deficits cumulate into a stock of foreign debt. Second, the asset markets are forward looking, so that the exchange rate is conditioned by the entire future path of policies rather than by a set of short-run expectations. Third, the model is amenable to policy optimization exercises, and in particular can be used to study the effects of policy coordination versus non-coordination in the OECD, on global macroeconomic equilibrium.

Reaffirming the Importance of Strategic Use A Two-Dimensional Perspective on Policy Analysis in Congress

Abstract: Focusing exclusively on the substantive use of policy analysis results in a limited assessment of the role of analysis in policymaking, particularly in a congressional setting. This article develop...

Policy implementation in federal and unitary systems : questions of analysis and design

Abstract: Multiorganizational Arrangements in the Governance of Unitary and Federal Political Systems.- Beyond Organizational Design: Contextuality and the Political Theory of Public Policy.- Comment on Wittrock: Creative Imagination and Appropriate Assemblies.- Forward and Backward Mapping: Reversible Logic in the Analysis of Public Policy.- Policy Subsystems as a Unit of Analysis in Implementation Studies: A Struggle for Theoretical Synthesis.- Comment on Warns ley: The Unit of Analysis as a Methodological Problem.- Policy Subsystems, Networks and the Tools of Public Management.- Small Firm Employment Creation: An Assistance Structure Explanation.- Comment on Hjern and Hull: Implementation Structures and the Importance of Local Actors.- Metropolitan Structure and Systemic Performance: The Case of Police Service Delivery.- Comment on Parks: Fragmented Policy Organizations: A Comment.- Diffusion of Responsibility: An Interorganizational Analysis.- Comment on O'Toole: The Structural Context of Responsibility.- Racial Inequalities in Low-Income Central City and Suburban Communities: The Case of Police Services.- Social Structure and Social Praxis in Interorganizational Policy Analysis.- Comments on Benson and Weitzel: Interorganizational Analysis: A Field for Social Praxis Based On Social Structure, or Strategic Choice and Reticulist Judgement?.- Reflections on Bridge-Building in Complex Terrains: A Postscript.- Strategic Interaction, Learning and Policy Evolution: A Synthetic Hodel.- Implementation Research and Institutional Design: The Quest for Structure.

Chapter 9 Distributional and macroeconomic aspects of environmental policy

Abstract: Publisher Summary The achievement of an efficient balance between the economic system and the environment is just one of many societal objectives. How environmental policy affects these other objectives is important because these impacts may serve to constrain the set of politically feasible policies, may recommend some approaches over others or may provide guidance as to the most appropriate timing of policy implementation. Two effects of environmental policy have been discussed in the chapter: distributional effects and macroeconomic effects. The former concerns how the costs and benefits of environmental policy are distributed among socioeconomic groups and among geographic regions; the latter concerns the impact of environmental policy on important national aggregates such as inflation, unemployment, and productivity. The chapter examines the theoretical models that serve to identify the channels of influence, the data which provide the raw material for the estimates and the methods used to quantify the impacts. The objective is to convey a sense of the magnitude of the impacts along with an appreciation for the reliability of these estimates for policy purposes. Finally, the chapter discusses the policies that have triggered the effects being estimated.

Evaluating development policies and programmes in the third world

Abstract: The issues and methodologies of programme evaluation have largely been developed within the North American context of an open and competitive political process. The policy cycle in Third World nations, especially authoritarian regimes, is a closed system with little consultation with affected target groups, suppression of criticism of government officials and policies, and a severe weakness in policy implementation. Third World governments prefer evaluation methods such as cost-benefit analysis which will not undermine fragile regimes by indicating problems in the policy formulation and implementation process. However, the most useful form of evaluation is implementation analysis, which can pinpoint the reasons why policies succeed or fail.

Macroeconomic Policies in the OECD and LDC External Adjustmemt

Abstract: In this paper, the authors describe a simulation model for analyzing the effects of macroeconomic policies in the OECD on global macroeconomic equilibrium. Particular attention is paid to the effects on developing countries of alternative mixes of monetary and fiscal policies in the OECD. Though the model is quite small, it has several properties which make it attractive for policy analysis. First, the important stock-flow relationships and intertemporal budget constraints are carefully observed, so that the model is useful for short-run and long-run analysis. Budget deficits, for example, cumulate into a stock of public debt which must be serviced while current account deficits cumulate into a stock of foreign debt. Second, the asset markets are forward-looking, so that the exchange rate is conditioned by the entire future path of policies rather than by a set of short-run expectations. Third, the model is amenable to policy optimization exercises, and in particular can be used to study the effects of policy coordination versus non-coordination in the OECD, on global macroeconomic equilibrium.

