Showing papers in "Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1991"
TL;DR: In this paper, the existence or absence of diffusion effects in regard to changes in the degree of freedom in the world's governments, and whether or not there has been a more specific global movement towards democracy are investigated.
Abstract: This article is an attempt to indicate how diffusion approaches, based on the concepts of linkage and interdependence, can be of help in our thinking about the spread of democracy. The analyses address the existence or absence of diffusion effects in regard to changes in the degree of freedom in the world’s governments, and whether or not there has been a more specific global movement towards democracy. The dependent variable is the set of “governmental transitions,” based on yearly Freedom House data. Diffusion analyses are at the global, regional, and neighbor-state levels (1974–1987). Thus analysis is limited to cues or prototypes from the external environment of states. Although neighbor effects are less than those found with the diffusion of war, all three levels support the proposition that there has been a diffusion of governmental transitions, including a movement towards democracy that provided a context for the dramatic events of 1988 and 1989.
408 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that previous studies have misspecified the theoretical argument that democracies are less war-prone than other forms of government because the people, who must bear the costs of war in lives and resources, will restrain the aggressive impulses of their leaders.
Abstract: It has often been argued that democracies are less war-prone than other forms of government because the people, who must bear the costs of war in lives and resources, will restrain the aggressive impulses of their leaders. Most empirical studies addressing this hypothesis have produced results indicating that democracies fight as often as other states. The authors argue that previous studies have misspecified the theoretical argument. The argument the authors propose and the test they design focus directly on specific mechanisms by which the decisions of leaders are constrained, rather than on composite conceptual and operational definitions of democracy. The authors also control for the opportunity leaders have to decide for war. Their results suggest that for major powers, higher levels of decisional constraints lead to a lower probability that conflicts will escalate to war, as the authors' theoretical argument predicts. The relationship does not hold for minor powers, however, and may even be reversed.
379 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that the degree of democracy, the extent of inequality in society, and economic growth rate go a long way to explain and predict political repression in a parsimonious model.
Abstract: The task of this study is to determine if certain political and socioeconomic variables have strong relationships with political repression conceptualized as disappearance, detention, torture, and political killings. The perspective of the study is from the question of why do people in power — with so many options available — choose repression as a method of rule. Repression is coded into numerical values from the State Department Country Reports, and then relationships with the degree of democracy, socioeconomic conditions, inequality, rate of economic change, and the level of economic development are tested in regression models. Significant relationships are found. The degree of democracy, the extent of inequality in society, and economic growth rate go a long way to explain and predict political repression in a parsimonious model.
377 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that domestic, political factors are more influential on the president's decision to use military force than characteristics of the international environment, and that domestic political factors remain most consequential in the decision of using force short of war.
Abstract: Ostrom and Job (1986) found that domestic, political factors are more influential on the president's decision to use military force than characteristics of the international environment. These results pose a serious challenge to realists' assumptions regarding the motives of states and the separability of domestic and foreign policy. This article reexamines Ostrom and Job's arguments and introduces a new indicator, a measure of the severity of ongoing international crises, to provide a better assessment of the relative effect of the international environment on presidential decision making. This severity index is significantly associated with the use of force by the United States from 1949 through 1976, and proves to be more influential than the international indicators used by Ostrom and Job. Nevertheless, domestic political factors remain most consequential in the president's decision to use force short of war.
288 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the causal relationship between economic growth and defense spending in fifty-five developing countries and found that the relationship between defense spending and economic growth cannot be generalized across countries.
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to investigate the causal relationship between economic growth and defense spending in fifty-five developing countries. Granger-causality tests are employed to analyze the presence and direction of causality between these two variables. Moreover, the study focuses upon the appropriate representation of the nature of nonstationarities apparent in these two economic time series across different countries. The results suggest that the relationship between defense spending and economic growth cannot be generalized across countries. The actual relationship may vary from one country to another due to the use of a different sample period, as well as differences in the socioeconomic structure and type of government in each country.
