Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

/pdf/sequencing-and-scheduling-algorithms-and-complexity-lnutyrr3kz.pdf

Sequencing and scheduling: algorithms and complexity

2005년 대한 생화학·분자생물학회 하계학술대회를 다녀와서

https://ira.lib.polyu.edu.hk/bitstream/10397/1269/1/SetupSurvey-2006%28June-19%29.pdf

A survey of scheduling problems with setup times or costs

Complexity and Approximation

Scheduling with batching: A review

In many practical situations, batching of similar jobs to avoid set-ups is performed whilst constructing a schedule. On the other hand, each job may consist of many identical items. Splitting a job often results in improved customer service or in reduced throughput time. Thus, implicit in determining a schedule is a lot-sizing decision which specifies how a job is to be split. This paper proposes a general model which combines batching and lot-sizing decisions with scheduling. A review of research on this type of model is given. Some important open problems for which further research is required are also highlighted.

/pdf/integrating-scheduling-with-batching-and-lot-sizing-a-review-qtiimkfy0d.pdf

Integrating Scheduling with Batching and Lot-Sizing: A Review of Algorithms and Complexity

Although the supply chain management literature is extensive, the benefits and challenges of coordinated decision making within supply chainscheduling models have not been studied. We consider a variety of scheduling, batching, and delivery problems that arise in an arborescent supply chain where a supplier makes deliveries to several manufacturers, who also make deliveries to customers. The objective is to minimize the overall scheduling and delivery cost, using several classical scheduling objectives. This is achieved by scheduling the jobs and forming them into batches, each of which is delivered to the next downstream stage as a single shipment. For each problem, we either derive an efficient dynamic programming algorithm that minimizes the total cost of the supplier or that of the manufacturer, or we demonstrate that this problem is intractable. The total system cost minimization problem of a supplier and manufacturer who make cooperative decisions is also considered. We demonstrate that cooperation between a supplier and a manufacturer may reduce the total system cost by at least 20%, or 25%, or by up to 100%, depending upon the scheduling objective. Finally, we identify incentives and mechanisms for this cooperation, thereby demonstrating that our work has practical implications for improving the efficiency of supply chains.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4132420.pdf

Supply chain scheduling: Batching and delivery

We address the problem of scheduling n jobs on a batching machine to minimize regular scheduling criteria that are non-decreasing in the job completion times A batching machine is a machine that can handle up to b jobs simultaneously The jobs that are processed together form a batch, and all jobs in a batch start and complete at the same time The processing time of a batch is equal to the largest processing time of any job in the batch We analyse two variants: the unbounded model, where b⩾n; and the bounded model, where b<n



For the unbounded model, we give a characterization of a class of optimal schedules, which leads to a generic dynamic programming algorithm that solves the problem of minimizing an arbitrary regular cost function in pseudopolynomial time The characterization leads to more efficient dynamic programming algorithms for specific cost functions: a polynomial algorithm for minimizing the maximum cost, an O(n3) time algorithm for minimizing the number of tardy jobs, an O(n2) time algorithm for minimizing the maximum lateness, and an O(n log n) time algorithm for minimizing the total weighted completion time Furthermore, we prove that minimizing the weighted number of tardy jobs and the total weighted tardiness are NP-hard problems



For the bounded model, we derive an O(nb(b−1)) time dynamic programming algorithm for minimizing total completion time when b>1; for the case with m different processing times, we give a dynamic programming algorithm that requires O(b2m22m) time Moreover, we prove that due date based scheduling criteria give rise to NP-hard problems Finally, we show that an arbitrary regular cost function can be minimized in polynomial time for a fixed number of batches © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

/pdf/scheduling-a-batching-machine-dfh4lgbz76.pdf

Scheduling a batching machine

http://cepac.cheme.cmu.edu/pasilectures/henning/EJOR-BrailsfordSmith.pdf

Chris N. Potts

Papers

Scheduling with batching: A review

Integrating Scheduling with Batching and Lot-Sizing: A Review of Algorithms and Complexity

Supply chain scheduling: Batching and delivery

Scheduling a batching machine

Constraint satisfaction problems: Algorithms and applications