Steffen Huck

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that despite anonymous interaction a preference for punishing unfair offers is an evolutionarily successful strategy if players interact in small groups, which leads players to split the resource equally almost always.

TL;DR: A slightly altered version of the mini ultimatum game of G. E. Bolton and R. Zwick is presented, finding a significant change in behavior: Fair offers occur less often when equal splits are replaced by nearly equal splits.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the impact of the publication of firm-specific data on the competitiveness of experimental oligopoly markets, and they find that more information leads to more competition.

TL;DR: Bohnet et al. as mentioned in this paper compared the effects of indirect and direct reputation-building in a binary-choice trust game where a buyer (the trustor) can either interact with the seller (the trustee) or exit.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the literatures on behavioral economics, bounded rationality and experimental economics as they apply to firm behavior in markets, including the impact of imitative and satisficing behavior by firms, outcomes when managers care about their position relative to peers, the benefits of employing managers whose objective diverges from profit-maximization (including managers who are overconfident or base pricing decisions on sunk costs), and the effect of social preferences on the ability to collude.