Showing papers in "International Security in 2018"
TL;DR: The U.S. grand strategy has persisted since the end of the Cold War despite shocks such as the 2008 global financial crisis and the costs of the war in Iraq.
Abstract: Why has U.S. grand strategy persisted since the end of the Cold War? Despite shocks such as the 2008 global financial crisis and the costs of the war in Iraq—circumstances that ought to have stimul...
101 citations
TL;DR: The U.S.-China comprehensive competition is currently playing out on an increasingly global scale as discussed by the authors, and the competition's primary locus is the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and it is centered in Southeast Asia.
Abstract: U.S.-China comprehensive competition is currently playing out on an increasingly global scale. The competition's primary locus is the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and it is centered in Southeast ...
81 citations
TL;DR: The most important variable in world politics is power, but scholars and policy analysts systematically mismeasure it as mentioned in this paper, and most studies evaluate countries' power using broad indicators of economic and...
Abstract: Power is the most important variable in world politics, but scholars and policy analysts systematically mismeasure it. Most studies evaluate countries’ power using broad indicators of economic and ...
75 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, non-nuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict.
Abstract: Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict. This form...
56 citations
TL;DR: The very nature of how civil wars end shifted with the end of the Cold War: wars became two times more likely to terminate in negotiateat as discussed by the authors, indicating that civil wars became less likely to end in one-sided victory.
Abstract: Historically, civil wars ended in one-sided victory With the end of the Cold War, however, the very nature of how civil wars end shifted: wars became two times more likely to terminate in negotiat
47 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors have cited five basic reasons why nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945: deterrence, practicality, precedent, reputation, and ethics, among others.
Abstract: Why since 1945 have nuclear weapons not been used? Political scientists have cited five basic reasons: deterrence, practicality, precedent, reputation, and ethics. Scholars attempting to weight the...
35 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that public opinion creates pressure on Chinese leaders to act coercively in territorial disputes, and that it also limits their options to de-escalate once crises have broken o...
Abstract: Many analysts argue that public opinion creates pressure on Chinese leaders to act coercively in territorial disputes, and that it also limits their options to de-escalate once crises have broken o...
34 citations
TL;DR: Since oil began fueling the global economy, governments have employed policies of "energy mercantilism" to secure access to this key input as mentioned in this paper, and critics of these policies claim they are unnecessary beca...
Abstract: Since oil began fueling the global economy, governments have employed policies of “energy mercantilism” to secure access to this key input. Critics of these policies claim they are unnecessary beca...
30 citations
TL;DR: The growth of Chinese military power poses significant challenges to Japan as mentioned in this paper, and China's military spending, which was half that of Japan's in 1996, is now three and a half times as large.
Abstract: The growth of Chinese military power poses significant challenges to Japan. China's military spending, which was half that of Japan's in 1996, is now three and a half times as large. Japan has take...
26 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that U.S. drone strikes generate blowback: by killing innocent civilians, such strikes radicalize Muslim populations at the local, national, and even transnational levels.
Abstract: Many analysts argue that U.S. drone strikes generate blowback: by killing innocent civilians, such strikes radicalize Muslim populations at the local, national, and even transnational levels. This ...
26 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explain why rebel groups often fight each other when confronting a common, and typically stronger, enemy, namely, the government: Inter-rebel aggression is a calculated response by rebel groups to opport...
Abstract: Why do rebel groups often fight each other when confronting a common, and typically stronger, enemy—namely, the government? Inter-rebel aggression is a calculated response by rebel groups to opport...
TL;DR: For years, the U.S. government has been waging counterterrorism campaigns against al-Qaida and other armed groups in safe havens and weak states as discussed by the authors. But what explains the effectiveness of such campaigns?
Abstract: For years, the U.S. government has been waging counterterrorism campaigns against al-Qaida and other armed groups in safe havens and weak states. What explains the effectiveness of such campaigns? ...
TL;DR: Realpolitik, the pursuit of vital state interests in a dangerous world that constrains state behavior, is at the heart of realist theory as discussed by the authors, and all realists assume either that states engage in such behav...
