1. The Advanced Encryption Standard Process.- 2. Preliminaries.- 3. Specification of Rijndael.- 4. Implementation Aspects.- 5. Design Philosophy.- 6. The Data Encryption Standard.- 7. Correlation Matrices.- 8. Difference Propagation.- 9. The Wide Trail Strategy.- 10. Cryptanalysis.- 11. Related Block Ciphers.- Appendices.- A. Propagation Analysis in Galois Fields.- A.1.1 Difference Propagation.- A.l.2 Correlation.- A. 1.4 Functions that are Linear over GF(2).- A.2.1 Difference Propagation.- A.2.2 Correlation.- A.2.4 Functions that are Linear over GF(2).- A.3.3 Dual Bases.- A.4.2 Relationship Between Trace Patterns and Selection Patterns.- A.4.4 Illustration.- A.5 Rijndael-GF.- B. Trail Clustering.- B.1 Transformations with Maximum Branch Number.- B.2 Bounds for Two Rounds.- B.2.1 Difference Propagation.- B.2.2 Correlation.- B.3 Bounds for Four Rounds.- B.4 Two Case Studies.- B.4.1 Differential Trails.- B.4.2 Linear Trails.- C. Substitution Tables.- C.1 SRD.- C.2 Other Tables.- C.2.1 xtime.- C.2.2 Round Constants.- D. Test Vectors.- D.1 KeyExpansion.- D.2 Rijndael(128,128).- D.3 Other Block Lengths and Key Lengths.- E. Reference Code.

The Design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced Encryption Standard

We propose a novel paradigm for defining security of cryptographic protocols, called universally composable security. The salient property of universally composable definitions of security is that they guarantee security even when a secure protocol is composed of an arbitrary set of protocols, or more generally when the protocol is used as a component of an arbitrary system. This is an essential property for maintaining security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as the Internet. In particular, universally composable definitions guarantee security even when an unbounded number of protocol instances are executed concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner, they guarantee non-malleability with respect to arbitrary protocols, and more. We show how to formulate universally composable definitions of security for practically any cryptographic task. Furthermore, we demonstrate that practically any such definition can be realized using known techniques, as long as only a minority of the participants are corrupted. We then proceed to formulate universally composable definitions of a wide array of cryptographic tasks, including authenticated and secure communication, key-exchange, public-key encryption, signature, commitment, oblivious transfer, zero knowledge and more. We also make initial steps towards studying the realizability of the proposed definitions in various settings.

/pdf/universally-composable-security-a-new-paradigm-for-3kyhnjofve.pdf

Universally composable security: a new paradigm for cryptographic protocols

After two decades of research and development, elliptic curve cryptography now has widespread exposure and acceptance. Industry, banking, and government standards are in place to facilitate extensive deployment of this efficient public-key mechanism. Anchored by a comprehensive treatment of the practical aspects of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), this guide explains the basic mathematics, describes state-of-the-art implementation methods, and presents standardized protocols for public-key encryption, digital signatures, and key establishment. In addition, the book addresses some issues that arise in software and hardware implementation, as well as side-channel attacks and countermeasures. Readers receive the theoretical fundamentals as an underpinning for a wealth of practical and accessible knowledge about efficient application. Features & Benefits: * Breadth of coverage and unified, integrated approach to elliptic curve cryptosystems * Describes important industry and government protocols, such as the FIPS 186-2 standard from the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology * Provides full exposition on techniques for efficiently implementing finite-field and elliptic curve arithmetic* Distills complex mathematics and algorithms for easy understanding* Includes useful literature references, a list of algorithms, and appendices on sample parameters, ECC standards, and software toolsThis comprehensive, highly focused reference is a useful and indispensable resource for practitioners, professionals, or researchers in computer science, computer engineering, network design, and network data security.

https://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/cryptography/Hankerson,%20Menezes,%20Vanstone.%20Guide%20to%20elliptic%20curve%20cryptography%20(Springer,%202004)(ISBN%20038795273X)(332s)_CsCr_.pdf

Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography

As sensor networks edge closer towards wide-spread deployment, security issues become a central concern. So far, much research has focused on making sensor networks feasible and useful, and has not concentrated on security.We present a suite of security building blocks optimized for resource-constrained environments and wireless communication. SPINS has two secure building blocks: SNEP and mTESLA SNEP provides the following important baseline security primitives: Data confidentiality, two-party data authentication, and data freshness. A particularly hard problem is to provide efficient broadcast authentication, which is an important mechanism for sensor networks. mTESLA is a new protocol which provides authenticated broadcast for severely resource-constrained environments. We implemented the above protocols, and show that they are practical even on minimal hardware: the performance of the protocol suite easily matches the data rate of our network. Additionally, we demonstrate that the suite can be used for building higher level protocols.

http://www.csl.mtu.edu/cs5461/www/Reading/Perrig02.pdf

SPINS: security protocols for sensor networks

A classical model is used for the power consumption of cryptographic devices. It is based on the Hamming distance of the data handled with regard to an unknown but constant reference state. Once validated experimentally it allows an optimal attack to be derived called Correlation Power Analysis. It also explains the defects of former approaches such as Differential Power Analysis.

