Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 2002"
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the patterns of transnational terrorist incidents that involve one or more deaths using alternative time-series methods, using an updated analysis of these fatal events for 1970-1999 is presented using a standard linear model with prespecified interventions that represent significant policy and political impacts.
Abstract: Using alternative time-series methods, this paper investigates the patterns of transnational terrorist incidents that involve one or more deaths. Initially, an updated analysis of these fatal events for 1970–1999 is presented using a standard linear model with prespecified interventions that represent significant policy and political impacts. Next, a (regime-switching) threshold autoregressive (TAR) model is applied to this fatality time series. TAR estimates indicate that increases above the mean are not sustainable during high-activity eras, but are sustainable during low-activity eras. The TAR model provides a better fit than previously tried methods for the fatality time series. By applying a Fourier approximation to the nonlinear estimates, we get improved results. The findings in this study and those in our earlier studies are then applied to suggest some policy implications in light of the tragic attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
278 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that individuals who are closest to the point of ambivalence between approval and disapproval are most likely to change their opinion in response to external circumstances, and that the propensity of different groups to rally does indeed vary according to individual and environmental circumstances.
Abstract: Despite the massive attention heaped on the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon by public opinion scholars, relatively little attention has been paid to its constituent elements. Yet, recent research has found that different groups of Americans respond differently to presidents’ activities according to their interests and attentiveness. In this study, I disaggregate public opinion along two dimensions: political party and political sophistication. I argue that in responding to high-profile presidential activities abroad, different groups of Americans weigh various individual, contextual, and situational factors differently. I investigate all major U.S. uses of force between 1953 and 1998 and find that the propensity of different groups to rally does indeed vary according to individual and environmental circumstances. To explain these differences, I employ two models of public opinion. The first emphasizes the importance of threshold effects in explaining opinion change. That is, individuals who are closest to the point of ambivalence between approval and disapproval are most likely to change their opinion in response to external circumstances. The second emphasizes both the propensities of different types of individuals to be exposed to a given piece of information, and their susceptibility to having their opinion influenced by any additional information. My results offer a more nuanced picture of the nature and extent of the rally phenomenon than has been available in previous studies. My findings also hold important implications for other related scholarly debates, such as whether, and under what circumstances, the use of force can successfully divert public attention from a president’s domestic political difficulties.
209 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show how the history of economic nationalism in the 19th century provides strong support for two important but potentially controversial arguments made in recent literature about economic nationalism: (1) that this ideology is most properly defined by its nationalist content (rather than as a variant of realism or as an ideology of protectionism), and (2) that it can be associated with a wide range of policy projects, including the endorsement of liberal economic policies.
Abstract: What kind of challenge does economic nationalism pose to economic liberalism in today's global political economy? Conventional wisdom holds that economic nationalism is an outdated ideology in this age of globalization and economic liberalization. But this argument rests on understandings of economic nationalism that are increasingly being called into question by recent scholarship. In this article, I show how the history of economic nationalism in the 19th century provides strong support for two important but potentially controversial arguments made in recent literature about the nature of economic nationalism: (1) that this ideology is most properly defined by its nationalist content (rather than as a variant of realism or as an ideology of protectionism), and (2) that it can be associated with a wide range of policy projects, including the endorsement of liberal economic policies. With these two points established through historical analysis, I conclude that economic nationalism should be seen still to be a powerful ideology in the current period, but that its relationship to the policy goals of economic liberals is an ambiguous one, just as it was in the 19th century. With the collapse of the Marxist political project in the ex-Soviet bloc, many observers have concluded that economic liberalism faces no serious political challenges as a dominant ideology in international economic policymaking. But when economic liberals were last such a central global political force during the 19th century, they faced challenges not just from Marxists but from economic nationalists too. What kind of a challenge does economic nationalism pose to economic liberalism in today's global political economy? This question is a difficult one to answer because it presumes a clear understanding of the term "economic nationalism." Although the ideologies of economic liberalism and Marxism are well understood within the field of international political economy (IPE), economic nationalism has received much less attention and has been analytically confused within scholarly literature for most of the 20th century. In the past few years, more serious attention has finally been given to the task of sharpening the analytical concept of economic nationalism. Two important arguments have emerged from this literature. First, a number of scholars have argued that the main fault of traditional definitions of the concept is that they have neglected the nationalist content of the ideology. Second, if this Author's note: I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for helping to finance some of the research for this article. For their very helpful comments, I would also like to thank the editors of this journal, three anonymous reviewers, George Crane, James Mayall, and Andreas Pickel.
