Showing papers in "Journal of Economic Theory in 2013"

TL;DR: It is proved that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of players truthfully communicating with each one of them.

TL;DR: The admission of high-skilled immigrants expedites redistribution toward the less-skilled local households through both a stronger fiscal support for public education and a reduction in the skill wage premium.

TL;DR: The role of non-binding goals to attenuate time inconsistency is addressed and none of the effects of goal-setting require loss aversion.

TL;DR: In this article, the optimal dynamics of an AK economy where population is uniformly distributed along the unit circle were studied, and the value function of the problem was found explicitly and the unique optimal control was identified in feedback form.

TL;DR: Focusing on preferences over lotteries of menus, the notion of Thinking Aversion is introduced and preferences are characterized as the difference between an affine evaluation of the content of the menu and a function that assigns to each menu a thinking cost.

TL;DR: The present paper formally clarifies the relation between the maxmin approach of decision theory under ambiguity and the minimax approach of robust statistics by showing the conditions under which the two approaches are actually equivalent.

TL;DR: A fairly mild condition for optimal marginal tax rates to be nonnegative everywhere is derived, using a new tax perturbation approach that integrates the nonlinearity of the tax function into the behavioral elasticities.

TL;DR: An axiom, called AM-proofness, saying that manipulation cannot occur through preferences adjacent to the sincere one is studied, showing that the sufficient condition is satisfied by the universal domain and the domain of single-peaked preferences.

TL;DR: The axiomatize the class of preferences that admit a representation of the form V(f) = mu - rho(d), where mu is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability, d is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and rho (d) is a measure of (aversion to) dispersion that corresponds to an uncertainty premium.

TL;DR: The optimal selling mechanism in a buyer–seller situation where the buyer is loss-averse is derived; a budget-balanced, efficient mechanism is found in a public goods location model; and a principal–agent model with ex post non-contractible actions available to the agent is considered.

TL;DR: A large market with directed search and signaling is studied and it is proved that there is a unique equilibrium under bargaining, which is superior to the price-posting equilibrium when a seller's bargaining power is intermediate and the quality differential is small.

TL;DR: It is shown that, for any supermodular complete information game, the global game selection is independent of the payoff functions chosen for the gameʼs global game embedding and a simple sufficient criterion is given to derive the selection and establish noise independence in many-action games by decomposing them into games with smaller action sets.

TL;DR: The standard model of bundling as a price discrimination device is extended to allow products to be substitutes and for Products to be supplied by separate sellers.

TL;DR: It is proved that even low switching cost customers have value for the incumbent: when there are more of them its profits increase as their presence hinders entrants who find it more costly to attract high switching cost Customers.

TL;DR: In this paper, a strictly convex function whose derivatives vanish precisely at the equilibria of Choo and Siow's model is presented, which implies uniqueness of the resulting equilibrium marriage distribution, simplifies the argument for its existence, and gives a representation of it in closed form.

TL;DR: It is shown that information and abstention are not necessarily negatively correlated: some voters are more likely to abstain the more informed they are, and the manner in which incentives to acquire information are non-monotonic in terms of both ideology and the level of intensity.

TL;DR: The paper shows that the rate of substitution for these two risk increases can be used to provide a broader definition and two additional characterizations of the nth degree risk aversion, including a more risk averse partial order.

TL;DR: Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play, where e is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time, and allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no- Regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria.

TL;DR: This work provides a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors re-examine the destabilizing role of balanced budget fiscal policy rules based on consumption taxation and show that non-linear consumption taxation may destabilize the economy, promoting expectation-driven fluctuations, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is sufficiently larger than one and the tax rate is counter-cyclical with respect to consumption.

TL;DR: This work addresses dissonance arising from the use of a Lebesgue interval for playerʼs names by showing a saturated probability space as being a necessary and sufficient name-space for the existence and upper hemi-continuity of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games with traits.

TL;DR: In this paper, the fixed point index is used to show that the stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of a coalitional bargaining game are unique and that there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that the offered quantities can be continuously varied, offered prices are selected from a finite set and the density of the additive demand shock is not too steep, where the resulting stepped SFE converges to the continuous SFE as the number of steps increases.

TL;DR: This article presented a political economy theory of the behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycle, which predicts that, in both booms and recessions, fiscal policies are set so that the marginal cost of public funds obeys a submartingale.

TL;DR: This paper analyzes an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift, and derives a closed-form solution of a Nash equilibrium outcome.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors derive a wide class of higher-order game dynamics, generalizing first-order dynamics and replicator dynamics, and show that strictly dominated strategies become extinct in n-th order payoff-monotonic dynamics n orders as fast as in the corresponding first order dynamics.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors model the creation and destruction of jobs in the presence of heterogeneity in firm productivity and frictional credit and labor markets, and find that adverse shocks to credit markets destroy the least productive jobs and slow job creation, thus raising aggregate TFP and unemployment, and reducing output.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfles a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender, and provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs.

TL;DR: It is shown that the equilibrium statistical inferences are based on an exponential learning model, which means that although the beliefs converge to truth, learning takes place too late.