Showing papers in "Psychological Review in 1984"

Achievement motivation: Conceptions of ability, subjective experience, task choice, and performance.

Abstract: Achievement behavior is denned as behavior directed at developing or demonstrating high rather than low ability. It is shown that ability can be conceived in two ways. First, ability can be judged high or low with reference to the individual's own past performance or knowledge. In this context, gains in mastery indicate competence. Second, ability can be judged as capacity relative to that of others. In this context, a gain in mastery alone does not indicate high ability. To demonstrate high capacity, one must achieve more with equal effort or use less effort than do others for an equal performance. The conditions under which these different conceptions of ability function as individuals' goals and the nature of subjective experience in each case are specified. Different predictions of task choice and performance are derived and tested for each case. In this article, predictions of task choice, performance, and subjective experience in experimental achievement settings are derived, and relevant evidence is examined. An intentional view of behavior (Dennett, 1978) is adopted. In this, action is construed as a rational attempt to attain goals or incentives. In commonsense terms, individuals' actions serve to achieve purposes efficiently or economically. In the terms of games theory, action maximizes

On the Ability to Inhibit Thought and Action: A Theory of an Act of Control

Abstract: Many situations require people to stop or change their current thoughts and actions. We present a theory of the inhibition of thought and action to account for people's performance in such situations. The theory proposes that a control signal, such as an external stop signal or an error during performance, starts a stopping process that races against the processes underlying ongoing thought and action. If the stopping process wins, thought and action are inhibited; if the ongoing process wins, thought and action run on to completion. We develop the theory formally to account for many aspects of performance in situations with explicit stop signals, and we apply it to several sets of data. We discuss the relation between response inhibition and other acts of control in motor performance and in cognition, and we consider how our theory relates to current thinking about attentional control and automaticity.

Causal explanations as a risk factor for depression: Theory and evidence.

Abstract: The attributional reformulation of the learned helplessness model claims that an explanatory style in which bad events are explained by internal, stable, and global causes is associated with depressive symptoms. Furthermore, this style is claimed to be a risk factor for subsequent depression when bad events are encountered. We describe a variety of new investigations of the helplessness reformulation that employ five research strategies: (a) cross-sectional correlational studies, (b) longitudinal studies, (c) experiments of nature, (d) laboratory experiments, and (e) case studies. Taken together, these studies converge in their support for the learned helplessness reformulation.

A retrieval model for both recognition and recall.

Abstract: ion of categorical information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. Medin, D. L., & Schaffer, M. M. (1978). Context theory of classification learning. Psychological Review, 85, 207238. Mclcalfe, J., & Murdock, B. B., Jr. (1981). An encoding and retrieval model of single-trial free recall. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20, 161-189. Murdock, B. B., Jr. (1962). The serial position effect in free recall. Journal oj Experimental Psychology, 64, 482488. Murdock, B. B., Jr. (1974). Human memory: Theory and data. Potomac, MD: Erlbaum. Murdock, B. B., Jr. (1982). A theory for the storage and retrieval of item and associative information. Psychological Review, 89, 609-626. Murdock, B. B., Jr., & Anderson, R. E. (1975). Encoding, storage and retrieval of item information. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), Information processing and cognition: The Loyola symposium. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Murdock, B. B., Jr., & Dufty, P. O. (1972). Strength theory and recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 94, 284-290. Muter, P. (in press). Recognition and recall of words with a single meaning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. Nairnc, J. S. (1983). Associative processing during rote rehearsal. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 3-20. Neely, J. H., & Balota, D. A. (1981). Test expectancy and semantic organization effects in recall and recognition. Memory and Cognition, 9, 283-306. Neely, J. H., Schmidt, S. R., & Roediger, H. L. III. (1983). Inhibition from related primes in recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 196-211. Nelson, D. L., & Davis, M. J. (1972). Transfer and false recognitions based on phonetic identities of words. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 92, 347-353. Norman, D. A., & Wickelgren, W. A. (1969). Strength theory of decision rules and latency in short-term memory. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 6, 192-208. Okada, R., & Burrows, D. (1973). Organizational factors in high-speed scanning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 101, 77-81. Pachella, R. G. (1974). An interpretation of reaction time in information processing research. In B. Kantowitz (Ed.), Human information processing: Tutorials in performance and cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Pike, R. (1973). Response latency models for signal detection. Psychological Review, 80, 53-68. Pike, R., Dalglcish, L., & Wright, J. (1977). A multipleobservations model for response latency and the latencies of correct and incorrect responses in recognition memory. Memory and Cognition, 5, 580-589. Raaijmakers, J. G. W., & Shiflrin, R. M. (1980). SAM: A theory of probabilistic search of associative memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 14). New York: Academic Press. Raaijmakers, J. G. W., & Shifrrin, R. M. (1981a). Order effects in recall. In A. Long & A. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and performance(Vol. 9). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Raaijmakers, J. G. W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (198Ib). Search of Associative Memory. Psychological Review, 88, 93-

