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Showing papers in "British Journal of Political Science in 2011"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors provide a foundational discussion and definition of expressive behaviour accounting for a range of factors. But no clear definition of the expressive behavior has gained wide acceptance yet, and no detailed understanding of the range of foundations of specific expressive motivations has emerged.
Abstract: A growing literature has focused attention on ‘expressive’ rather than ‘instrumental’ behaviour in political settings, particularly voting. A common criticism of the expressive idea is that it is ad hoc and lacks both predictive and normative bite. No clear definition of expressive behaviour has gained wide acceptance yet, and no detailed understanding of the range of foundations of specific expressive motivations has emerged. This article provides a foundational discussion and definition of expressive behaviour accounting for a range of factors. The content of expressive choice – distinguishing between identity-based, moral and social cases – is discussed and related to the specific theories of expressive choice in the literature. There is also a discussion of the normative and institutional implications of expressive behaviour.

227 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors place active, interpretive agents at the centre of analysis, in institutional settings modelled as more flexible than those found in "sticky" versions of historical institutionalism.
Abstract: Rational choice, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism are under criticism from a new ‘constructivist institutionalism’ – with critics claiming that established positions cannot explain institutional change effectively, because agents are highly constrained by their institutional environments. These alleged problems in explaining institutional change are exaggerated and can be dealt with by using a suitably tailored historical institutionalism. This places active, interpretive agents at the centre of analysis, in institutional settings modelled as more flexible than those found in ‘sticky’ versions of historical institutionalism. This alternative approach also absorbs core elements of constructivism in explaining institutional change. The article concludes with empirical illustrations, mainly from Australian politics, of the key claims about how agents operate within institutions with ‘bounded discretion’, and how institutional environments can shape and even empower agency in change processes.

227 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper used a multi-level modeling approach to estimate the effect of ethnic diversity on measures of generalized and strategic trust using data from a new survey in Britain with a sample size approaching 25,000 individuals.
Abstract: We use a multi-level modelling approach to estimate the effect of ethnic diversity on measures of generalized and strategic trust using data from a new survey in Britain with a sample size approaching 25,000 individuals. In addition to the ethnic diversity of neighbourhoods, we incorporate a range of indicators of the socio-economic characteristics of individuals and the areas in which they live. Our results show no effect of ethnic diversity on generalized trust. There is a statistically significant association between diversity and a measure of strategic trust, but in substantive terms, the effect is trivial and dwarfed by the effects of economic deprivation and the social connectedness of individuals.

191 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper showed that defections from a hegemonic party under poor economic performance increases as income declines, and their case studies of defections in Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF in 2008 and Turkey under the Democratic Party in 1955 provide evidence for this proposition.
Abstract: Hegemonic party regimes are non-democratic regimes that (1) rule with the aid of a dominant political party and (2) hold multi-party elections. Elite coalitions organized under the aegis of a hegemonic party are most vulnerable in elections that coincide with poor economic performance. A declining economy provides elites with a platform around which they can mobilize support to challenge incumbents in elections. As a result, the likelihood of defections from hegemonic parties increases as income declines. This study’s original dataset, which includes 227 elections for the chief executive in hegemonic party dictatorships from 1946 to 2004, and its case studies of defections in Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF in 2008 and Turkey under the Democratic Party in 1955 provide evidence for this proposition.

144 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors pointed out that scholars of the social sciences remained interested in education "too briefly" and soon wandered back to their respective home turf, allowing: organizational theorists to gaze awhile upon the odd ways of universities and then return to the business firm; political scientists to assemble some essays on government and higher education and then go back to traditional political institutions; economists to measure some inputs and outputs and speculate on benefits and costs and then find other topics for their tools; sociologists to absorb education in the study of stratification and forget about the rest.