218 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an analysis of the data indicates that during the first period there was an initial tendency for democratic states to ally with each other at a higher rate than probability indicates should have been the case, but that the overall level of democratic alliances decreased as the rate of their existing alliances dissolved and democracies sought other types of partners.
Abstract: An examination of the alliance choices of democratic states between 1920 and 1939 and between 1946 and 1965 is undertaken to answer the question, do democracies have a tendency to ally with each other more than they ought to according to probability? The analysis of the data indicates that during the first period there was an initial tendency for democratic states to ally with each other at a higher rate than probability indicates should have been the case, but that the overall level of democratic alliances decreased as the rate of their existing alliances dissolved and democracies sought other types of partners. During the period from 1946 to 1965 alliances between democracies were formed and maintained at much higher rates than probability indicates should have been the case. Further analysis demonstrates that this effect is probably not significantly affected by either the effects of previous wartime alliances or geography.
207 citations
TL;DR: This paper showed that there is a discernible relationship between election cycles and the behavior of democratic states in international conflicts and that although election dynamics may mitigate against war entry in the short run, it is plausible that they have made war more likely or more severe in the long run.
Abstract: Insight into the effect of domestic factors on the international conflict behavior of democratic states can be garnered from treating electoral cycles as cycles in the relative power of state and society. This article shows that there is a discernible relationship between election cycles and the behavior of democratic states in international conflicts. In the past 200 years, democratic states have tended to get into relatively more wars early in the election cycle and fewer wars late in the cycle. Interestingly, this result holds regardless of whether it was a democracy or a nondemocracy which initiated the war. The author argues, however, that this pattern at the international level is insufficient for drawing firm conclusions about the preferences of democratic states and societies at the domestic level. Finally, the author suggests that although election dynamics may mitigate against war entry in the short run, it is plausible that they have made war more likely or more severe in the long run.
205 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors conducted a computer tournament to investigate whether there exist alternative strategies that perform well in noisy repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD) games, and the results of the tournament demonstrated that, consistent with analytical work, TFT performed rather poorly.
Abstract: In the last decade, there has been a resurgence of interest in problems of cooperation, stimulated largely by Axelrod's work. Using an innovative tournament approach, Axelrod found that a simple strategy, tit-for-tat (TFT), was most successful in playing the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD) in a noiseless environment. However, recent analytical work has shown that monitoring problems caused by noise significantly impair TFT's effectiveness. The primary purpose of the present research is to discover whether there exist alternative strategies that perform well in noisy PDs. To investigate this question, the authors conducted a computer tournament. The results of the tournament demonstrated that, consistent with analytical work, TFT performed rather poorly. In contrast, strategies that were generous (i.e., cooperated more than their partners did) were quite effective.
204 citations
TL;DR: This paper investigated the mediations of ninety-seven community mediators in the People's Republic of China and found that Chinese mediators utilize the same techniques and strategies in successful versus nonsuccessful mediations; however, their strategies and techniques differ in couple (husband-wife) as opposed to non-couple disputes.
Abstract: This study investigated the mediations of ninety-seven community mediators in the People's Republic of China. The mediators' reports on two mediations each — one successful and one unsuccessful — indicated the frequency with which they use twenty-seven mediation techniques. In addition, their information revealed the strategies — assist, procedural, educate, and external reliance — they employ in their mediations. It was found that Chinese mediators utilize the same techniques and strategies in successful versus nonsuccessful mediations; yet, their techniques and strategies differ in couple (husband-wife) as opposed to noncouple disputes.
144 citations
TL;DR: In computer simulation studies of the prisoner's dilemma conducted by Axelrod (1984), the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy was found to be most effective.
Abstract: In computer simulation studies of the prisoner's dilemma conducted by Axelrod (1984), the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy was found to be most effective. Two important properties of the TFT strategy are based on the reciprocity norm: (1) It is “provocable” and immediately retaliates if the other person defects; and (2) it is “forgiving” and immedicately reciprocates cooperation if the other returns to cooperation after defection. Delay of reciprocity for the two types of TFT properties were varied: immediate versus one trial delay. In two experiments, a single naive subject (undergraduate male student) was led to believe that he was playing a two-person prisoner's dilemma, but he actually played against a programmed strategy. The results of both experiments yielded significant effects for delay of forgiveness: Mean proportion of cooperative choices was greater when cooperative overtures were reciprocated immediately than when they were delayed. Two other properties of TFT, “niceness” and clarity, were also ass...
