Showing papers on "Stackelberg competition published in 1988"

The analytics of continuing conflict

Abstract: Individuals, groups, or nations — if rational and self-interested — will be balancing on the margin between two alternative ways of generating income: (1) “peaceful” production and exchange, versus (2) ‘appropriative” efforts designed to seize resources previously controlled by others (or to defend against such invasions). Both production and appropriation, on the assumption here, are entirely normal lines of activity engaged in to the extent that doing so seems profitable. The general-equilibrium steady-state model involves a resource partition function, a social production function, a combat power function, and an income distribution equation. Solutions were obtained under thesymmetrical Cournot protocol and two alternativeasymmetrical assumptions: the familiar Stackelberg condition and a more novel hierarchical protocol called Threat-and-Promise. The analysis demonstrates that, in contrast with the harmonistic bias of orthodox economic theory, a general-equilibrium model can also encompass the hostile and destructive interactions that characterize real-world social relations.

Convex two-level optimization

Abstract: In this paper a model for a two-level planning problem is presented in the form of a static Stackelberg game. By assumption, play is sequential and noncooperative; however, the leader can influence the actions of the followers through a set of coordination variables while the followers' responses may partly determine the leader's payoff. Under certain convexity assumptions, it is shown that the feasible region induced by the leader is continuous in the original problem variables. This observation, coupled with two corollary results, are used as a basis for a hybrid algorithm which clings to the inducible region until a local optimum is found. A branching scheme is then employed to located other segments of the region, eventually terminating with the global optimum. A number of examples are given to highlight the results, while the algorithm's performance is tested in a comparison with two other procedures.

A Mathematical Programming Model of Decentralized Multi-Level Systems

Abstract: In decentralized systems, the objectives at the different levels often differ. Each level controls only a subset of the decision variables but is affected by the decisions made at the other levels. Recent methods in bi-level linear programming solve such systems better than decomposition methods. Here, the bi-level LP is extended to a bi-level system with many decision-makers at the lower level, and a tri-level system with one decision-maker at each level. In both of these cases, the higher level acts as the leader and the lower level as the follower in the Stackelberg game. The resulting techniques are illustrated with simple numerical examples.

Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games

Abstract: The concept of sequential Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced in the general framework of dynamic, two-person games defined in the Denardo contracting operator formalism. A relationship between this solution concept and the sequential Nash equilibrium for an associated extended game is established. This correspondence result, which can be related to previous results obtained by Basar and Haurie (1984), is then used for studying the existence of such solutions in a class of sequential games. For the zero-sum case, the sequential Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to a sequential maxmin equilibrium. An algorithm is proposed for the computation of this particular case of equilibrium.

Dynamic Strategic Monetary Policies and Coordination in Interdependent Economies

Abstract: This paper develops strategic monetary policies using a standard two-country macro model under flexible exchange rates. The equilibria considered include feedback Nash and feedback Stackelberg, both of which are compared to the Pareto optimal cooperative equilibrium. The optimal policies are obtained as feedback rules in which real money supplies are adjusted to movements in the real exchange rate. The properties of these policies and their welfare implications are analyzed using numerical simulations. The contrast in the present results with those obtained previously for a short-run horizon suggest the importance of both intertemporal and intratemporal tradeoffs in the d etermination of optimal strategic policies. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.

Rational Rationing in Stackelberg Equilibria

Abstract: In the Contect of Duopoly Theory with Differentiated Products, Economic Theorists Usually Consider the Price As the Choice Variable for the Firms. Given the Prices, the Respective Quantities Demanded and Profits Can Be Computed. in This Paper, We Consider Strategy Spaces Consisting of Both Price and Production Variables. Two Models Are Developped: in One Model, the Firm Will Choose Its Price and the Number of Consumers It Will Serve (A Serving Capacity) While, in the Other Model, It Will Choose the Price and the Total Quantity It Will Produce (A Production Capacity). We Are Particularly Concerned in This Paper with the Existence of Endogenously-Determined Rationing in a Leader-Follower Duopoly Framework. We Show That Rationing Is Always (May Be) Present in Equilibrium When Strategies Are Expressed in Terms of the Price and the Production (Serving) Capacity. Moreover, Only the Leader Or First-Mover Will Or May Engage in Rationing. Rationing Appears Therefore As a Strategic Variable. What May Appear As a Fixed Price Equilibrium Or a Disequilibrium Turns Out in This Case to Be a Strategic Equilibrium with Completely Flexible Prices. an Example Is Worked Out.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

A game theoretic approach to flow control in an integrated environment with two classes of users