Abstract: More than twenty-five years ago, the prominent educational scholar Burton R. Clark began his seminal contribution to the governance of higher education institutions with a lament. After noting an upsurge of interest in the study of education at that time, he complained that scholars of the social sciences remained interested in education ‘too briefly’ and soon wandered back to their respective home turf, allowing: organizational theorists to gaze awhile upon the odd ways of universities and then return to the business firm; political scientists to assemble some essays on government and higher education and then go back to traditional political institutions; economists to measure some inputs and outputs and speculate on benefits and costs and then find other topics for their tools; sociologists to absorb education in the study of stratification and forget about the rest. (Clark 1983: 1)

117 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test competing spatial and valence theories of party choice and investigate the hypothesis that spatial calculations provide cues for making valence judgements, finding that valence mechanisms outperform a spatial model in terms of strength of direct effects on party choice.
Abstract: A six-wave 2005–09 national panel survey conducted in conjunction with the British Election Study provided data for an investigation of sources of stability and change in voters’ party preferences. The authors test competing spatial and valence theories of party choice and investigate the hypothesis that spatial calculations provide cues for making valence judgements. Analyses reveal that valence mechanisms – heuristics based on party leader images, party performance evaluations and mutable partisan attachments – outperform a spatial model in terms of strength of direct effects on party choice. However, spatial effects still have sizeable indirect effects on the vote via their influence on valence judgements. The results of exogeneity tests bolster claims about the flow of influence from spatial calculations to valence judgments to electoral choice.

116 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A theory of the distribution of responsibility, combining insights from the political economy of development and the study of mass behaviour, is presented in this article, showing that citizens often blame policy outcomes on international and private-sector actors, to which they, as voters, have no direct recourse.
Abstract: International structures tie the hands of policy makers in the developing world. Dependency on the world economy is blamed for low growth, high volatility and less redistribution of income than average, but the effect of international constraints on mass politics is relatively unknown. This study examines how citizens of developing democracies assign responsibility for policy outcomes. A theory of the distribution of responsibility, combining insights from the political economy of development and the study of mass behaviour, is presented. Evidence from seventeen Latin American countries shows that citizens often blame policy outcomes on international and private-sector actors, to which they, as voters, have no direct recourse. Ties to world markets and the International Monetary Fund, especially foreign debt, shift responsibility towards international actors and tend to exonerate national politicians.

106 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, an informal social network (ISN) model was proposed to explain individually rational non-altruistic voting participation in the United States, and the authors found that if group variables that affect whether voting is used as a marker of individual standing in groups are included, the likelihood of turnout rises dramatically.
Abstract: Classical rational choice explanations of voting participation are widely thought to have failed. This article argues that the currently dominant Group Mobilization and Ethical Agency approaches have serious shortcomings in explaining individually rational turnout. It develops an informal social network (ISN) model in which people rationally vote if their informal networks of family and friends attach enough importance to voting, because voting leads to social approval and vice versa. Using results from the social psychology literature, research on social groups in sociology and their own survey data, the authors argue that the ISN model can explain individually rational non-altruistic turnout. If group variables that affect whether voting is used as a marker of individual standing in groups are included, the likelihood of turnout rises dramatically.

99 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the extent of party-system extremism in thirty-one electoral democracies as a function of electoral-system proportionality is evaluated. And the authors show that more proportional systems support greater ideological dispersion, while less proportional systems encourage parties to cluster nearer the centre of the electoral space.
Abstract: This study evaluates the extent of party-system extremism in thirty-one electoral democracies as a function of electoral-system proportionality. It uses data from the Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems project to estimate the extent of party-system compactness or dispersion across polities and to determine whether more proportional systems foster greater ideological divergence among parties. Electoral system characteristics most associated with party-system compactness in the ideological space are investigated. The empirics show that more proportional systems support greater ideological dispersion, while less proportional systems encourage parties to cluster nearer the centre of the electoral space. This finding is maintained in several sub-samples of national elections and does not depend on the inclusion of highly majoritarian systems (such as the United Kingdom).