140 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors find that certain types of democratic transitions markedly increase the risk of such disputes within dyads, even when economic and political relations between states are taken into account.
Abstract: Whereas most research on the democratic peace has focused on relations within pairs of states, research on the relationship between democratization and armed conflict has centered primarily on the behavior of individual states. Moreover, the existing literature has placed primary emphasis on explaining the effects of democratization on war, rather than military disputes more generally. In this article, we find that certain types of democratic transitions markedly increase the risk of such disputes within dyads, even when economic and political relations between states are taken into account. Particularly prone to violence are dyads in which either state undergoes an incomplete democratic transition; that is, a shift from an autocratic to a partially democratic (or anocratic) regime that stalls prior to the establishment of consolidated democratic institutions.
138 citations
TL;DR: The authors explored two distinct phases of the linguistic turn associated with logical positivism: the first phase, associated with logic of reality, and the second, at the roots of a range of alternative approaches, approaches language use as analogous to making moves in a game.
Abstract: Constructivists have distanced themselves from questions of language in order to engage the "positivist" mainstream in dialogue. Yet language has played a central role in one important strand of positivism. Current debates in international relations assume a question about whether language is important. This article asks how or why language is important to the study of IR by exploring two distinct phases of the linguistic turn. The first phase, associated with logical positivism, approaches language as a picture of the logic of reality; the second, at the roots of a range of alternative approaches, approaches language use as analogous to making moves in a game. In constructing a link between two phases of the linguistic turn, the abyss separating "positivists," who aren't concerned with language, and "poststructuralists," who are, is replaced with a spectrum of different approaches to language and logic in international relations. The significance of these differences is illustrated in a variety of theoretical and empirical examples.
122 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that scientific progress is best made by combining three methodological approaches in our research: formal, mathematical logic to ensure internal consistency in arguments about complex and contingent relations among variables; case studies and archival research to evaluate verisimilitude between theory and action; and statistical analysis to establish the generality of the hypothesized relations among variable.
Abstract: In reviewing the history of portions of international studies I reflect on how we might best advance knowledge. I dwell on two issues: questions of method and the urgency of refocusing our efforts on leaders and domestic affairs as the centerpiece for understanding the world of international relations. I argue that scientific progress is best made by combining three methodological approaches in our research: formal, mathematical logic to ensure internal consistency in arguments about complex and contingent relations among variables; case studies and archival research to evaluate verisimilitude between theory and action; and statistical analysis to establish the generality of the hypothesized relations among variables. Often such methodologically diverse and progressive research will best be accomplished by encouraging collaboration rather than by perpetuating the current norm of penalizing co-authorship especially among junior scholars. I offer concrete examples of advances in knowledge achieved through the employment of mathematical reasoning and statistical analysis as many have cast doubts about the substantive contributions of these particular approaches. My perspective is, of course, personal and may not be shared by many others. I set out my thoughts, therefore, with the hope that they will stimulate constructive debate and dialogue and that they will serve to integrate diverse approaches to international affairs.
116 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory that reconciles, encompasses, and extends the competing arguments, explaining the empirical inconsistency, was proposed to identify the conditions under which various properties of a conflict (onet, duration, and severity) should and should not reduce bilateral trade ex ante and ex post.