/pdf/correlation-power-analysis-with-a-leakage-model-43r492wcsc.pdf

Correlation Power Analysis with a Leakage Model

We present template attacks, the strongest form of side channel attack possible in an information theoretic sense. These attacks can break implementations and countermeasures whose security is dependent on the assumption that an adversary cannot obtain more than one or a limited number of side channel samples. They require that an adversary has access to an identical experimental device that he can program to his choosing. The success of these attacks in such constraining situations is due manner in which noise within each sample is handled. In contrast to previous approaches which viewed noise as a hindrance that had to be reduced or eliminated, our approach focuses on precisely modeling noise, and using this to fully extract information present in a single sample. We describe in detail how an implementation of RC4, not amenable to techniques such as SPA and DPA, can easily be broken using template attacks with a single sample. Other applications include attacks on certain DES implementations which use DPA-resistant hardware and certain SSL accelerators which can be attacked by monitoring electromagnetic emanations from an RSA operation even from distances of fifteen feet.

Template Attacks

Side channel cryptanalysis techniques, such as the analysis of instantaneous power consumption, have been extremely effective in attacking implementations on simple hardware platforms. There are several proposed solutions to resist these attacks, most of which are ad-hoc and can easily be rendered ineffective. A scientific approach is to create a model for the physical characteristics of the device, and then design implementations provably secure in that model, i.e, they resist generic attacks with an a priori bound on the number of experiments. We propose an abstract model which approximates power consumption in most devices and in particular small single-chip devices. Using this, we propose a generic technique to create provably resistant implementations for devices where the power model has reasonable properties, and a source of randomness exists. We prove a lower bound on the number of experiments required to mount statistical attacks on devices whose physical characteristics satisfy reasonable properties.

/pdf/towards-sound-approaches-to-counteract-power-analysis-2ahx28uuq3.pdf

Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks

We present results of a systematic investigation of leakage of compromising information via electromagnetic (EM) emanations from CMOS devices. These emanations are shown to consist of a multiplicity of signals, each leaking somewhat different information about the underlying computation. We show that not only can EM emanations be used to attack cryptographic devices where the power side-channel is unavailable, they can even be used to break power analysis countermeasures.

/pdf/the-em-side-channel-s-976joojd85.pdf

The EM Side-Channel(s)

Hardware manufacturers are increasingly outsourcing their IC fabrication work overseas due to their much lower cost structure. This poses a significant security risk for ICs used for critical military and business applications. Attackers can exploit this loss of control to substitute Trojan ICs for genuine ones or insert a Trojan circuit into the design or mask used for fabrication. We show that a technique borrowed from side-channel cryptanalysis can be used to mitigate this problem. Our approach uses noise modeling to construct a set of fingerprints/or an IC family utilizing side- channel information such as power, temperature, and electromagnetic (EM) profiles. The set of fingerprints can be developed using a few ICs from a batch and only these ICs would have to be invasively tested to ensure that they were all authentic. The remaining ICs are verified using statistical tests against the fingerprints. We describe the theoretical framework and present preliminary experimental results to show that this approach is viable by presenting results obtained by using power simulations performed on representative circuits with several different Trojan circuitry. These results show that Trojans that are 3-4 orders of magnitude smaller than the main circuit can be detected by signal processing techniques. While scaling our technique to detect even smaller Trojans in complex ICs with tens or hundreds of millions of transistors would require certain modifications to the IC design process, our results provide a starting point to address this important problem.

/pdf/trojan-detection-using-ic-fingerprinting-4p1lpfee2q.pdf

Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting

The power consumed by a circuit varies according to the activity of its individual transistors and other components As a result, measurements of the power used by actual computers or microchips contain information about the operations being performed and the data being processed Cryptographic designs have traditionally assumed that secrets are manipulated in environments that expose no information beyond the specified inputs and outputs This paper examines how information leaked through power consumption and other side channels can be analyzed to extract secret keys from a wide range of devices The attacks are practical, non-invasive, and highly effective—even against complex and noisy systems where cryptographic computations account for only a small fraction of the overall power consumption We also introduce approaches for preventing DPA attacks and for building cryptosystems that remain secure even when implemented in hardware that leaks

/pdf/introduction-to-differential-power-analysis-3gzgydg5a4.pdf

Pankaj Rohatgi

Papers

Template Attacks

Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks

The EM Side-Channel(s)

Trojan Detection using IC Fingerprinting

Introduction to differential power analysis