93 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article analyzed geo-coded surveys from the United States and the UK to identify when residents' attitudes are influenced by living near immigrant communities and found that local contextual effects hinge on national politics.
Abstract: Theories of inter-group threat hold that local concentrations of immigrants produce resource competition and anti-immigrant attitudes. Variants of these theories are commonly applied to Britain and the United States. Yet the empirical tests have been inconsistent. This paper analyses geo-coded surveys from both countries to identify when residents’ attitudes are influenced by living near immigrant communities. Pew surveys from the United States and the 2005 British Election Study illustrate how local contextual effects hinge on national politics. Contextual effects appear primarily when immigration is a nationally salient issue, which explains why past research has not always found a threat. Seemingly local disputes have national catalysts. The paper also demonstrates how panel data can reduce selection biases that plague research on local contextual effects. In the 1970s, a native-born British woman complained about her West Indian neighbours, telling an interviewer: ‘There’s too much noise with the foreigners y We just can’t go where we want any more. Why should they get National Health Service benefits?’ 1 For this London resident, immigrants provoked both local concerns about neighbourhood life and national concerns about the distribution of benefits. Similar anti-immigrant sentiments were common in many parts of Britain during the 1970s, when immigration and integration were salient issues. 2 In recent years, these questions have reappeared on the British political agenda periodically, brought to the fore by riots, terrorist attacks, international events, migration within Europe and the political parties. 3

88 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a method of estimating the political centre using public opinion data collected for the period between 1950 and 2005 is presented, and it is demonstrated that it is possible to measure the centre in Britain, that it moves over time and it shifts in response to government activity and furthermore, it has an observable association with general election outcomes.
Abstract: The political ‘centre’ is often discussed in debates about public policy and analyses of party strategies and election outcomes. Yet, to date, there has been little effort to estimate the political centre outside the United States. This article outlines a method of estimating the political centre using public opinion data collected for the period between 1950 and 2005. It is demonstrated that it is possible to measure the centre in Britain, that it moves over time, that it shifts in response to government activity and, furthermore, that it has an observable association with general election outcomes.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors claim that enduring psychological differences, such as differences in personality, influence patterns of political participation, and that these factors constitute fundamental elements of personality, and they posit that attention to these factors alone yields an incomplete account of the origins of participation.
Abstract: To a substantial extent, political participation arises as a result of individuals’ interactions with aspects of the social and political environment. The resources people amass, the social connections they develop and the messages they receive combine to influence their propensity towards political action. However, building on recent research on personality and political behaviour,1 we posit that attention to these factors alone yields an incomplete account of the origins of participation. Our claim is that by their nature, some people are open to new experiences and others are not, some are responsible, some are outgoing and so on. These factors constitute fundamental elements of personality. We contend that enduring psychological differences – differences in personality – influence patterns of political participation.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors adapted the ESA model of interest system density, originally developed to study the interest communities of the American states, to the EU case, and test the model with OLS regression using data on the density of different types or guilds of organized interests in the European Union.
Abstract: To evaluate calls for a more theoretically generalizable, large-N study of EU interest representation, we adapt the ESA model of interest system density, originally developed to study the interest communities of the American states, to the EU case. We necessarily modify both model and measures in order to account for the unique features of the EU policy process. We test the model with OLS regression using data on the density of different types or guilds (economic and social sectors) of organized interests in the European Union. We use the findings to discuss the viability of inter-system transfers of theories about the politics of interest representation.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article argued that partisanship is not only shaped by the traditionally suggested socio-economic factors, but also by the uncertainty of future income (risk exposure): rich individuals facing a high degree of risk exposure (or poor people facing low risk exposure) are ‘cross-pressured’; while their income suggests that they should identify with the Republicans, their income prospects make them sympathize with the Democrats.