Abstract: Do military disputes between two states suppress trade between their firms? Both liberals and realists suggest that conflict occurrence reduces bilateral trade. However, using a rational expectation argument, Morrow (1999) proposes that conflict occurrence and trade should be uncorrelated statistically. Empirical evidence to date both supports expectations and appears contradictory and inconclusive. We offer a theory that reconciles, encompasses, and extends the competing arguments, explaining the empirical inconsistency. By incorporating rational expectations and uncertainty into the profit calculus of trading firms, the theory identifies the conditions under which various properties of a conflict (onset, duration, and severity) should and should not reduce bilateral trade ex ante and ex post . We test the ex post effects in two datasets that cover either a wider range of countries or a longer time period than previous quantitative studies. Both an unexpected MID onset and the unexpectedness of a MID onset reduce bilateral trade substantially ex post . Preliminary tests suggest that MID duration and severity also affect bilateral trade ex post . We conclude by discussing the implications of our research.
115 citations
TL;DR: This paper examined the relationship between politics and speculative attacks in developing countries and found that speculative attacks are more likely under left rather than under right governments and during the period after an election as compared with all other periods.
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between politics and speculative attacks in developing countries. While a burgeoning literature focuses on the economic determinants of speculative behavior, little attention has been paid to the importance of political factors. I examine the response of international capital markets to electoral and partisan changes in a sample of 78 developing countries using monthly data from January 1975 to December 1998. All other things being equal, the empirical evidence indicates that speculative attacks are more likely (1) under left rather than under right governments and (2) during the period after an election as compared with all other periods. The results suggest that models developed for OECD economies can be used to understand political-economic phenomena in developing countries.
107 citations
Abstract: This article examines how humanitarian laws of war have been recast in light of a new generation of hi-tech weapons and innovations in strategic theory. Far from falling into disuse, humanitarian law is invoked more frequently than ever to confer legitimacy on military action. New legal interpretations, diminished ad bellum rules, and an expansive view of military necessity are coalescing in a regime of legal warfare that licenses hi-tech states to launch wars as long as their conduct is deemed just. The ascendance of technical legalism has undercut customary restraints on the use of armed force and has opened a legal chasm between technological haves and have-nots. Most striking is the use of legal language to justify the erosion of distinctions between soldiers and civilians and to legitimize collateral damage. Hi-tech warfare has dramatically curbed immediate civilian casualties, yet the law sanctions infrastructural campaigns that harm long-term public health and human rights in ways that are now clear.
74 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an exploratory analysis of the subnational dimension of income inequality, using data from the Luxembourg Income Study, is presented, showing the value of regional analysis by reexamining the relationship between electoral turnout and income inequality.
Abstract: This paper offers an exploratory analysis of the subnational dimension of income inequality, using data from the Luxembourg Income Study. The paper undertakes two basic tasks. First, it describes the results of calculations on household-level income data that produce indicators of intra- and inter-household inequality for 191 regions in 12 developed countries for the late 1980s and early 1990s, and for 149 regions in 8 countries for the mid-1990s. Second, the paper demonstrates the value of regional analysis by reexamining the relationship between electoral turnout and income inequality, an important substantive issue which has heretofore been explored almost entirely at the national or individual level but upon which regional-level analysis can shed valuable light.
65 citations
TL;DR: The authors provides a more complete description of Imre Lakatos's metric, addresses a number of critiques related to its use, and surveys how MSRP has been used to evaluate IR research, and argues for a sustained discussion about the promises and difficulties of theory appraisal and suggests that MSRP may be a useful point of departure for that dialogue.
