The contribution of the amygdala and hippocampus to the acquisition of conditioned fear responses to a cue (a tone paired with footshock) and to context (background stimuli continuously present in the apparatus in which tone-shock pairings occurred) was examined in rats. In unoperated controls, responses to the cue conditioned faster and were more resistant to extinction than were responses to contextual stimuli. Lesions of the amygdala interfered with the conditioning of fear responses to both the cue and the context, whereas lesions of the hippocampus interfered with conditioning to the context but not to the cue. The amygdala is thus involved in the conditioning of fear responses to simple, modality-specific conditioned stimuli as well as to complex, polymodal stimuli, whereas the hippocampus is only involved in fear conditioning situations involving complex, polymodal events. These findings suggest an associative role for the amygdala and a sensory relay role for the hippocampus in fear conditioning.

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Differential Contribution of Amygdala and Hippocampus to Cued and Contextual Fear Conditioning

Introduction
Debate continues over the precise causal contribution made by mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward. There are three competing explanatory categories: ‘liking’, learning, and ‘wanting’. Does dopamine mostly mediate the hedonic impact of reward (‘liking’)? Does it instead mediate learned predictions of future reward, prediction error teaching signals and stamp in associative links (learning)? Or does dopamine motivate the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli (‘wanting’)? Each hypothesis is evaluated here, and it is suggested that the incentive salience or ‘wanting’ hypothesis of dopamine function may be consistent with more evidence than either learning or ‘liking’. In brief, recent evidence indicates that dopamine is neither necessary nor sufficient to mediate changes in hedonic ‘liking’ for sensory pleasures. Other recent evidence indicates that dopamine is not needed for new learning, and not sufficient to directly mediate learning by causing teaching or prediction signals. By contrast, growing evidence indicates that dopamine does contribute causally to incentive salience. Dopamine appears necessary for normal ‘wanting’, and dopamine activation can be sufficient to enhance cue-triggered incentive salience. Drugs of abuse that promote dopamine signals short circuit and sensitize dynamic mesolimbic mechanisms that evolved to attribute incentive salience to rewards. Such drugs interact with incentive salience integrations of Pavlovian associative information with physiological state signals. That interaction sets the stage to cause compulsive ‘wanting’ in addiction, but also provides opportunities for experiments to disentangle ‘wanting’, ‘liking’, and learning hypotheses. Results from studies that exploited those opportunities are described here.

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The debate over dopamine’s role in reward: the case for incentive salience

In this review, we consider the potential functional role of beta-band oscillations, which at present is not yet well understood. We discuss evidence from recent studies on top-down mechanisms involved in cognitive processing, on the motor system and on the pathophysiology of movement disorders that suggest a unifying hypothesis: beta-band activity seems related to the maintenance of the current sensorimotor or cognitive state. We hypothesize that beta oscillations and/or coupling in the beta-band are expressed more strongly if the maintenance of the status quo is intended or predicted, than if a change is expected. Moreover, we suggest that pathological enhancement of beta-band activity is likely to result in an abnormal persistence of the status quo and a deterioration of flexible behavioural and cognitive control.

Beta-band oscillations--signalling the status quo?

Time is a fundamental dimension of life. It is crucial for decisions about quantity, speed of movement and rate of return, as well as for motor control in walking, speech, playing or appreciating music, and participating in sports. Traditionally, the way in which time is perceived, represented and estimated has been explained using a pacemaker-accumulator model that is not only straightforward, but also surprisingly powerful in explaining behavioural and biological data. However, recent advances have challenged this traditional view. It is now proposed that the brain represents time in a distributed manner and tells the time by detecting the coincidental activation of different neural populations.

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What makes us tick? Functional and neural mechanisms of interval timing

The hippocampal formation can encode relative spatial location, without reference to external cues, by the integration of linear and angular self-motion (path integration). Theoretical studies, in conjunction with recent empirical discoveries, suggest that the medial entorhinal cortex (MEC) might perform some of the essential underlying computations by means of a unique, periodic synaptic matrix that could be self-organized in early development through a simple, symmetry-breaking operation. The scale at which space is represented increases systematically along the dorsoventral axis in both the hippocampus and the MEC, apparently because of systematic variation in the gain of a movement-speed signal. Convergence of spatially periodic input at multiple scales, from so-called grid cells in the entorhinal cortex, might result in non-periodic spatial firing patterns (place fields) in the hippocampus.

Path integration and the neural basis of the 'cognitive map'

The negatively accelerated, gradually increasing learning curve is an artifact of group averaging in several commonly used basic learning paradigms (pigeon autoshaping, delay- and trace-eye-blink conditioning in the rabbit and rat, autoshaped hopper entry in the rat, plus maze performance in the rat, and water maze performance in the mouse) The learning curves for individual subjects show an abrupt, often step-like increase from the untrained level of responding to the level seen in the well trained subject The rise is at least as abrupt as that commonly seen in psychometric functions in stimulus detection experiments It may indicate that the appearance of conditioned behavior is mediated by an evidence-based decision process, as in stimulus detection experiments If the appearance of conditioned behavior is taken instead to reflect the increase in an underlying associative strength, then a negligible portion of the function relating associative strength to amount of experience is behaviorally visible Consequently, rate of learning cannot be estimated from the group-average curve; the best measure is latency to the onset of responding, determined for each subject individually

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The learning curve: Implications of a quantitative analysis

Context and Learning

Inhibition of mediodorsal thalamus disrupts thalamofrontal connectivity and cognition.

Mice with Chronically Elevated Dopamine Exhibit Enhanced Motivation, but not Learning, for a Food Reward

https://www.cell.com/trends/neurosciences/pdf/S0166-2236(08)00279-8.pdf

Peter D. Balsam

Papers

The learning curve: Implications of a quantitative analysis

Context and Learning

Inhibition of mediodorsal thalamus disrupts thalamofrontal connectivity and cognition.

Mice with Chronically Elevated Dopamine Exhibit Enhanced Motivation, but not Learning, for a Food Reward

Temporal maps and informativeness in associative learning