Abstract: Why has the American political landscape grown more partisan since the 1970s? This article provides a novel account of the determinants of partisanship. The author argues that partisanship is not only shaped by the traditionally suggested socio-economic factors, but also by the uncertainty of future income (risk exposure): rich individuals facing a high degree of risk exposure (or poor people facing low risk exposure) are ‘cross-pressured’; while their income suggests that they should identify with the Republicans, their income prospects make them sympathize with the Democrats. These two traits have overlapped increasingly since the 1970s. Those with lower incomes tend to be also those with higher risk exposure (risk inequality increased). This has led to a sorting of the American electorate: more citizens have become ‘natural’ partisans.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a new index of ethno-religious crosscuttingness (ERC) was derived from national public opinion surveys, and it was shown that ERC is a significant determinant of civil war onset when interacted with ethnic fractionalization.
Abstract: This article seeks to further our understanding of how social structure affects the onset of civil war. Existing studies to date have been inconclusive, focusing only on single-cleavage characteristics of social structure, such as ethnic or religious fractionalization. This study argues that models that do not take into account the relationship between cleavages (or cleavage structure) are biased and thus reach faulty conclusions. With the focus on the cleavages of ethnicity and religion, the effects of two characteristics of cleavage structure on civil war onset (cross-cuttingness and cross-fragmentation) are defined and tested. A new index of ethno-religious cross-cuttingness (ERC), derived from national public opinion surveys, reveals that ERC is a significant determinant of civil war onset when interacted with ethnic fractionalization.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, foreign-imposed regime changes (FIRC) make civil war onset more likely when they damage state infrastructural power, as in the context of interstate war, and when they change the target's political institutions as well as leadership.
Abstract: This article proposes that foreign-imposed regime changes (FIRCs) make civil war onset more likely when they damage state infrastructural power, as in the context of interstate war, and when they change the target’s political institutions as well as leadership. Using rare events logit to analyse civil war onset from 1920 to 2004, it is found that interstate war and institutional change are virtually necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for an FIRC to cause a civil war. Many control variables are included. The results are robust to different research design specifications; nevertheless, they cannot confirm that occupation troops make an FIRC more likely to spark civil war.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, three perspectives on delegation in the European Union are presented: the transaction-costs perspective focuses on information asymmetries between policy makers and implementers, the consensus-building perspective views the decision to delegate as a trade-off between decisiveness and inclusiveness during the bargaining process, and the commitment perspective views policy makers delegate authority as a solution to commitment problems.
Abstract: Three perspectives on delegation in the European Union are presented in this article. The transaction-costs perspective focuses on information asymmetries between policy makers and implementers. According to the commitment perspective, policy makers delegate authority as a solution to commitment problems. The consensus-building perspective views the decision to delegate as a trade-off between decisiveness and inclusiveness during the bargaining process. Hypotheses are derived from these perspectives regarding the amount of delegation to both the European Commission and to member states in legislation. From detailed information on eighty-six EU laws, there is some evidence for the transaction-costs perspective as an explanation of delegation to the Commission. With respect to delegation to member states, there is some evidence for both the transaction-costs perspective and the consensus-building perspective.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the formation of tolerance judgements is shown to differ depending on a group's association with violent and non-democratic behaviour and the theory suggests that tolerance is high and resilient towards groups that themselves observe democratic rights.
Abstract: Most research on political tolerance relying on the ‘least-liked’ group approach has painted a bleak picture of low and feeble levels of tolerance. An alternative approach, permitting an evaluation of the breadth of tolerance, is combined with the use of survey experiments to demonstrate that tolerance varies considerably across target groups. Specifically, the formation of tolerance judgements is shown to differ depending on a group’s association with violent and non-democratic behaviour. Thus, tolerance is high and resilient towards groups that themselves observe democratic rights – even if these groups are disliked or feared. The theory suggests that this is caused by norms of reciprocity and, contrary to extant research, this article shows that within the limits set by these norms, tolerance is strong.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Using a series of spatial and salience-based definitions of the core vote, combined with elite interviews with William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard, the three Conservative leaders between 1997 and 2005, empirical evidence in support and also refutation of core vote critique is evaluated as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The British Conservative party during 1997–2005 appeared to support the view that parties react to defeat by energizing their core vote base. Using a series of spatial and salience-based definitions of the core vote, combined with elite interviews with William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard, the three Conservative leaders between 1997 and 2005, empirical evidence in support and also refutation of the core vote critique is evaluated here. The analyses suggest that Conservative issue strategies between 1997 and 2005 were chosen on grounds of spatial proximity and public perceptions of issue ownership, and that an appeal to Conservative voters was consistent with a broader appeal. The implications of this evidence are important for conceptualizing and applying party base explanations in Britain and beyond.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the extent to which voters prefer candidates with more political experience in second-order elections to the European Parliament and found that voters prefer experienced top candidates.