Policy Science as Metaphysical Madness

Abstract: In the past dozen years or so, policy-oriented social science research and analysis has become a growth industry in the United States. This has occurred in response to demand created by the spate of social welfare programs initiated by the Great Society and, for the most part, continued and expanded by the later administrations. Whereas in 1965 federal agencies spent about $235 million on applied social science research, in 1975 they spent almost $1 billion. Of the approximately $7.4 billion spent in these eleven years about two-thirds was under contract.1 This brought into being several large independent research bodies, some quasi-public and others private, and it greatly increased the amount of university-based policy-oriented social research and the supply of social scientists. According to the 1970 census, the number of social scientists increased by 163 percent in the 1960s, an increase larger than that of any other major occupational group nearlythree times that of professional and technical workers as a whole.

European Policy Coordination: An Evaluation

Abstract: Uncoordinated macroeconomic policies lead to 'beggar thy neighbour' strategies which are clearly suboptimal for the European Community as a whole. Given the high degree of interdependence of their economies, European governments have a clear incentive to export their inflation or their unemployment. No formal model is needed to conclude that among countries which have similar economic structures, policy objectives and policy instruments such competition is bound to be futile and costly for all concerned. In this paper we try to shed light on these aspects of European policy coordination, both through the use of a simple analytic model and through an empirical evaluation of the potential gains of superior European strategies.

Policy Analysis Using a Computable General Equilibrium Model: A Review of Experience at the IMPACT Project

Abstract: Originally presented at the Fourth International Symposium on Forecasting, London, July 1984, this article reviews the role in policy analysis of the ORANI model of the Australian economy A schematic description of the model is given Conceptual issues concerning the use of such models for counterfactual policy analysis and for explicit forecasting are canvassed A taxonomy is presented of policy applications of ORANI classifying both the policy issues addressed and the range of information obtained from the applications Details of selected applications are discussed with the aim of illustrating the main themes which arise in policy studies conducted using the model

Interactive Computer Modeling for Policy Analysis: The Flood Hazard Problem

Abstract: This paper discusses an interactive modeling system to support policy analysis for dealing with flood hazards. Policy analysis in this area is complex due to numerous stakeholders with varying concerns, the variety of scenarios that might be considered, and alternative policy options. These conditions require that a modeling system be flexible and support users in a variety of ways. The system should be viewed as a decision aid rather than a burden. The modeling system described in this paper attempts to achieve these goals for microanalytic models that deal with samples of homeowners in a flood-prone community.

The Dialectic of Public and Private Pensions

Abstract: Complex images of the differences between public and private activities are endemic in modern capitalist societies. Numerous examples can be found in the field of social policy, but this paper focuses on the historical dialectic between public and private pension arrangements. It compares the interaction over time in a number of countries of the central principles of solidarity and equivalence which have shaped the development of pension provision. Then it illustrates how an understanding of contemporary pressures for the privatization of pension arrangements as a response to the fiscal crisis of welfare states cannot be divorced from their historical and institutional contexts. The paper concludes that pluralistic pension systems offer the best prospect for rational policy analysis and debate provided that a continuing critique of, and dialogue between, the different sectors is encouraged to flourish.

Policy Analysts, Clients, and Social Scientists

Abstract: Two Types of Policy Analysis If you do not have a client, you are not doing policy analysis. This simple test focuses attention on the real purpose of all policy analysis, serves to differentiate policy analysts from social scientists, and provides a basis for evaluating any piece of policy analysis. Policy analysts are in the business of helping their clients resolve particular public policy dilemmas.1 The key standard for evaluating their work is the one of policy relevance: Has the analysis indeed helped a policymaker-the client-do his or her job? In contrast, social scientists seek to advance their discipline by producing general theory. Social scientists care little whether their generalizations can help any policymaker. For the practicing policy analyst, however, the master is not an abstract ideal such as furthering the frontier of the discipline or applying an intellectual paradigm to a new class of problems; rather, the master is the client.