118 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a nonlinear mathematical model of international competition is presented in which the transition from predictable laminar to unpredictable turbulent flow is the model manifestation of a transition from cold to hot war in the world system being modelled.
Abstract: One of the reasons advanced for the absence of a major war between the two superpowers during the forty-five years of their enmity since World War II is that the world system in which they functioned was essentially bipolar and hence, presumably, inherently more stable than previous multipolar worlds. Given the recent decline in the power of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. relative to the rest of the world, it is important to test the validity of this presumption. A nonlinear mathematical model of international competition is presented in which the transition from predictable laminar to unpredictable turbulent flow is the model manifestation of the transition from cold to hot war in the world system being modelled. The model is a tripolar competition which arises continuously from a bipolar system as a coupling parameter is varied. Thus the realm of nonchaotic, stable, competition can be examined as a function of the coupling parameter. It is found that the regime of stability decreases as the system complexity...
TL;DR: The authors examined the attitudes of American foreign policy officials toward the public's sophistication on matters of foreign policy, and the degree of input the public should have into policy and the appropriate level of policy responsiveness.
Abstract: This study examines the attitudes of American foreign policy officials toward (1) the public's sophistication on matters of foreign policy, and (2) the degree of input the public should have into policy and the appropriate level of policy responsiveness. It finds officials to be marginally more positive about the public's sophistication than has previously been thought, but finds a major difference (increase) in the degree of input that officials feel the public should have into the policy process. The result of these sets of attitudes is a form of responsiveness whereby officials factor public opinion into decisions, but then attempt to change public opinion (by “educating” the public) if opposition to a decision subsequently emerges.
TL;DR: In this article, the effects of familiarity and liking on negotiating perceptions and behaviors are explored in two experiments, one focusing on prenegotiation expectations and perceptions, the other on negotiation processes and outcomes.
Abstract: Effects of familiarity and liking on negotiating perceptions and behaviors are explored in two experiments, one focusing on prenegotiation expectations and perceptions (experiment 1), the other on negotiation processes and outcomes (experiment 2). Both experiments were embedded in the context of a simulation of conflict between groups resembling the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Results obtained in the two experiments showed different effects for the familiarity and liking variables: Analytically distinct effects for these variables on prenegotiation perceptions contrasted with the combined effects on negotiating behavior and postnegotiation perceptions. In experiment 1, liking influenced expected movement from initial positions, perceptions of the opponent, and types of strategies prepared for the negotiation; familiarity had its primary impact on perceptions of the situation as being conducive to agreement. Results of experiment 2 showed that reducing either liking or familiarity served to re...
TL;DR: This paper applied recent work on social cognition to examine the impact of foreign policy on presidential elections, particularly on the evaluation of incumbent candidates and found that specific issue evaluations shape the public's overall evaluation of candidates and that the overall evaluation in turn shapes the public voting decision.
Abstract: This article applies recent work on social cognition to examine the impact of foreign policy on presidential elections, particularly on the evaluation of incumbent candidates. The authors propose that specific issue evaluations shape the public's overall evaluation of candidates and that the overall evaluation in turn shapes the public's voting decision. This two-step hypothesis is tested with aggregate and individual-level data for both foreign policy and economic evaluations of incumbent performance and for the very different elections of 1980 and 1984. The results support the hypothesized two-step process at both aggregate and individual levels of analysis and for all categories of party identifiers. Foreign policy issues not only shape public evaluation of candidates but their influence does not compare unfavorably with that of economic circumstances. The results provide new evidence that the outcome of presidential elections is influenced, albeit indirectly, by foreign policy.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present and test two arguments about how the democratic institutions of the United States influence arms control bargaining, using principal-agent models of elections with retrospective voters, which form the basis of a formal model linking elections and arms control.