Abstract: Elections are inherently about selecting good candidates for public office and sanctioning incumbents for past performance. Yet, in the low salience context of ‘second-order elections’ to the European Parliament, empirical evidence suggests that voters sanction first-order national incumbents. However, no previous study has examined whether voters also use these elections to select good candidates. This article draws on a unique dataset on the political experience of party representatives in eighty-five national elections to the European Parliament to evaluate the extent to which voters prefer candidates with more political experience. The results show that selection considerations do matter. Parties that choose experienced top candidates are rewarded by voters. This effect is greatest when European elections are held in the middle of the national electoral cycle.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A novel theory of the healthcare policy of right-wing governments is presented in this paper, which posits that health care is inherently different from the politics of a social policy related to the labour market.
Abstract: A novel theory of the healthcare policy of right-wing governments is presented in this article. It posits that the politics of health care is inherently different from the politics of a social policy related to the labour market. Health care protects against risks that are in the main uncorrelated with the income distribution. This implies that median voters will favour public provision, while high-income voters will not. This generates a unique challenge to right-wing governments that have to balance the interests of the two. The solution is marketization via compensation, where public spending is expanded but where public support of private market solutions is given special priority.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the extent to which social democracy has changed in Europe and Australasia as a result of the introduction of the Third Way ideas, and explored the programmatic change made by social democratic parties with respect to the welfare state and economic management, issues that have always been considered their core business.
Abstract: This Research Note investigates the extent to which social democracy has changed in Europe and Australasia as a result of the introduction of the ‘Third Way’. In the next section, I discuss the programmatic change made by social democratic parties with respect to the welfare state and economic management, issues that have always been considered their core business. In the following section, the shift from the ideology of the traditional welfare state to the ideas of the so-called social investment state, as part of the Third Way ideas, will be explored. This change over time (1975–2004) will be measured by means of two scales: one representing the traditional social democratic position on ‘social welfare’; the other indicating the new tendency of social democracy towards ‘social investment’. Indeed, a number of social democratic parties have shifted their policy positions towards what has become known as the ‘Third Way’ and away from their original position as measured by the overall Left–Right scale. Finally, I shall address to what extent this change in ideology has been influenced by the vote-seeking and office-seeking behaviour of social democratic parties. This is intended to explore the question of to what extent the change is a ‘new’ way for leftwing politics or rather implies a movement of social democracy towards the centre or (even) to the right within party systems after 1990. This comparative analysis covers nineteen social democratic parties and their main competitors in: Australia, Austria, Belgium (two parties), Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a theory of imperialism and decolonization that explains both historic cycles of expansion and decline and the collective demise of the urge to colonize, while economic development leads to a secular decline in payoffs for appropriating land, minerals and capital.
Abstract: Nations have historically sought power and prosperity through control of physical space. In recent decades, however, this has largely ceased. Most states that could do so appear relucant, while the weak cannot expand. This article presents a theory of imperialism and decolonization that explains both historic cycles of expansion and decline and the collective demise of the urge to colonize. Technological shocks enable expansion, while rising labour costs and the dynamics of military technology gradually dilute imperial advantage. Simultaneously, economic development leads to a secular decline in payoffs for appropriating land, minerals and capital. Once conquest no longer pays great powers, the systemic imperative to integrate production vertically also becomes archaic.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article used a large sample of countries over a long time period to test the unbiasedness implication of the rational expectations hypotheses (REH), revealing much variation in the accuracy of expectations and the nature of the biases in expectations.
