Showing papers by "Christine Parker published in 2012"
Book•
30 Jan 2012
TL;DR: Parker and Nielsen as mentioned in this paper discuss the psychology of self-regulation and the role of compliance in the design of compliance management systems, as well as the social, economic, and political environments for compliance.
Abstract: Contents: 1. Introduction Christine Parker and Vibeke Nielsen PART I: MOTIVES 2. Fear, Duty and Regulatory Compliance: Lessons from Three Research Projects Robert A. Kagan, Neil Gunningham and Dorothy Thornton 3. Motivating Compliance: Economic and Material Motives for Compliance Sally S. Simpson and Melissa Rorie 4. The Psychology of Self-Regulation: Normative Motivations for Compliance Tom Tyler PART II: ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS 5. To Comply or Not to Comply - That Isn't the Question: How Organizations Construct the Meaning of Compliance Lauren B. Edelman and Shauhin A. Talesh 6. The Other Side of the Compliance Relationship Garry C Gray and Susan S Silbey 7. Beyond Compliance: Explaining Business Participation in Voluntary Environmental Programs Jonathon Borck and Cary Coglianese 8. Internal Corporate Compliance Management Systems Christine Parker and Sharon Gilad PART III: REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF COMPLIANCE 9. Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement: Responsive Regulation and Beyond Neil Gunningham 10. Regulatory Enforcement Styles and Compliance Peter May and Soren Winter 11. Voluntary Programs, Regulatory Compliance and the Regulation Dilemma Matthew Potoski and Aseem Prakash 12. Individuals as Enforcers: The Design of Employee Reporting Systems Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel PART IV: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS FOR REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 13. Facing the Compliance Challenge: Hercules, Houdini or the Charge of the Light Brigade? Fiona Haines 14. Negotiating Social, Economic and Political Environments: Compliance with Regulation Within and Beyond the State Bridget Hutter 15. Naming and Shaming in Regulatory Enforcement Judith van Erp 16. The Impact of Private, Industry and Transnational Civil Society Regulation and their Interaction with Official Regulation Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld and Stefan Renckens Index
105 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a typology to conceptualize and measure business motives relevant to compliance behavior and conclude that the path from fundamental interests or motives to behavior is filled with constraints and contingent factors at the individual, organizational, and structural levels.
Abstract: This article develops theoretical understanding of the motives of business firms and their managers for compliance. First, we develop a typology to conceptualize and measure business motives relevant to compliance behavior. We distinguish between three categories of motives: economic, social, and normative. We hypothesize, however, that business firms and their managers do not divide into types motivated exclusively by singular priorities. We expect each firm to hold a constellation of plural motives. Moreover, we expect that economic and social motives are more alike between regulatees within the same regulatory regime than normative motives. Second, we conduct a preliminary test of the plausibility of our typology of motives and our theory of constellations of plural motives using data from a survey of the thousand biggest companies in Australia. Finally, we conclude that the path from fundamental interests or motives to behavior is filled with constraints and contingent factors at the individual, organizational, and structural levels. © 2012 The Authors. Law & Policy © 2012 The University of Denver/Colorado Seminary.
101 citations
TL;DR: This article examined the rationality of anti-cartel law from the point of view of the 'legal consciousness' of 25 business people who have faced enforcement action for cartel conduct, and found that among business people, there are similar differences and ambiguities about the rationale for criminal anticartel laws, and the very meaning of acting economically, as there are among scholars and policy elites.
Abstract: In July 2009, Australia introduced criminal offences and jail for collusive conduct (price fixing, output restriction, market allocation and bid rigging) in markets. The substance of the justification for criminalization of cartel conduct is 'blindly' economic. It does not spring from a sense of moral or political outrage at collusion in the market. Rather, it is justified on the basis of effective regulatory technique, the need to deter economically harmful behaviour. This paper examines the rationality of anti-cartel law from the point of view of the 'legal consciousness' of 25 business people who have faced enforcement action for cartel conduct. Their justifications for their own behaviour in light of the law tell us about how they believe the law can be legitimated. This is compared with policy and scholarly rationales for criminal anti-cartel law. The paper finds that, among business people who have been made subject to the anti-cartel law, there are similar differences and ambiguities about the rationale for criminal anti-cartel law, and the very meaning of acting economically, as there are among scholars and policy elites. This pinpoints one place of instability in the legitimacy of economic rationalities of regulation and governance in action. © 2012 The Author.
32 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine ways of doing that and how empirical research can be used to track ethics across a legal services market consisting of a range of different markets and provider types, both professional and non-professional.