Abstract: This article presents and tests two arguments about how the democratic institutions of the United States influence arms control bargaining Principal-agent models of elections with retrospective voters form the basis of a formal model linking elections and arms control It implies that the United States offers additional concessions as economic conditions deteriorate, but also that this effect declines as conditions get worse Congress' control of the defense budget provides a way to affect the Soviets' reservation level for negotiations But if the Soviets anticipate congressional actions, the only effects are reduced Soviet concessions immediately before critical votes on defense and a response to the outcome of the vote An empirical examination of US and Soviet bargaining behavior during the 1970s supports these hypotheses The United States increases its concessions as inflation heightens The Soviets reduce their concessions during periods with critical votes on defense in Congress, offer addition
TL;DR: The authors assesses the impact of decision framing and the anticipated behavior of others on choosing to cooperate in social dilemma problems and find that four main effects were significant, as well as the interactions of response proportions by game context and response certainty by response direction.
Abstract: This study assesses the impact of decision framing and the anticipated behavior of others on choosing to cooperate in social dilemma problems. Two hundred and eighty-eight students completed a questionnaire which presented two management scenarios representative of social dilemmas a manager might confront in a business environment. The two scenarios were based on parameters established by a generalized uniform N-person dilemma game. One scenario was described in a give-some context (contribute to the collective good); the other was presented in a take-some context (destruction of an existing collective good). After each scenario, information was presented concerning the response proportion of others, the certainty of the others' response, and whether others were expected to cooperate or defect. All four main effects were significant, as well as the interactions of response proportions by game context and response certainty by response direction. Reliable framing effects were evidenced. Individuals were mo...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the calculus of third-party participation in ongoing wars, and showed that under an expected utility model of third party participation, the expected utility is lower than that of the traditional model.
Abstract: This article investigates the calculus of third-party participation in ongoing wars. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita have shown that under an expected utility model of third-party participation, the ...
TL;DR: From 1956 to 1971, a group of conflict resolution researchers centered at the University of Michigan attempted to develop a comprehensive scientific theory of human conflict and to establish a new paradigm for conflict resolution as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: From 1956 to 1971 a group of conflict resolution researchers centered at the University of Michigan attempted to develop a comprehensive scientific theory of human conflict and to establish a new p...
TL;DR: The authors argue that the substantive complexities of arms rivalries can be implicitly encompassed by simple rational models considerably less restrictive than Richardson's model, and propose a new approach to modeling that is required if we are to understand the underlying dynamics of resource allocation that sustain an arms race.
Abstract: Richardson's simple arms race model inspired an extensive (and still growing) body of research by scholars in many disciplines. Unfortunately, much of this work follows Richardson's lead by paying scant attention to domestic politics and decision-making processes. Despite the use of increasingly sophisticated formal models, empirical measures, and statistical methods, progress has been stymied by continued reliance on rigid models and literal interpretations of statistical tests, especially regarding the relative potency of external and internal factors. A new approach to modeling is required if we are to understand the underlying dynamics of resource allocation that sustain an arms race. The author argues that the substantive complexities of arms rivalries can be implicitly encompassed by simple rational models considerably less restrictive than Richardson's model.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on the behavior-begets-behavior dynamic in the context of the interactions of states in crisis and propose a model of matching or reciprocal behavior, and several factors, such as threat to basic values, sociopolitical conditions, and power relations among crisis actors, contribute to the disruption of the matching process.
Abstract: This article focuses on the behavior-begets-behavior dynamic in the context of the interactions of states in crisis. Matching behavior is defined as a reciprocal relationship between incoming behavior (crisis trigger) and outgoing behavior (crisis response). A model of matching or reciprocal behavior is proposed, and several factors — threat to basic values, sociopolitical conditions, and power relations among crisis actors — are examined from the perspective of their potential disruption of the matching process. An initial finding is that crises, like the much more heavily studied conflict processes in general, exhibit a very high degree of matching behavior. However, there is considerable evidence that the factors examined here contribute to the disruption of these processes. A low threat to decision makers' values provides a context in which decision makers may respond with violence to nonviolent crisis triggers. Similarly, deteriorating sociopolitical conditions in countries experiencing a foreign pol...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study bargaining behavior of an agent in a one-shot bargaining situation and show that the agent's minimum demands unambiguously increase with increases in uncertainty about the principal's reservation price.