Abstract: Realpolitik, the pursuit of vital state interests in a dangerous world that constrains state behavior, is at the heart of realist theory. All realists assume either that states engage in such behav...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate whether Franklin Delano Roosevelt escalate confliict with Japan and Germany before Pearl Harbor, or did he attempt to avoid war, and how U.S. public opinion influenced these decisions.
Abstract: Did Franklin Delano Roosevelt escalate confliict with Japan and Germany before Pearl Harbor, or did he attempt to avoid war? To what extent did U.S. public opinion influence these decisions? And, c...
TL;DR: Since 1949, China has adopted nine national military strategies known as “strategic guidelines, known as strategic guidelines as mentioned in this paper, which represent major changes in China's military strategy and have been adopted in 1956, 1980, and 1993.
Abstract: Since 1949, China has adopted nine national military strategies, known as “strategic guidelines.” The strategies adopted in 1956, 1980, and 1993 represent major changes in China's military strategy...
TL;DR: When rebel groups engage incumbent governments in war for control of the state, questions of international recognition arise as mentioned in this paper, and international recognition determines which combatants can draw on state resources and resources.
Abstract: When rebel groups engage incumbent governments in war for control of the state, questions of international recognition arise. International recognition determines which combatants can draw on state...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate whether China is likely to intervene if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, and if so, does Beijing have the willingness and capabilities to deal safely with North Korea's nuclear program.
Abstract: Is China likely to intervene if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, and if so, does Beijing have the willingness and capabilities to deal safely with North Korea's nuclear program? Securing and...
TL;DR: The existing literature suggests that nationalism does not necessarily produce resistance to foreign military occupation, however, it also can lead to acquiescence and even to active collaborati... as mentioned in this paper ].
Abstract: Does nationalism produce resistance to foreign military occupation? The existing literature suggests that it does. Nationalism, however, also can lead to acquiescence and even to active collaborati...
TL;DR: The authors argued that Narizny's understanding of realism is oawed and that his recommendation that realists should either say little about state preferences or abandon realism altogether is misplaced (pp. 188 and 190).
Abstract: In his article “On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics,” Kevin Narizny criticizes neoclassical realism for incorporating domestic variables that are inconsistent with realist assumptions.1 Below, I argue that Narizny’s understanding of realism is oawed and that his recommendation that realists should either say little about state preferences or abandon realism altogether is misplaced (pp. 188–190). To begin, Narizny claims that absence of functional differentiation means that states have the same preferences (p. 162). Absence of functional differentiation means that the international division of labor pales compared to the division of labor within states. Every state strives to perform the same functions: every state has an army, police, schools, and so on. Only in this limited sense are states “like units.”2 Unlike states, individuals have specialized functions (e.g., construction worker, lawyer, or soldier).3 Next, Narizny argues that Waltz “offers only three hypotheses: balances form; successful innovations are emulated; and bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity” (p. 159). In fact, Waltz posits many more hypotheses, including the following:
TL;DR: Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann as discussed by the authors argue that the risks of drone proliferation are modest or low for use in crisis bargaining, deterrence, and coercive diplomacy.
Abstract: In “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation,” Michael Horowitz, Sarah Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann argue that the risks of drone proliferation are modest or low for use in crisis bargaining, deterrence, and coercive diplomacy.1 Although they correctly highlight the potentially stabilizing effects of drones and note that many popular accounts of the potential risks from drones succumb to unjustiaed hype, their analysis overlooks four reasons why the utility of drones for interstate bargaining may be higher than they estimate. First, Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann argue that drones could increase the amount of information available to government actors by providing real-time surveillance of potential oash points. By making surprise attacks more difacult, surveillance drones can exert a stabilizing effect in crisis bargaining situations (p. 30). One implicit assumption of their argument is that more information advances the quality of decisionmaking. Although generally true, this argument overlooks the problem of information overload, whereby a lack of processing capacity prevents organizations from using information effectively to advance the quality of decisionmaking. Despite the vast intelligence collection and analysis apparatus that the United States possesses, even senior Pentagon leaders have struggled with this and described themselves as “swimming in sensors and drowning in data” from drones.2 Other states without the budget, intelligence infrastructure, and data processing capabilities of the United States are even more likely to and that additional imagery produced by drones may not be processed quickly or efaciently enough to be useful in a crisis. Drones may increase the volume of information available to decisionmakers, but the utility of that additional information is
TL;DR: In this paper, Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper present an elegant and powerful theory that explains conditions under which a great power (in their case, the United States) offers a client state arms, an alliance commitment, or both.