Abstract: Despite the popularity of Imre Lakatos's ideas and numerous references to his Methodology of Scientific Research Programs (MSRP), IR scholars often misstate and misapply his criteria for appraising theoretical development. This article provides a more complete description of Lakatos's metric, addresses a number of critiques related to its use, and surveys how MSRP has been used to evaluate IR research. It suggests that IR proponents of Lakatos's methodology could better appreciate the limits of its application, and that those who use his metric could do so in a more informed way. The article argues for a sustained discussion about the promises and difficulties of theory appraisal, and suggests that MSRP may be a useful point of departure for that dialogue. It calls for IR theorists to undertake comparative analyses of different rationalist metrics to provide the basis for making informed judgments about their different strengths and weaknesses in helping to produce better theories.
TL;DR: This paper argued that the success of the arguments for scientific realism depends in large measure on the accuracy of the characterizations of the competing views and that when the alternative accounts are properly described, the purposes are better satisfied by a version of Duhemian conventionalism.
Abstract: The recent increase in interest in scientific realist foundations for international relations theory, spearheaded by Wendt in various works, most fully articulated in his Social Theory of International Politics, and supported by a number of other authors, has brought to the fore a set of related issues in the philosophy of the social sciences. The advocacy of scientific realism in the international relations literature has largely taken the form of attacks on various nonscientific realist foundational theories. Consequently, the success of the arguments for scientific realism depends in large measure on the accuracy of the characterizations of the competing views. This paper argues that Wendt and others have misrepresented the challengers and have thus overstated the superiority of scientific realism. The paper further considers the aims and purposes of providing meta-theoretical foundations for IR theories, and argues that when the alternative accounts are properly described, the purposes are better satisfied by the latter and, in particular, by a version of Duhemian conventionalism.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate whether certain factors pertaining to the process of foreign policy decision-making have a measurable, qualitative effect on foreign policy outcomes. The research is grounded in the groupthink literature but incorporates different dimensions of similar underlying notions from other international relations areas as well.
Abstract: This article investigates whether certain factors pertaining to the process of foreign policy decision making have a measurable, qualitative effect on foreign policy outcomes . The research is grounded in the groupthink literature but incorporates different dimensions of similar underlying notions from other international relations areas as well. Three different types of process factors are investigated: situational factors, such as stress and time constraints; factors associated with the structure of the group; and information processing factors. We test the influence of these factors on two types of outcomes—a decision's effect on national interests and its effect on the level of international conflict. We investigate this link in 31 cases of decision from 1975 through 1993. Scores for the outcome variables are based on survey responses from 21 foreign policy experts. For the process variables, we develop sets of operational definitions and then code each case based on extensive reading of case-study materials. OLS regression models are used to assess the hypotheses. We find that situation variables matter very little in terms of affecting outcomes and quality of information processing. On the other hand, both group structural factors and information processing are significantly related to outcomes in terms of national interests and level of international conflict.
TL;DR: This article provided a systematic study of informal integration in East Asia, which consists of not only regional production networks, but also ethnic Chinese business networks and subregional economic zones and found that the three informal mechanisms have formed an interrelated pattern of regional integration.
Abstract: This article studies East Asian political economy from a regional perspective. The Asian financial crisis showed that East Asian economies are highly regionalized. However, the linkages among Asian economies, mostly informal in nature, often appear “invisible” to many in the West, who focus more on the states and formal institutions. Drawing on a broad set of literature mostly in Asian languages, this paper provides a systematic study of informal integration in East Asia, which consists of not only regional production networks, but also ethnic Chinese business networks and subregional economic zones. It finds that the three informal mechanisms have formed an interrelated pattern of regional integration in East Asia. The nature of the economic networks is very useful in explaining the Asian crisis and the different performances of East Asian economies in the crisis. The crisis has also resulted in profound changes in informal integration. While the Japanese-led production networks have been greatly weakened, the Chinese Economic Area is rising, driven by the ethnic Chinese business networks and subregional economic zones. As a result, the Japan-dominated “flying geese pattern” has been broken. The connections between Greater China and the United States have also been enhanced and are out-competing the Japanese production networks. Many of the new developments have been ignored in the West but they are key factors that will shape the future of Asian and World political economy.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that migration played a critical role in the development, relative power, and interaction of Greek city-states as well as the transformation of Athens into a polyethnic empire.