Personality, motivation, and performance: A theory of the relationship between individual differences and information processing.

Abstract: We introduce a model to relate the personality dimensions of introversion- extraversion, achievement motivation, and anxiety to efficient cognitive performance. We show how these personality dimensions in combination with situational moderators (e.g., success, failure, time pressure, incentives, time of day, and stimulant drugs) affect the motivational constructs of arousal and effort. We propose a general information-processing model that accounts for the systematic effects of these motivational states on certain task components (sustained information transfer and some aspect of short-term memory). We combine empirical generalizations about task components in a structural model and derive testable predictions that differentiate alternative motivational hypotheses.

Assessment of covariation by humans and animals: The joint influence of prior expectations and current situational information.

Abstract: In this article, we propose a theoretical framework for understanding and integrating people's and animals' covariation assessment. We argue that covariation perception is determined by the interaction between two sources of information: (a) the organism's prior expectations about the covariation between two events and (b) current situational information provided by the environment about the objective contingency between the events. Both accuracies and errors in people's and animals' covariation assessments are analyzed within this interactional theoretical framework. We then review four lines of research in support of this analysis. Finally, we consider the issue of accuracy versus rationality in covariation assessment. A consensus has been forming among learning, clinical, and social psychologists: The ability to detect the relationships or covariations among stimuli, behaviors, and outcomes in one's environment is an important component of adaptive behavior. The covariation between two events may be defined in terms of their co-occurrence (i.e., the degree to which one event occurs more often in the presence than in the absence of the other event). Information about the relationships or covariations between events in the world provides people and animals with a means of explaining the past, controlling the present, and predicting the future, thereby maximizing the likelihood that they can obtain desired outcomes and avoid aversive ones. The concept of covariation provides a cornerstone for a number of substantive areas within psychology. For example, contemporary learning theorists point to the role of ob

Is there a cell-biological alphabet for simple forms of learning?

Abstract: Recent studies indicate that the cellular mechanism underlying classical conditioning of the Aplysia siphon withdrawal reflex is an extension of the mechanism underlying sensitization. This finding suggests that the mechanisms of yet higher forms of learning may similarly be based on the mechanisms of these simple forms of learning. We illustrate this hypothesis by showing how several higher order features of classical conditioning, including generalization, extinction, second-order conditioning, blocking, and the effect of contingency, can be accounted for by combinations of the cellular processes that underlie habituation, sensitization, and classical conditioning in Aplysia.

A theory of criterion setting with an application to sequential dependencies.

Abstract: Three models of sequential effects in psychophysica l tasks are defined and experimental results described. These appear most consistent with a model in which the momentary value of the criterion is modified by memory traces, an independent trace being retained for each relevant past event. On this basis, a theory of criterion setting is developed: A long-term process determines an initial value for the criterion, and two short-term processes adjust the criterion (a) to match current changes in the expected probabilities of signals and (b) to maximize the information transmitted by the subject's responses. The theory is applied to results in the literature. Although signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966), which is now widely applied, includes the hypothesis of a decision criterion and puts forward normative prescriptions for its value, the problem of how a subject maintains his criterion at the appropriate value and adjusts that value to take account of relevant intercurrent events has largely been ignored. It is regrettable that criterion setting should generally be treated as a given but unexamined fact, because its proper understanding may clarify important psychological aspects of decision in all areas and may help to explain some still unresolved problems such as the causation of sequential effects. The object of the present article is to present a theory of criterion setting developed by the first author. As this theory arose from a consideration of some features of sequential dependencies, we begin with a brief discussion of the latter. It is a familiar but still unexplained observation that the outcomes of successive psychophysical decisions are related (Verplanck,