Abstract: In “To Arm or to Ally?” Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper present an elegant and powerful theory that explains conditions under which a great power (in their case, the United States) offers a client state arms, an alliance commitment, or both.1 Their article does not give due attention, however, to what motivates a patron to provide security assistance to clients in the arst place—especially its desire to inouence its clients to obtain concessions in military, political, economic, and other policies.2 Below I explain how Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper’s conceptualization of key variables inadvertently plays down the role of inouence-seeking in U.S. policy. First, Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper’s conceptualization of arms transfers does not reoect the wide range of ways in which a patron can support a client and the signiacant differences among the types of arms transfers with regard to buying inouence. Their conceptualization of arms transfers, in which “a state gives another state weapons to augment its military capabilities” (p. 95), “covers multiple methods of provision, including sales, grants, and loans” (p. 97). As they discuss at the beginning of the article, however, the United States spends large sums of money on security assistance worldwide, a signiacant portion of which is spent on things other than U.S. arms (p. 91). Israel, for example, has been allowed by the U.S. government to use about
Journal Article•
TL;DR: This paper argued that the arc of human history is progressive and enlightened; that liberal states are preferable to all other regime types; and that eventually, through mechanisms including economic interdependence, democratization, and international institutions, states will eventually converge upon the liberal model.
Abstract: interstate behavior across different political regime types, levels of interdependence, and thickness of regional multilateral institutions. Moreover, unlike neoclassical realism, liberalism is both teleological and normative. Liberalism proceeds from the ontological suppositions that the arc of human history is progressive and enlightened; that liberal states are preferable to all other regime types; and that eventually, through mechanisms including economic interdependence, democratization, and international institutions, states will eventually converge upon the liberal model.8 Conversely, neoclassical realism neither privileges any domestic regime type nor expects states to converge upon a single model. It purports to explain foreign policy and international politics as they are, rather than evaluating them from the scholar’s normative standard of what they ought to be. —Jeffrey W. Taliaferro Medford, Massachusetts
TL;DR: Downes and O'Rourke as discussed by the authors argue that neither type of regime change improves relations between interveners and targets by reducing the likelihood of their engaging in future conoict and, in many cases, it makes concoict more likely, implying that the emergence of post-FIRC conoicts marks the failure of FIRC in interstate relations.
Abstract: In “You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations,” Alexander Downes and Lindsey O’Rourke offer important contributions to the study of how foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) affects interstate relations. According to Downes and O’Rourke, states should exercise caution when considering whether to pursue covert or overt FIRC, because neither type of regime change improves relations between interveners and targets by reducing the likelihood of their engaging in future conoict and, in many cases, it makes conoict more likely.1 They imply that the emergence of post-FIRC conoicts marks the failure of FIRC in interstate relations. Two theoretical problems arise from Downes and O’Rourke’s oversimpliacation of the purpose of FIRCs. To begin, interveners may have objectives for engaging in FIRCs other than improving interstate relations, such as weakening rivals and thereby advancing their own security—goals that are at least as important as avoiding future conoict. Consider, for example, U.S. covert FIRCs in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. As John Prados writes, “Afghanistan by itself was of little importance to the United States.”2 The main objective of these FIRCs was to frustrate the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to prevent the spread of Soviet inouence in the region.3 Indeed, the FIRCs forced the Soviets into a long-lasting and costly stalemate, which contributed to