Abstract: The debate regarding historical continuity and transformation of international systems within International Relations (IR) theory has turned to conceptualizing world politics in terms of civilizations, particularly with respect to analysis of the pre-modern era. The political consequences of human migration have been overlooked in this debate. Migration shaped the demographic, social, and political dynamics within pre-modern civilizations and migration was a major medium of interaction between civilizations and their external environments, including other civilizations. This argument is elaborated in case studies of ancient Greece and Rome. Migration played a critical role in the development, relative power, and interaction of Greek city-states as well as the transformation of Athens into a polyethnic empire. Migration was central to the rise and decline of the Roman Empire, as particularly highlighted in the development of Roman citizenship, its role in the political incorporation of non-Romans, and the bearing of this process on the relationship between the Roman Empire and its environment. Refugee crises, human smuggling, and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by terrorists who resided in the United States on student, business, and tourist visas have recently thrown a spotlight on the role of international migration in contemporary world politics. This would not, however, be the first time that human migration has influenced the course of world politics.
TL;DR: The authors examine attitudes and preferences about nuclear issues among two elite publics-scientists and legislators-surveyed in 1997, and among two samples of the U.S. general public surveyed in 1997 and 1999, and find evidence of similar belief structures and similar relationships between beliefs and nuclear policy preferences among their elite and mass samples.
Abstract: Our research adds new evidence to the continuing debate about capacities of mass publics to contribute to foreign and security policy processes. Focusing on U.S. beliefs and preferences about nuclear security in the post-Cold War era, we examine not only linear relationships among elite and mass belief structures, but also combinations of beliefs that may be precursors to policy coalitions. We examine attitudes and preferences about nuclear issues among two elite publics-scientists and legislators-surveyed in 1997, and among two samples of the U.S. general public surveyed in 1997 and 1999. We compare elite and mass belief structures using three different methods: descriptive comparisons of central tendencies, relational analyses using bivariate and multivariate regressions, and coalitional analyses using cluster analytical techniques. With each method of analysis we find evidence of similar belief structures and similar relationships between beliefs and nuclear policy preferences among our elite and mass samples.
TL;DR: The authors analyzed the competitive dynamics in global arms transfers from 1951 to 1995 and found that arms transfers by the Cold War rivals moved together in patterns consistent with competitive policy making in an environment of military-technological change and that one or both sides adjusted their supply policies to correct for deviations from a moving equilibrium.
Abstract: This article analyzes the competitive dynamics in global arms transfers from 1951 to 1995. I discuss the enduring forces behind the proliferation of military capability during the Cold War and other historical periods, and then consider the competitive dynamics characteristic of the superpower rivalry itself. The process of military-technological advance, along with the dynamics of enduring interstate rivalry, lead us to expect certain patterns in quantitative data representing arms-transfer levels over time. Concepts in time-series analysis—cointegration and error correction—are helpful for understanding competitive arms-transfer policies during the Cold War, and I apply the relevant analytical tools to test for the hypothesized patterns in the empirical data. American and Russian, as well as NATO and Warsaw Pact, arms transfers are examined at three levels of regional aggregation: the Third World as a whole, the Middle East security complex, and the Persian Gulf subcomplex. The evidence shows that arms transfers by the Cold War rivals moved together in patterns consistent with competitive policy making in an environment of military-technological change, and that one or both sides adjusted their supply policies to correct for deviations from a moving equilibrium. This describes an action-reaction process, but a loosely coupled one deriving from military-technological uncertainties, the complexities of regional security dynamics, and the multidimensional character of the Cold War competition.
TL;DR: This article revisited the determinants and effectiveness of Section 301 of U.S. trade law and developed a modified two-level game model for understanding the conditions under which domestic interests and institutions support the use of aggressive negotiation tactics.