Automatic and Controlled Processing Revisited

Abstract: The theory of automatic and controlled processing outlined in Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and in Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) is defended in the present note. We argue that the criticisms of Ryan (1983) range from irrelevant to incorrect, based on a brief review of data from the 1977 articles and on some more recent publications. The evidence Ryan discusses comes from the prememorized-list paradigm, a paradigm that undoubtedly involves automatic and controlled processes but probably not automatic detection and controlled search. We argue that a variety of mechanisms consistent with our general theory, some automatic and some controlled, could be operating in the prememorized-list paradigm and can explain the observed results. A theory of automatic and controlled processing was outlined and given empirical support in the articles of Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977). The characteristics of both types of processes were established through examination of particular examples of each of these classes of processes. These examples, of critical importance in many search and attention tasks, were termed automatic detection and controlled search, and their characteristics were determined empirically. In particular, in memory- or visual-search tasks, consistent mapping (CM) refers to paradigms in which targets and distractors never exchange roles over trials of the study. Varied mapping (VM) refers to paradigms in which targets on one trial may be distractors on another, and vice versa. We demonstrated that extended testing in CM paradigms led to a marked flattening of the set-size functions and to a number of other prominent effects. We termed the processes used by subjects, automatic detection. In contrast, the use of a VM procedure, however extended, leaves intact the form and the slope of the set-size function. We termed the processes used in this situation, controlled search. Based on the findings, we postulated that automatic processing is generally a fast, parallel, fairly

Model of social inference processes

Abstract: This article presents a new model of inference processes in the social perceiver, along with the basis of the model in prior experimental results and in the ACT* cognitive theory. The two stages of the model involve different types of processing: interpretive versus procedural. In the first stage, an inference is performed by general, domain-independent processes guided by a learned inference rule that is selected from long-term memory. In the second, procedural stage, after much experience with a particular inferential domain, an inference process is selected without explicit search, based on a pattern match to the current goal and knowledge state. The inference becomes automatic. Existing experimental evidence supports predictions of the model in both the attribution and attitude domains. Insights and findings of current approaches to inference, including information integration and judgmental heuristics, can be encompassed within the new model in a natural way. Directions for future research applying the model are discussed. Social inferences—those involving attributions, other beliefs, and attitudes—are intrinsic components of many processes of interest to social and cognitive psychologists, including person perception, social judgment, causal attribution, language comprehension, and attitude formation and change (cf. Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Wyer & Carlston, 1979). This article presents a new model of social inference processes, based on a general theory of cognitive structure and processes and on recent results in social psychology. Existing theoretical approaches to social inference fall into three general categories (Hastie, 1983): Information Integration Theory (N. H. Anderson, 1981), judgmental heuristics (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), and information-processing models (Wyer & Srull, 1980). The relationship of the new model to these current approaches is discussed later in the article. However, current

Social learning theory and the dynamics of interaction.

Abstract: The recent controversy between Bandura (1983) and Phillips and Orton (1983) about the causal relations involved in social interactions prompted a discussion of the proper role for formal models in the analysis of social interactions. I argue that (a) Bandura's attempt at formal modeling of patterns of causation is vague and misleading; (b) internal variables, such as expectation and self-monitoring, can easily be handled by formal models; (c) simple deterministic models can behave in unexpectedly complex ways, so cannot be ruled out in principle as explanations for social interaction; and (d) unaided verbal reasoning cannot hope to come to grips with the dynamics of even simple interacting systems.

Representing Personal Determinants in Causal Structures.

Abstract: L'auteur repond aux critiques de Staddon (1984) et a sa presentation d'un modele formel d'analyse des interactions sociales, en contestant la reduction des determinants cognitifs aux stimuli anterieurs