Abstract: With the power as the performance criterion, a game-theoretical approach is proposed and analyzed. A network or system optimization solution leads to a Pareto optimal point. In a user or individual optimization setting the Nash and the Stackelberg equilibria are found. A decentralized and easily implementable algorithm is proved to converge to the Nash equilibrium. The choice of the strategy to be used depends on the particular application and the desirable overall performance. >

Stackelberg, cournot and collusive monopoly: performance and welfare comparisons

Abstract: This article compares and evaluates performance and welfare in three classical oligopoly models: Stackelberg leader, Cournot, and collusive monopoly. Hahn's stability conditions render an unambiguous ranking of market price; the monopoly price is highest and the Stackelberg price is lowest. Welfare comparisons are less clear-cut due to additional effects coming from reallocation of outputs among sellers. Conditions under which these reallocation effects will enhance or offset the unambiguous price effects on welfare are discussed and examples are given. Possible implications for antitrust policy, regarding constraints on market share of large producers in noncompetitive markets, are examined.

The solution to a kind of Stackelberg game systems with multi-follower: coordinative and incentive

Abstract: A kind of Stackelberg game problems with multi-follower is dealt with in this paper. In contrast with the general one-leader multifollower Stackelberg game problems, the assumption that the Nash equilibrium relation holds among the followers is not necessary in the discussion of this paper. By selectting a proper strategy, the multifollower problem is transferred to a single-follower problem. In other words, the one-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game problem is transferred to a simplicit-function problem and a one-leader one-follower Stackelberg game problem. The one-leader multi-follower game process is, in fact, the coordinative and incentive process. For a large class of game systems, the general conditions are proposed for the existence of the coordinative and incentive strategies. The one-leader two-follower problems under different performance indexes are discussed in detail in this paper.

What Do Voluntary Export Restraints Do

Abstract: This paper has two aims First, to examine alternative ways of modeling VERS in imperfectly competitive markets This is important, since the effects of VERS are sensitive to the models used Second, to argue that the effects of VERS also depend on whether goods are complements or Substitutes This point is illustrated by extending the model of Krishna (1983) to allow complementary goods to be produced by domestic and foreign firms If goods are substitutes, VERs et at free trade levels raise all profits, while if they are complements, the VERS have no effect Thus tariffs and quotas are fundamentally non-equivalent under Bertrand duopoly when substitute goods are produced, but are equivalent when complementary goods are being produced This is contrasted to the case of Stackelberg leadership Th importance of specifying the effects of any restriction on the payoff functions of agents and using this to analyze its affects on equilibrium of the game is emphasized

Performance versus informativeness in linear-quadratic Gaussian noncooperative games

Abstract: In this paper, we study the impact of informativeness on the performance of linear quadratic Gaussian Nash and Stackelberg games. We first show that, in two-person static Nash games, if one of the players acquires more information, then this extra information is beneficial to him, provided that it is orthogonal to both players' information. A special case is that when one of the players is informationally stronger than the other, then any new information is beneficial to him. We then show that a similar result holds for dynamic Nash games. In the dynamic games, the players use strategies that are linear functions of the current estimates of the state, generated by two Kalman filters. The same properties are proved to hold in static and feedback Stackelberg games as well.

Stackelberg game model incorporating public participation for electric generating system development

Abstract: The present paper represents a two-level multi-follower Stackelberg game linear quadratic model for the electric generating system development. For stable electric supply, the model incorporates the public participation from the point of view of social siting concern. The model analyzes the effects of social siting concern on the generating system development. The interperiod generating capacity balance and several evaluation factors such as the social siting concern play fundamental roles in the model. Its characteristics are investigated by simulation analyses.

Team-coordination Of Sub-Systems In Hierarchical Control Of Large Scale Systems

Abstract: In the hierarchical control problems of the large scale systems, the leader-follower games (so called Stackelberg games) play a very important role. In large scale system, the coordinator (the leader) possesses a supervisory position to coordinate the sub- systems (the followers). A kind of team-coordinative strategies is presented in this paper. The presented strategy possesses the property that transforms the one-leader multi-follower Stackelberag game problem into a implicit-function problem and a one-leader one-follower Stackelberg game problem. Then, with a general incentive strategy, the one-leader one-follower Stackelberg game problem can be solved. For a class of problems of Stackelberg game with two followers, the general conditions are proposed for the existence of the team-coordinative strategies.

The Reduction Of Hierarchical Systems For Manufacturing Plants

Abstract: This paper considers the reduction of hierarchical systems in manufacturing plants. The coufiguratlon of manufacturing systems is briefly described, and the incentive game method is introduced for the decision and control of the systems. Under the nested information structure, a generalized equilibrium solution for a two-person two-level incentive Stackelberg game is given, and extended to one leader N-follower case and N+I-Person N+l- level case. The necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of the solutions are presented. And several equivalence principles are summarized for the reduction of the hierarchical systems.