Abstract: When does America's “aggressively unilateral” trade policy work best to open overseas markets? This paper revisits the determinants and effectiveness of Section 301 of U.S. trade law and develops a modified two-level game model for understanding the conditions under which domestic interests and institutions support the use of aggressive negotiation tactics. It argues that a system-level variable, the structure of trade, systematically affects threat effectiveness by influencing both the level of unity among domestic interest groups and the degree of divided government in the sender of threats (the United States). America's sanction threats will enjoy more unified domestic support and hence be more credible when the dispute involves a country having a competitive trade relationship with the U.S. (such as Japan, Canada, and the European Union) rather than one having a complementary trade relationship with the U.S. (such as China, India, and Brazil). Statistical tests based on the universe of Section 301 cases concluded between 1975 and 1995 yield evidence in support of this contention.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the likelihood that a single, international regime or multiple regimes governing this technology will form by way of negotiation, and find that four normative-institutional arrangements, organized around distinct general principles, have a potential governance role: world food security and safety, liberalized trade, protection of intellectual property, and conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
Abstract: Controversies surrounding the appropriate use and diffusion of agricultural biotechnologies are giving rise to questions about governance at the international level. This article investigates the likelihood that a single, international regime or multiple regimes governing this technology will form by way of negotiation. We show that four normative-institutional arrangements, organized around distinct general principles, have a potential governance role: world food security and safety, liberalized trade, protection of intellectual property, and conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. We argue that an adequate amount of compatibility between the principles and norms of these arrangements is required to support the type of communicative action or truth-seeking needed to develop the intersubjective understanding for a regime. Using a framework for assessing normative compatibility, we find not one, but two nascent understandings rooted in the trade and biodiversity areas competing to form the foundation for governance. Further analysis of levels of institutional density between the two developing regimes reveals they are presently too low to support a negotiated resolution of normative conflict. Finally, we demonstrate that recent framing attempts at the international level to decrease areas of tension and incompatibility in principles/norms between the regimes have neglected to create the crucial normative background conditions needed to avert a scenario of increased political conflict in the near future.
TL;DR: The authors argues that postmodern criticisms of nature do not undermine global environmental protection efforts, but rather provide their own guidelines for practice, and calls on postmodernist IR scholars to take their own concerns seriously and stand up for the paradigmatic "other," the nonhuman world in all its abundance and diversity.
Abstract: Recent postmodern international relations (IR) scholarship threatens to undermine global environmental protection efforts. Global environmental protection is fundamentally about conserving and preserving nature. It involves safeguarding the quality of the earth's air, water, soil, and other species. Postmodern critics have shown, however, that "nature" is not simply a given, physical object but a social construction-an entity that assumes meaning within various cultural contexts and is fundamentally unknowable outside of human categories of understanding. This criticism raises significant challenges for global environmental politics. How can societies protect the nonhuman world if the very identity of that enterprise is cast into doubt? How can states cooperate to protect nature if the meaning of the term is socially and historically contingent? This article argues that postmodern criticisms of "nature" do not undermine global environmental protection efforts-as many IR scholars suggest-but rather provide their own guidelines for practice. Postmodernists value the so-called "other"; they aim to give voice to the poor, oppressed, and otherwise disadvantaged in an attempt to limit hegemonic tendencies of the powerful. The article calls on postmodernist IR scholars to take their own concerns seriously and stand up for the paradigmatic "other," the nonhuman world in all its abundance and diversity. It calls on postmodern IR scholars to extend their concern for the "other" to the realm of plants, animals, landscapes, and so forth, and work to protect the radical "otherness" of the so-called natural world. The article, in other words, uses postmodern criticism against itself to ground commitment to global environmental protection.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore why the government would lay the foundation for political reform without creating institutions capable of imposing economic reform on the politically powerful business sector, and develop an argument that strong, antiliberal economic actors create incentive for the government in a democratizing state to refrain from economic liberalization, even while moving forward with democratic liberalization.