Abstract: Agents often bargain on behalf of their principals. In many common negotiating situations, especially where ex post ratification of the agent's agreement is required (e.g., union contracts, treaties), an agent faces inherent uncertainty about the terms that are minimally acceptable to the principal (the principal's “reservation price”). In fact, the agent's entire payoff function may be uncertain. We study bargaining behavior in these circumstances and show that the agent's minimum demands unambiguously increase with increases in uncertainty about the principal's reservation price, with increases in uncertainty about the payoff function, and with increases in the agent's degree of risk aversion. We then fashion these results about an individual agent's behavior into conclusions about the difficulty of reaching agreement in the overall negotiations. Using Axelrod's measure of the “conflict of interest” in a game, optimal insistence prices in a one-shot bargaining situation, and two equilibrium concepts in ...
TL;DR: This paper examined patterns of continuity and change in attitudes within the context of an existence conflict and presented a theoretical framework for the analysis of attitudes, and applied it to the attitudes of Allon and Peres vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue.
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to examine patterns of continuity and change in attitudes within the context of an existence conflict. It presents a theoretical framework for the analysis of attitudes, and applies it to the attitudes of Allon and Peres vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue. Differences in attitude between the two decision makers did exist. Yet Allon and Peres maintained common views regarding core issues in the conflict such as the rejection of the PLO and its demand for a Palestinian state, the preservation of the Jewish character of Israel, and support for a territorial compromise based on defensible borders. To be sure, the attitudes of Allon and Peres toward the PLO were a perfect replica of an attitude in an existence conflict, and excluded any possibility for rapprochement. However, toward the Palestinian population, both showed a great deal of openness, and persistently sought a just and honorable way out of the circle of mutual mistrust and hostility.
TL;DR: This article examined the influence of mediators' interests and outcome recommendations on disputants' perceptions and behavior and found that favorable mediator alignment may cushion the impact of overt, unfavorable recommendations from that mediator.
Abstract: This experiment examined the influence of mediators' interests and outcome recommendations on disputants' perceptions and behavior. A distinction (following Pruitt, 1983) was made between two types of mediator bias: general alignment and overt support. In the general alignment variable, participants dealt with a mediator who was aligned either: (a) with them - mediator outcomes were positively correlated with their own, or (b) against them - mediator outcomes were negatively correlated with their own. In the overt support variable, participants were confronted with a mediator who made outcome recommendations that were overtly favorable, even handed, or unfavorable. The results indicate that disputants mistrusted favorable recommendations from unfavorably aligned mediators; this “Trojan horse effect” also led to lower ratings of mediator acceptability. The results suggest that favorable mediator alignment may cushion the impact of overt, unfavorable recommendations from that mediator. Broader theoretical a...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the association between a major power passing through a critical point interval and its war involvement is much stronger in transition dyads than in nontransition dyads.
Abstract: Recently two putative causes of great power war - power transitions (as identified by Houweling and Siccama 1988) and critical points (as identified by Doran 1989) - have confronted each other. In subsequent publications Doran changed the dating of several of his critical points. The authors will demonstrate that these changes have the effect of increasing the positive association between nations passing through a critical point interval on their relative capability trajectory and their involvement in war. Doran correctly observes that power transitions in dyads do not increase the probability of fighting in these dyads when none of their members is simultaneously passing through a critical point interval. However, the authors show that the association between a major power passing through a critical point interval and its war involvement is much stronger in transition dyads than in nontransition dyads. A power transition in a dyad, in which at least one of its members is also passing through a critical p...
TL;DR: In this article, a survey of 7th grade Arab students in seven segregated and mixed Jewish-Arab communities reveals that their perceptions of Jews and of their own deprivation are determined by their political self-identity rather than by earlier contact with Jews.