Abstract: Market liberalisation of legal services is being accompanied by key changes in professional regulation, notably outcome focused regulation, prioritised through risk-assessment and invoking stronger elements of relationship management. These suggest changes in the nature of professionalism. For some at least, market liberalisation in particular threatens to weaken professional ethics. Because of the transitions underway in the legal services market, there is a need to better understand the ethics of legal service providers. This report examines ways of doing that. Regulators (and businesses) in other fields and jurisdictions have begun to recognise the limitations of command and control regulation and as a result, an interest in tools which seek to deepen understandings of ethics has grown. Systematic understanding of ethics in the legal services market is remarkably thin. Debate about ethics is often based on anecdote and argument and where it is evidenced at all it usually derives from data on complaints and regulatory enforcement. These are limited sources, subject to limited analysis. Some more detailed specific analyses have been undertaken relevant to particular market sectors (wills) or themes (referral fees). This document reviews how empirical research can be used to track ethics across a legal services market consisting of a range of different markets and provider types, both professional and non-professional.
20 citations
01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate John Ruggie's legacy from the standpoint of the sociology and politics of business regulation and compliance and argue that Ruggies has successfully conducted a political and diplomatic project to connect international human rights law language and methods to practical discourses of corporate social responsibility (CSR) at the United Nations (UN).
Abstract: This chapter evaluates John Ruggie's legacy from the standpoint of the sociology and politics of business regulation and compliance. It argues that Ruggie has successfully conducted a political and diplomatic project to connect international human rights law language and methods to practical discourses of corporate social responsibility (CSR) at the United Nations (UN). The chapter sets out the analytical framework. It suggests that the Framework necessarily formalises-and thus potentially ossifies-what could be agreed by the UN, business and human rights activists at one point in time. The chapter provides comments on the Framework in the spirit of contestation and critique. It also suggest how its ongoing implementation could be adjusted and developed to encourage, or at least allow for, greater accountability for the justice and human rights implications of business activities on people and environments. Keywords:analytical framework; corporate social responsibility (CSR); Diplomatic Project; human rights; John Ruggie; United Nations (UN)
14 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In 2003, one of Australia's "oldest, richest and proudest corporations," James Hardie Industries, restructured itself into a global corporation headquartered in the Netherlands and reduced its tax liability as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Between 2001 and 2003, one of Australia's "oldest, richest and proudest corporations," James Hardie Industries, restructured itself into a global corporation headquartered in the Netherlands. In so doing, it reduced its tax liability. It also "separated itself" from its two original Australian subsidiaries and the huge liabilities stemming from the business that had been the basis for its success from 1917 up until the 1980s, but which was also killing many of its employees and customers. That business was the manufacture and sale of the material that quite literally "built" a nation: "fibrous asbestos cement."
8 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, Caron Beaton-Wells and Christine Parker reveal problems with the assumptions that are made about the likely effects of criminalization on business behavior both as a deterrence mechanism and as a moral inducement.
Abstract: Research revealed problems with the assumptions that are made about the likely effects of criminalization on business behavior both as a deterrence mechanism and as a moral inducement. Caron Beaton-Wells (Univ. of Melbourne) & Christine Parker (Monash Univ.)
8 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The James Hardie Group as discussed by the authors was one of Australia's “oldest, richest and proudest corporations,” which restructured itself into a global corporation based in the Netherlands and reduced its tax liability.
Abstract: Between 2001 and 2003, one of Australia’s “oldest, richest and proudest corporations,”1 James Hardie Industries, restructured itself into a global corporation headquartered in the Netherlands.2 In so doing, it reduced its tax liability. It also “separated itself” from its two original Australian subsidiaries and the huge liabilities stemming from the business that had been the basis for its success from 1917 up until the 1980s, but which was also killing many of its employees and customers.3 That business was the manufacture and sale of the material that quite literally “built” a nation: “fibrous asbestos cement.”4 By the mid-1980s, the James Hardie group had already stopped manufacturing asbestos and was focused on other businesses. 5
5 citations
01 Jan 2012
3 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors report evidence on these issues from a survey of 567 Australian business people whose role makes compliance with anti-cartel law salient, concluding that business people know about the law and believe they are likely to be caught and face enforcement action and jail if they break the law.
Abstract: In July 2009 the Australian Parliament passed legislation criminalising cartel conduct and introducing jail penalties for individuals who engage in cartel behaviour. The rhetoric justifying criminalisation assumes that compliance can be induced through the mechanism of deterrence. This in turn assumes that business people know about the law, and that they believe they are likely to be caught and face enforcement action and jail if they break the law. This paper reports evidence on these issues from a survey of 567 Australian business people whose role makes compliance with anti-cartel law salient.
3 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the extent of influence of the type of professional in charge of compliance on two measures of compliance management behaviors of the businesses and the (substantive) way compliance is managed in practice.