Abstract: South Korea enjoyed high rates of economic growth until the mid-1990s. However in mid-1997 the country went into a severe economic crisis which ultimately resulted in a request for an IMF bailout. Leading up to the crisis, the government had embarked upon democratic liberalization but not much economic liberalization. This research explores why the government would lay the foundation for political reform without creating institutions capable of imposing economic reform on the politically powerful business sector. The absence of such institutions put the government in a position where it could not respond to the emerging economic crisis. The government's inability to act eroded its own position of power and governance. From this perspective, the government's inattention to economic reform appears irrational as it led to a weakening of its own position. We build a model of political and economic liberalization showing that the government was engaged in nested games (i.e., games in multiple arenas) with the political opposition, the labor unions, and the powerful business sector. We develop an argument that strong, antiliberal economic actors create incentive for the government in a democratizing state to refrain from economic liberalization, even while moving forward with democratic liberalization.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify conditions under which FTAs help and hinder broader trade liberalization: they do the former when members' intra-and extra-FTA comparative advantages are similar and the latter when the opposite is true.
Abstract: Do free trade agreements (FTAs) help or hinder multilateral trade liberalization? This question, though much debated, remains unanswered because (1) there has been scant attention to the conditions under which FTAs have either effect, and (2) extant hypotheses have not been rigorously tested. In this article I identify conditions under which FTAs help and hinder broader trade liberalization: they do the former when members' intra- and extra-FTA comparative advantages are similar and the latter when the opposite is true. I test these hypotheses using trade, output, and tariff data from the European Free Trade Association. The trade data indicate that members with similar intra- and extra-FTA comparative advantages liberalized trade more rapidly than those with dissimilar comparative advantages. The output and tariff data suggest that these differences among members reflect hypothesized economic and political processes. My research implies that scholars should abandon universalistic arguments concerning the effects of regional arrangements and devote more attention to the conditions governing the relationship between regionalism and multilateralism.
TL;DR: This paper explored how the dramatic expansion of British trade in the decades prior to World War I affected Britain's ability to raise an army and found that the expansion of trade did not ease Britain's resource constraints by making labor more freely available for military purposes.
Abstract: This article explores how the dramatic expansion of British trade in the decades prior to World War I affected Britain's ability to raise an army. We first develop a simple institutionally based model of British army recruiting which we then perturb by expanding trade while holding all other variables constant. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the expansion of trade would impede Britain's ability to raise an army, a prediction that finds substantial support in the historical record using both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that trade enhances a state's military power, we find that the expansion of trade did not ease Britain's resource constraints by making labor more freely available for military purposes. Rather, by raising the civilian demand for labor, the expansion of trade made labor more expensive and difficult to mobilize, even as a more effective army became more important to British strategy.
TL;DR: In this article, Kegley and Hermann argue that dyadic democratic interventions occur more frequently than would be expected given the number of jointly democratic dyads in the international system, but these cases are rare in comparison to interventions conducted by democratic and/or autocratic states in undemocratic states.
Abstract: The Democratic Peace Proposition, which states that no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other, has been questioned by scholars who claim that such pacific behavior among free states does not apply to lower forms of conflict. In particular, Kegley and Hermann contend that democracies intervene in the affairs of other liberal states via overt military acts or covert machinations. In many cases, they argue that dyadic democratic interventions (DDIs) occur more frequently than would be expected given the number of jointly democratic dyads in the international system. I examine their research design and suggest changes to their concepts of states, interventions, and regime type, as well as their sample size and definition of dyads in the international system. I implement these changes and retest such arguments on a sample of interventions from 1945 to 1991. I find 11 cases where a democracy intervenes against another democracy, but these cases are rare in comparison to interventions conducted by democratic and/or autocratic states in undemocratic states, or by autocratic states against democratic states. Furthermore, these DDIs are less likely to occur than the presence of democracy in the international system would suggest.