We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets (JEL C78, C90, D63, D64, H41)

/pdf/erc-a-theory-of-equity-reciprocity-and-competition-9lhkqwqjzg.pdf

ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition

With the publication of The Logic of Collective Action in 1965, Mancur Olson challenged a cherished foundation of modern democratic thought that groups would tend to form and take collective action...

/pdf/collective-action-and-the-evolution-of-social-norms-39il4hoxmh.pdf

Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

This article discusses the economic implications of reciprocity. A long-standing tradition in economics views human beings as exclusively self-interested. In most economic accounts of individual behavior and aggregate social phenomena, the vast forces of greed are put at the center of the explanation. However, many people deviate from purely self-interested behavior in a reciprocal manner. Reciprocity means that in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal. There is considerable evidence that a substantial fraction of people behave according to this dictum: People repay gifts and take revenge even in interactions with complete strangers and even if it is costly for them and yields neither present nor future material rewards. This notion of reciprocity is thus very different from kind or hostile responses in repeated interactions that are solely motivated by future material gains.

/pdf/fairness-and-retaliation-the-economics-of-reciprocity-3kli7g3xjv.pdf

Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity

In recent years, there has been a steadily increasing interest on the part of economists in happiness research. We argue that reported subjective well-being is a satisfactory empirical approximation to individual utility and that happiness research is able to contribute important insights for economics. We report how the economic variables income, unemployment and inflation affect happiness as well as how institutional factors, in particular the type of democracy and the extent of government decentralization, systematically influence how satisfied individuals are with their life. We discuss some of the consequences for economic policy and for economic theory.

/pdf/what-can-economists-learn-from-happiness-research-tp056e628i.pdf

What can economists learn from happiness research

https://www.econ.uzh.ch/dam/jcr:ffffffff-9758-127f-0000-00003449356a/ArePeopleCondCooperative.pdf

Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

Informational cascades with continuous action spaces

http://www.crema-research.ch/papers/2004-09.pdf

Implications for Trust and Trustworthiness When Institutions Change

In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction when asymmetric contracts are given.

Strategic Delegation In Experimental Markets

The findings on the ultimatum game are considered as belonging to the most robust experimental results In this paper we present a slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of Bolton and Zwick (1995) Whereas in the latter exactly equal splits were feasible in our games these were replaced by nearly equal splits favoring (slightly) the proposer in one version and the responder in a second version Such a minor change should not matter if behavior was robust We found, however, a behavioral discontinuity in the sense that fair offers occur less often when equal splits are replaced by nearly equal splits This has implications for theories incorporating fairness into economics

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/61247/1/72112979X.pdf

The relevance of equal splits: On a behavioral discontinuity in ultimatum games

Previous studies of charitable giving have focused on middle or higher income earners in Western countries, neglecting the poor. Despite this focus, the lowest income groups are often shown to contribute substantial shares of their income to charitable causes. In a large-scale natural field experiment with over 180,000 cli-ents of a micro-lending company in Kyrgyzstan, we study charitable giving by a population that is much poorer relative to the typical donors that have been stud-ied so far. In a 2x2 design, we explore two main hypotheses about giving by the poor: (i) that they are more price sensitive and (ii) that they care about their prox-imity to the charitable project. We find evidence in favor of the former hypothesis but not of the latter.

Steffen Huck

Papers

Informational cascades with continuous action spaces

Implications for Trust and Trustworthiness When Institutions Change

Strategic Delegation In Experimental Markets

The relevance of equal splits: On a behavioral discontinuity in ultimatum games

Charitable giving by the poor: A field experiment on matching and distance to charitable output in Kyrgyzstan