Journal ArticleDOI
Understanding When Agents Are Fairmen or Gamesmen
TLDR
In this paper, a regularity in the data that is consistent with all the previous experiments was found: first players who have a great advantage in the sense that the Stahl/Rubinstein division would give them a large share of the initial pie demand more than half of the pie, but do not fully exploit their advantage.About:
This article is published in Games and Economic Behavior.The article was published on 1994-07-01. It has received 24 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Game theory & Division (mathematics).read more
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Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a theory of decision making that attempts to elucidate the roles of fairness, self-interest, and selfdeception in the allocation of economic rewards.
Journal ArticleDOI
Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining
TL;DR: Moves of information search showed that subjects did not look at the amounts being divided in different rounds in the correct order, and for the length of time, necessary for backward induction, unless they were specifically instructed.
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Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining
TL;DR: In this article, a three-round bargaining game where the (perfect) equilibrium offer was $1.25 and an equal split was $2.11 was conducted, and the average offer was a little lower than the equilibrium.
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A positive theory of economic fairness
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a positive theory of economic fairness which strives for generality by characterizing the fairness values which people share across differing contexts and attempt to isolate these underlying values from more situation-specific perceptual effects (e.g., framing effects) which may have an impact on reported fairness.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
TL;DR: In this paper, the evolutionary foundations of bilateral bargaining behavior are examined, in the sense that agents may recognize each others' bargaining strategies, and the unique outcome is an equal split.