Abstract: 4. Testing Hypothesis 1: Compliance Behavior of Respondent's Company In order to test Hypothesis 1, we evaluate the extent of influence of the type of professional in charge of compliance on two measures of compliance management behaviors of the businesses--implementation of (formal) compliance management systems and the (substantive) way compliance is managed in practice. (114) (a) Implementation of formal compliance system elements (Table 2): The questionnaire asked respondents to provide yes or no answers to a series of twenty-one very specific questions about whether their organization had implemented various procedures and actions expected to be part of a good (formal) compliance system. (115) The questions were later grouped into four different indices measuring the implementation of system elements concerning a) complaints handling, b) communication and training from the top of the organization to employees, c) management accountability and whistle-blowing, and d) compliance performance measurement and discipline. We use these four measures to look at four different dimensions of compliance system implementation (rather than one index of all the items) because businesses will not necessarily implement all potential aspects of compliance systems equally. (116) On the other hand, using these four indices rather than looking at variation in each of the twenty-one elements individually gives a clearer picture that takes into account the fact that there are different ways of performing the different functions of a compliance system. (117) (b) Compliance management in practice (Table 3): Implementation of a compliance system is aimed at putting formal structures in place that managers and employees can use to identify, prevent and correct compliance. (118) This should be helpful in influencing the way activities are managed in practice to improve actual compliance. But it is not enough on its own. (119) It is possible for an organization to implement the various elements of compliance management programs in a formulaic, formalistic, or purely symbolic way. (120) But the key to a compliance management program's impact on compliance will be the impact it has on everyday routines and practices. (121) Effective compliance management in practice means that management and employees identify compliance problems, communicate them to those who can fix them, and rectify them as a part of their everyday routines and practices. (122) The aim of compliance management programs is to ensure compliance by improving compliance management in practice. Again we constructed a single measure by adding together fourteen questions containing specific statements about what business management actually does in order to make sure they comply with the TPA (shown in Table 3). 5. Testing Hypothesis 2: Respondent Company's Risk Analyses Risk analysis requires determining both the magnitude of the loss and the probability that the loss will occur. (123) As there are multiple stakeholders who can sanction non-compliance, the salience of a stakeholder sanction must be determined in addition to the weight it is accorded. (124) As the regulator is reactive, (125) we add to the measure of legal detection of non-compliance, detection by stakeholders. (a) Respondents' Weighting of Losses from Different Stakeholders (Table 4): We measure the way the firm weighs the magnitude of loss for non-compliance resulting from sanctions from different stakeholders by a series of questions asking about how much they would worry about (i) economic losses in relation to various different stakeholders if their firm was accused of breaches of the TPA; and (ii) losses of respect and esteem in relation to various different stakeholders if their firm was accused of breaches of the TPA. These questions are all predicated on the hypothetical that the firm is "accused of breaches of the TPA one day in the future." In so doing, we attempt to segregate out the seriousness of the norm violation from the probability of it being detected. …
01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: In this article, the authors reveal problems with the assumptions that are made about the likely effects of criminalization on business behavior both as deterrence and as moral inducement, and show that these assumptions are incorrect.
Abstract: Tough sanctioning of cartel conduct (price-fixing, market sharing, output reduction, or bid-rigging) are now a focus of competition law and enforcement. However, our research revealed problems with the assumptions that are made about the likely effects of criminalization on business behavior both as deterrence and as moral inducement.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: This article examined the rationality of anti-cartel law from the point of view of the "legal consciousness" of 25 business people who have faced enforcement action for cartel conduct, and found that among business people, there are similar differences and ambiguities about the rationale for criminal anticartel laws, and the very meaning of acting economically, as there are among scholars and policy elites.
Abstract: In July 2009, Australia introduced criminal offences and jail for collusive conduct (price fixing, output restriction, market allocation and bid rigging) in markets. The substance of the justification for criminalization of cartel conduct is ‘blindly’ economic. It does not spring from a sense of moral or political outrage at collusion in the market. Rather, it is justified on the basis of effective regulatory technique, the need to deter economically harmful behaviour. This paper examines the rationality of anti-cartel law from the point of view of the ‘legal consciousness’ of 25 business people who have faced enforcement action for cartel conduct. Their justifications for their own behaviour in light of the law tell us about how they believe the law can be legitimated. This is compared with policy and scholarly rationales for criminal anti-cartel law. The paper finds that, among business people who have been made subject to the anti-cartel law, there are similar differences and ambiguities about the rationale for criminal anti-cartel law, and the very meaning of acting economically, as there are among scholars and policy elites. This pinpoints one place of instability in the legitimacy of economic rationalities of regulation and governance in action.