Abstract: This article discusses the accuracy and sources of economic assessments in three ways. First, following the rational expectations literature in economics, a large sample of countries over a long time period permits tests of the unbiasedness implication of the rational expectations hypotheses (REH), revealing much variation in the accuracy of expectations and the nature of the biases in expectations. Secondly, a theory of expectation formation encompassing the unbiasedness prediction of the REH and setting out the conditions under which economic expectations should be too optimistic or too pessimistic is elucidated. Zaller’s theory of political attitude formation allows the identification of variables conditioning the accuracy of expectations across contexts, drawing a link between the thinking of political scientists and economists about expectation formation. Finally, the theoretical argument that political context impacts the accuracy of average expectations is tested. A great deal of work in both political science and economics has asked the question of whether subjective economic assessments (i.e., retrospective perceptions and/or expectations) are accurate – at either the individual level or when averaged over a representative sample of individuals. 1 In economics, interest in this question is animated by the desire to test the assumptions of rational expectations models that assume that the individual’s economic assessments are as accurate as they can be. In political science, interest in the question stems from the ubiquitous use of, and apparent empirical power of, economic assessments in individual models of the vote choice. In this article, we hope to advance the general discussion of the accuracy and sources of economic assessments in three ways. First, following the large literature testing rational expectations in economics, we use a new dataset that allows us to test the unbiasedness implication of the rational expectations hypotheses (REH) in a larger sample of countries (over a larger time period) than has previously been possible. This exercise reveals a great deal of country-by-country and over-time variation in both the accuracy of expectations and the nature of the biases in expectations (i.e., whether they are pessimistic or optimistic). In addition, in only three of our ten countries do we fail to formally reject the unbiasedness condition of the REH. Secondly, given this variability in the accuracy of expectations across

Journal ArticleDOI
Tobias Böhmelt1
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors disaggregated coalitions of third-party mediators and examined their effectiveness in interventions and argued that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the size of a mediating coalition and mediation effectiveness.
Abstract: This article disaggregates coalitions of third-party mediators and examines their effectiveness in interventions. First, it is argued that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the size of a mediating coalition and mediation effectiveness. Secondly, mediators sharing a history of conflict and distrust will transfer their past relationships to a mediation attempt, making it less effective. Consequently, states sharing friendly and co-operative ties with each other are more successful in managing conflicts. Finally, a coalition of mediators that is largely democratic should be more effective due to a shared culture of peaceful conflict resolution, inclusivity and increased communication flows. The empirical analysis using data from the Issues Correlates of War Project for 1965–2000 largely provides support for the theory.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors assesses the degree of policy responsiveness in the new democracies of post-communist Europe and find that public support for reform has a large and significant effect on reform progress, and that the quality of democracy in the region may be higher than commonly perceived.
Abstract: This article assesses the degree of policy responsiveness in the new democracies of post-communist Europe. Panel data on economic reform and public opinion show that public support for reform has a large and significant effect on reform progress. Where public support for reform is high, reform proceeds more quickly. This effect remains strong even when controlling for the endogeneity of public support and other economic and political causes of reform, though it is strongest in more democratic countries. These results suggest that economic reform may be better promoted by persuading the public of the beneficial consequences of reform than by trying to insulate reformers from the public, and that the quality of democracy in the region may be higher than commonly perceived.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined how casualties from interstate conflicts affect voter behaviour, specifically incumbent vote share, using the investment model of commitment to model individual vote choice, and found that increases in the costs of conflict (i.e., more casualties) can increase the probability that voters will support the incumbent, increasing incumbent voter share.
