Introduction to differential power analysis
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This paper examines how information leaked through power consumption and other side channels can be analyzed to extract secret keys from a wide range of devices and introduces approaches for preventing DPA attacks and for building cryptosystems that remain secure even when implemented in hardware that leaks.Abstract:
The power consumed by a circuit varies according to the activity of its individual transistors and other components As a result, measurements of the power used by actual computers or microchips contain information about the operations being performed and the data being processed Cryptographic designs have traditionally assumed that secrets are manipulated in environments that expose no information beyond the specified inputs and outputs This paper examines how information leaked through power consumption and other side channels can be analyzed to extract secret keys from a wide range of devices The attacks are practical, non-invasive, and highly effective—even against complex and noisy systems where cryptographic computations account for only a small fraction of the overall power consumption We also introduce approaches for preventing DPA attacks and for building cryptosystems that remain secure even when implemented in hardware that leaksread more
Citations
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Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Paul C. Kocher,Jann Horn,Anders Fogh,Daniel Genkin,Daniel Gruss,Werner Haas,Mike Hamburg,Moritz Lipp,Stefan Mangard,Thomas Prescher,Michael Schwarz,Yuval Yarom +11 more
TL;DR: Spectre as mentioned in this paper is a side channel attack that can leak the victim's confidential information via side channel to the adversary. And it can read arbitrary memory from a victim's process.
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Security attacks in IoT: A survey
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References
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Book ChapterDOI
Differential Power Analysis
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. And they also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.
Book ChapterDOI
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
TL;DR: By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operalions, attackers may be able to find fixed Diffie-Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems.
Journal ArticleDOI
Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems
Eli Biham,Adi Shamir +1 more
TL;DR: A new type of cryptanalytic attack is developed which can break the reduced variant of DES with eight rounds in a few minutes on a personal computer and can break any reduced variantof DES (with up to 15 rounds) using less than 256 operations and chosen plaintexts.
Book ChapterDOI
Correlation Power Analysis with a Leakage Model
TL;DR: A classical model is used for the power consumption of cryptographic devices based on the Hamming distance of the data handled with regard to an unknown but constant reference state, which allows an optimal attack to be derived called Correlation Power Analysis.