Abstract: Organized encounters between Arab and Jewish students as a means of education for coexistence are questioned vis-a-vis the recent politicization of Arabs who are Israeli citizens, and the subsequent shift in their self-identity from “Israeli Arabs” to Palestinians. A survey of 268 seventh grade Arab students in seven segregated and mixed Jewish-Arab communities reveals that their perceptions of Jews and of their own deprivation are determined by their political self-identity rather than by earlier contact with Jews. These perceptions further influence their readiness to associate with Jewish children. Concluding that the contact hypothesis may not enhance interethnic relations in situations of political conflict, we suggest that the school system shift its focus from students' encounters to curricular programs dealing directly with the conflict issues.
TL;DR: In this paper, game-theoretic models of national crisis behavior can be used to generate research hypotheses about how specific features of national political structures and political culture are related to war-proneness.
Abstract: A natural approach to understanding the tendencies of nations to enter or avoid wars is through the study of national decision making in international crises. Recent game-theoretic models of national crisis behavior can be used to generate research hypotheses about how specific features of national political structures and political culture are related to war-proneness. To illustrate, propositions about the relationships of several national characteristics to crisis involvement and war initiation are derived from two such models. Empirical testing of these hypotheses can help shed new light on Kant's thesis that democracies are less war-prone than other states.
TL;DR: In this article, the Long-range Analysis of War Project, University of Colorado, predicted that the war magnitude between Iraq and the United Nations collective security coalition will be between 5 (hundred thousand combatant fatalities) and 6- (low million).
Abstract: Results from this study conducted in November 1990 at the Long-Range Analysis of War Project, University of Colorado, predict that the magnitude μ of a war between Iraq and the United Nations collective security coalition will be between 5 (hundred thousand combatant fatalities) and 6- (low million). War magnitude is defined as the common logarithm of total combatant fatalities. This falsifiable forecast (“an event 5 ≤μ≤ 6- will occur”) was derived using mathematical models for fatalities, extent, and duration, estimated on historical populations of Correlates of War Project data on interstate wars involving great powers. The forecast will be wrong if and only if 5 > μ > 6-. However, failure is scientifically unlikely in this case, because the models are parsimonious, they show strong empirical fit, and extensive tests prove that they are largely insensitive to historical evolution - unlike Lanchester-type models.
TL;DR: Based on a model linking ascent prerequisites, relative decline, long-wave dynamics, and systemic war, the relationships among the pace of technological innovation, relative economic position, and....
Abstract: Based on a model linking ascent prerequisites, relative decline, long-wave dynamics, and systemic war, the relationships among the pace of technological innovation, relative economic position, and ...
TL;DR: In this paper, a six-choice prisoner's dilemma game that was described in terms of an arms race was conducted, where the simulated other employed either a GRIT or tit-for-tat strategy, with either communication or no communication.
Abstract: Subjects (40 males and 40 females) played against a simulated other in a six-choice prisoner's dilemma game that was described in terms of an arms race. The simulated other employed either a GRIT or tit-for-tat strategy, with either communication or no communication. The GRIT strategy elicited more cooperation than the tit-for-tat strategy, and there was an interaction such that the GRIT strategy with communication produced more cooperation than any of the other conditions. In addition, explicit communication decreased the occurrence of deception being employed against the GRIT strategist. Although GRIT produced more conciliation than tit-for-tat, the simulated other using GRIT was also taken advantage of more frequently; to avoid exploitation, modifications in the GRIT strategy may be needed. The results are discussed in terms of how explicit communication is needed for GRIT to be optimally effective and how additional communication may reduce exploitation.
TL;DR: Wolfson and Shabahang as mentioned in this paper generalize from the experience of a world close to war since the beginning of the Twentieth Century to look at the causes of conflict in wider perspective.
Abstract: At the end of the cold war it is possible to look at the causes of conflict in wider perspective. This chapter was written in 1990, in an attempt to generalize from the experience of a world close to war since the beginning of the Twentieth Century. It was originally published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution [Wolfson and Shabahang, 1991a].