Abstract: Research suggests that the costs of international conflict (e.g. casualties) alter public opinion, executive approval and policy positions of elected officials. However, do casualties affect voting in terms of aggregate outcomes and individual vote choices? This article examines how casualties from interstate conflicts affect voter behaviour, specifically incumbent vote share. Using the investment model of commitment to model individual vote choice, it is argued that increases in the costs of conflict (i.e., more casualties) can increase the probability that voters will support the incumbent, increasing incumbent vote share. This model is tested with both cross-national aggregate data from twenty-three countries and individual-level British survey data. The results support the argument.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The relationship between median citizen opinion on the left-right dimension, as measured in the Eurobarometer and European Electoral Studies series of surveys, and the positions of governments in West European democracies is explored to gain a fuller understanding of how and to what extent median opinion may influence what governments subsequently set out to do.
Abstract: The relationship between median citizen opinion on the left–right dimension, as measured in the Eurobarometer and European Electoral Studies series of surveys, and the left–right positions of governments in West European democracies is explored to gain a fuller understanding of how and to what extent median opinion may influence what governments subsequently set out to do. The analysis allows for the possibility that measurement may not be equivalent across countries and surveys, that the data may contain significant dynamic effects, and that different countries may exhibit different relationships between the two variables. The analyses show that changes in the citizen median generally produce larger changes in government position, the size depending mainly on the proportionality of the electoral system.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors re-analyse the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data to directly evaluate the hypothesized mediating role of electoral systems in explaining party vote share.
Abstract: The proposed relationship between electoral systems and party extremism assumes that electoral systems mediate the relationship between party proximity (to the mean voter position) and vote share. In disproportional systems, parties are expected to gain greater electoral rewards for adopting moderate positions than in proportional systems. Following Jay Dow in this issue, I re-analyse the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data to directly evaluate the hypothesized mediating role of electoral systems in explaining party vote share. 1 These analyses do not support the finding that electoral systems mediate the relationship between party proximity and vote share. This finding suggests that further exploration is necessary to understand the relationship between electoral systems and party positioning. To review, in 2001, Jay Dow published spatial mappings of the Dutch, Israeli, Canadian and French party systems and concluded that ‘parties in the majoritarian systems are located significantly closer to the center of the distribution of voters than those in proportional systems’. 2 Inspired by Dow, I then explored the same relationship between electoral system proportionality and average party extremism in eighteen countries. 3 Parties competing in proportional electoral systems were expected, on average, to adopt more extreme policy positions than their counterparts competing in disproportional systems. After analysing eighteen democracies, however, I reported that there was no evidence that electoral systems affect parties’ tendencies to propose extreme or moderate policy positions. Jay Dow analyses the same relationship in thirty-one countries using more recent data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), 4 and he reconfirms the conclusions he reports in his 2001 article that proportional electoral systems promote party extremism, and disproportional systems are more compact. I do not question the conclusions Dow reports: the empirical findings stand. If this is the case, the question naturally turns to what accounts for the difference in findings. Earlier in the issue, Dow accurately targets explanations for the differences. These are based on time-period, data and groups of countries. Since I agree that these are the likely candidates, and I do not take issue with Dow’s empirical findings, I wish to push the argument forward by turning the

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors show how, since 1994, sceptics have refined and extended the critique of rational choice and how practitioners have defended their approach, and a more general argument has emerged, and how changes to the way in which rational choice is practised and defended, together with some broader changes in the social sciences, have created more areas of common ground and taken some of the urgency out of this debate.
Abstract: Arguing about rational choice theory remains a popular pastime. Following the publication of Green and Shapiro’s Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, a backlash against the use of rational choice theory within political science gained momentum. This article shows how, since 1994, sceptics have refined and extended the critique of rational choice and how practitioners have defended their approach, and a more general argument has emerged. In the 1990s, attitudes towards rational choice theory constituted a fundamental fault-line within the discipline, but changes to the way in which rational choice is practised and defended, together with some broader changes in the social sciences, have created more areas of common ground and taken some of the urgency out of this debate.