Showing papers in "Games and Economic Behavior in 1994"

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an experiment to test whether fairness alone can explain proposers' willingness to make nontrivial offers in simple bargaining games, and they examine two treatments: game (ultimatum or dictator) and pay (pay or no pay).

TL;DR: This paper found that if the right to be the first mover is "earned" by scoring high on a general knowledge quiz, then first movers behave in a more self-regarding manner.

TL;DR: In this paper, two groups containing 10 pairs of players each playing a finitely repeated matching pennies game were varied in terms of the information available to any player about past choices and payoffs of its opponent.

TL;DR: In this article, numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions are proposed, and the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous biddERS collude.

TL;DR: This paper reported the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects were presented with different two-person decision problems in both their extensive and normal forms and found that the presentation of the decision problem significantly affects the strategy chosen.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the problem of undominated Nash equilibria by bounded mechanisms and provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for such implementation in virtually all economic environments, and are also satisfied by interesting correspondences from the social choice literature.

TL;DR: In this paper, a Tarski-type fixed point theorem for an ascending correspondence on a complete lattice is proved and then applied to show that the set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete Lattice.

TL;DR: The refined bargaining set is introduced, which is the first solution concept in cooperative game theory that simultaneously provides answers to both of the fundamental questions: what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study standard sequential auctions, in which the seller chooses the order of sale, and right-to-choose auctions, where the winner chooses her preferred item from the remaining items.

TL;DR: In this paper, a static solution concept, rationalizable conjectural equilibrium (RPE), is proposed to describe the steady states of recurring play of a game, in which players do not perfectly observe the actions of others.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that in the symmetric case, equilibrium bids in both first-price sealed-bid auctions and oral auctions increase as each bidder′s share increases.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated several nested refinements of Nash equilibrium in two-person signaling games and found that subjects select the more refined equilibria up to divinity, but an anomaly occurs in one game in which the stable equilibrium is preferred to an NWBR equilibrium.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze rent-seeking games in which competitors for a rent can act and react finitely or infinitely often and argue for an infinite-move model as the most appropriate specification of a model of rentseeking.

TL;DR: This paper showed that the uniqueness and efficiency properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein bargaining are vulnerable to players' ability to burn money, which can serve to enhance bargaining power if it is credible.

TL;DR: In this article, a mechanism which uses neither integer games nor modulo games is shown to implement any social choice function in a production economy with private and (excludable) public goods.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce axiomatically a unique value on the more general class of games indicated above for the classical cooperative TU games and discuss probabilistic values on the space of generalized games.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a solution for the set of strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in infinitely repeated games with discounting and perfect monitoring, where the solution is obtained by finding the largest scalar which solves a certain equation.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that common knowledge of rationality is not, in general, equivalent to the limit as n → ∞ of order n mutual knowledge, and that finite order mutual knowledge may be poor as an approximation of common knowledge.

TL;DR: In this article, game theory is applied to novels, short stories, plays, opera librettos, narrative poems, and the Hebrew Bible from both an historical and a critical perspective.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors considered repeated games with incomplete information, where the uninformed player has complete knowledge of his own payoffs, and provided a characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs and proved the existence of an equilibrium.

TL;DR: In this paper, the equivalence between the stable solution set of any cooperative game in characteristic form (G1) and the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies of a certain non-cooperative game (G2) was shown.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets that satisfy a natural criterion of internal consistency, one that the earlier notions do not satisfy, and show that such limit sets must either be singletons or belong to the Pareto frontier of the convex hull of the feasible set of stage game payoffs.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore relationships between the long run average values of a dynamic programming problem and the limit of the discounted values when the discount factor goes to one, and show that the relationship between the average values and the discounted value of a programming problem can be described as follows:

TL;DR: In this article, the set of limit points of equilibrium payoffs in n -player repeated games with bounded recall was studied, where the memory capacities of all the players grow to infinity.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a version of Rubinstein bargaining in which both parties possess symmetric information about an asset's value, but the value may change over time, and the players can wait to learn new information before responding to a given offer, each offer carries an implicit option value.

TL;DR: For undiscounted, infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, examples are given of a computable strategy to which there is no best response, and a computationable strategy for which there are best responses but no computable best responses as mentioned in this paper.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider non-cooperative core stories with the property that agents can explicitly communicate their preferences for association, and find a plausible class of such mechanisms for which the following result is valid.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the implications of explicit slight uncertainty about the strategic sequence of moves, that is, about the informational structure, for a two-person nonzero-sum game.

TL;DR: The authors examined repeated games where players have the (possibly costly) option of initiating bargaining over continuation payoffs between plays of the stage game and showed that renegotiation may be indispensable off the equilibrium path for supporting renegotiation-perfect outcomes.

TL;DR: In this paper, a regularity in the data that is consistent with all the previous experiments was found: first players who have a great advantage in the sense that the Stahl/Rubinstein division would give them a large share of the initial pie demand more than half of the pie, but do not fully exploit their advantage.