/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.

http://www.maths.lse.ac.uk/Personal/stengel/TEXTE/agt-stengel.pdf

Algorithmic Game Theory

Cost Effectiveness in Health and Medicine.

ESPEN guideline on clinical nutrition and hydration in geriatrics

Existence of equilibrium actions and of equilibrium: A note on the ‘new’ existence theorems

1. Introduction.- 1. Collective decisions and power structure.- 2. Social choice.- 3. Games and game forms.- 4. The effectivity functions of a game form.- 5. Effectivity functions and cooperative games.- 6. An overview of the book.- 7. Notes.- 2. The structure of effectivity functions.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Fundamental concepts.- 3. Polarity.- 4. Selected families of effectivity functions.- 5. Topological effectivity functions.- 6. Notes.- 3. Stability.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The core of an effectivity function.- 3. Stable effectivity functions.- 4. Stability of convex effectivity functions.- 5. Acyclicity and stability.- 6. Stable veto functions.- 7. Notes.- 4. Implementation.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Implementation of social choice correspondences by game forms.- 3. Monotonic social choice functions.- 4. Notes.- 5. Implementation in strong Nash equilibrium.- 1. Strong Nash equilibrium.- 2. The effectivity functions of a strongly Nash implementable social choice correspondence.- 3. The fundamental theorem.- 4. The nucleus.- 5. The supernucleus.- 6. The subcore.- 7. A characterization of strong Nash implementable social choice correspondences.- 8. Notes.- 6. Exact and strong consistency.- 1. Self-implementation.- 2. Successive elimination and exact and.- consistency.- 3. The Holzman conditions.- 4. Notes.- 7. Implementation in coalition proof Nash equilibrium.- 1. Coalition proof Nash equilibrium.- 2. Implementation in coalition proof Nash equilibrium.- 3. Uniform domination.- 4. U-effectiveness and indirect u-domination.- 5. Notes.- 8. Other effectivity functions.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The ?-effectivity function.- 3. Cooperative equilibria of type 1.- 4. Equilibria of type 2 and 3.- 5. Notes.- 9. Value of effectivity functions.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Effectivity functions with convex feasible sets.- 3. Correlated strategies and effectivity functions.- 4. Effectivity functions of repeated games.- 5. Notes.- References.

Effectivity functions in social choice

Background: Seasonal allergic rhinoconjunctivitis can, for some people, reduce quality of life and the ability to cope with everyday tasks.Scope: In this paper we investigate the cost-effective­ness of immunization therapy with Alutard SQ (ASQ) and compare the cost-effectiveness in countries where the therapy has been in use in order to assess the impact of national therapeutic practices on the results of health economic assessments. Data are obtained from a clinical trial carried out in 2001–2002. To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of immunization we have added data on resource use in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden.Findings: The computations result in cost-effectiveness ratios for allergen immunization between €10 000 and €20 000 per QALY even without provision for indirect costs, and achieving dominance in most countries where indirect costs have also been taken into account. The country comparisons show that the direct cost of administrating the up-dosing and ma...

A cost-effectiveness analysis of immunotherapy with SQ allergen extract for patients with seasonal allergic rhinoconjunctivitis in selected European countries

The compromise value is introduced as a single-valued solution concept for NTU-games. It is shown that the compromise value coincides with the τ-value for TU-games and with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for bargaining problems. In addition the axiomatic characterizations of both the two-person Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the τ-value can be extended to the compromise value for large classes of NTU-games.

/pdf/the-compromise-value-for-ntu-games-2d6dqihg13.pdf

Hans Keiding

Papers

Existence of equilibrium actions and of equilibrium: A note on the ‘new’ existence theorems

Effectivity functions in social choice

A cost-effectiveness analysis of immunotherapy with SQ allergen extract for patients with seasonal allergic rhinoconjunctivitis in selected European countries

The compromise value for NTU-games

An environmental performance index for products reflecting damage costs