Showing papers in "Public Choice in 1976"

Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles

Abstract: Condorcet's paradox [6] of simple majority voting occurs in a voting situation with n voters and m candidates or alternatives if for every alternative there is a second alternative which more voters prefer to the first alternative than conversely. The paradox can arise only if the strict simple majority relation on the alternatives is cyclic, provided that m is finite. Studies of the paradox are usually based either on profiles or A-profiles (anonymous preference profiles). A profile is a function that assigns a preference order on the alternatives to each voter. An A-profile, which has also been called a return [28], profile [31] and pattern [20], is a function that assigns a nonnegative number of voters to each potential preference order on the alternatives such that the sum of the assigned integers equals n. In general, many different profiles which retain voter identities map into the same A-profile, and any two profiles that map into the same A-profile bear the same simple majority relation on the alternatives. Hence, it may appear that it is purely a matter of personal taste or analytical convenience whether one works with profiles or with A-profiles in studying Condorcet's paradox. Although this is true in one sense, there are important differences between the two bases that will be explored in the present paper. Of special concern will be the fact that some A-profiles correspond to very few profiles (consider an A-profile that assigns all n voters to the same preference

The existence of group preference functions

Abstract: Although Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem in social choice theory ([1]) is well-known and famous, it seems to be less common knowledge that this result does not hold for the case of an infinite number of voters. As far as I know, the first time this fact has been mentioned in print is in Peter Fishburn's [3]. There he gave a proof of the existence of what Arrow called a "social welfare function", using a special kind of probability measure. In a letter Peter Fishburn has informed me that Julian Blau knew about the infinite voter result in 1960 already. He has, however, not published anything on it. In this paper I will prove that not only do such functions exist, but they exist in great numbers. In fact, the cardinal number of functions satisfying the conditions posed by Arrow equals the total number of functions from the same domain. Arrow's theorem will follow as a corollary when the main theorem is combined with a simple mathematical fact. The roles played by the different conditions are spelt out more clearly than usual when Arrow's result is proved in this way. The technique of the proof is also applicable to the case of so-called "quasi-transitive" social preference. Especially Amartya Sen [8] and Frederic Schick [7] have argued that a possible solution to the problem of social choice would be to relax the condition that social preference be transitive and require only

Social pressure and contributions to health charities

Abstract: On the whole the evidence lends support to the hypothesis that social pressure affects the level of charitable contributions We find, however, that the form of the pressure is an important determinant of the size of health contributions Personal forms of solicitation appear to increase contributions, relative to impersonal forms such as media advertisements and mail campaigns Within the class of personal solicitations, we find that pressure to give which is exerted by friends is more effective than requrests by strangers Limited evidence was also found that some workplace relationships result in more effective fund-raising when compared to solicitations by strangers

The kernel and payoffs in European government coalitions

Abstract: This paper attempts to analyze the process of coalition formation in the European parliamentary democracies in terms of existing concepts from game theory. The game theory approach rests first of all on the assumption of individual, or actor, optimizing behavior in some particular situation or game. For relatively simple situations various solution concepts can be developed. If some actual parliamentary situation may be modelled by a game like structure, then the various game theoretic solution concepts may be developed to produce solution predictions, and these may be compared with the events that did occur. The match between prediction and observation may however be poor. If this is the case then one may infer that the essential assumption of optimizing behavior could not be justified. This inference is however infertile, since the game theory developments rest on the existence of unobservables, the utility functions or the like, and we can not explore the nature of such unobservables. A second inference may be that the game theory model does not catch the significant features of the parliamentary game. While it is possible to develop game theory models of high generality, such models do not generate simple solution notions. The predictions therefore are too

Rotc service commitments: A comment

Abstract: In a recent note in this Journal, Thomas and Bierman argue that the military should consider reducing the minimum service requirement for ROTC candidates. Although we agree that the services should consider the trade-off between accessions and minimum obligated service, we find no theoretical basis for the authors' contention that \"supply\" will be increased and that there WIU be a higher quality of candidates in the program. To start, we draw figure 1 with schedules similar to those drawn by Thomas and Bierman. qH and qL are the \"supply schedules\" for high quality and low quality candidates, respectively. We have added the schedules vertically, qT' to obtain the maximum potential accessions per year. The higher is the minimum service requirement (MSR), the lower is the potential number of accessions. For an MSR of M 1 and demand of MlC, M1A high quality and AC (which is less than M1B ) low quality candidates are accessed. Unfortunately, the curves do not directly depict the demand for and supply of newly commissioned officers. The military's demand is properly stated in terms of man-years acquired: that is, the number accessed times their years of service. The demand is for (OM 1 x M1C ) man-years (assuming no attrition in the first M 1 years and no officers serve beyond MSR). High quality individuals supply (OM 1 x:M1A ) man-years; low quality individuals supply (OM 1 x AC) man-years. Recognizing that demand and supply is in terms of man-years and not accessions is necessary when calculating the optimal MSR.

The electoral college and the rational vote

Abstract: We have shown first, that if the electoral college was abolished the theoretically measured power of voters would increase and second, that in presidential elections the measure of voting power used does in fact have a highly significant impact on the decision as to whether or not to vote. Thus, the analysis predicts that the abolition of the electoral college would have a significant impact on voter participation. From a policy viewpoint, if we view participation in elections as desirable, this could be used as an argument in favor of direct election of the president. From a scientific viewpoint, we are able to make a strong and unambiguous prediction about the results of a (possible) future event from theoretical considerations. If the electoral college should be abolished, it will be possible to test our predictions. In addition, we have provided a further test of the rational behavior view of electoral participation and have shown that this model applies to presidential elections. Finally, we have shown that the theoretical measure of voting power does predict actual behavior.

A diagrammatic exposition of the logic of collection action

Abstract: During the decade since the appearance of Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action, a number of economists and political scientists have focused their efforts on further developing the model of group behavior analyzed by Olson.2 While these efforts have contributed to both the precision and the generality of the theory of collective action, the theory remains a somewhat loosely connected set of verbal and graphical assertions about group behavior, and the central results of the theory have not all been demonstrated using the same analytical style. This paper attempts to remedy this deficiency in some major respects.3 The analysis is made particularly easy to follow because of a result discussed in the Appendix which enables the analysis of both Cournot and Pareto optimal behavior using the same graph. It is hoped that this method of presentation will contribute to a consolidation of the theory of collective action and will also make the theory more easily accessible to the average reader.

Polluters' profit and political response: The dynamics of rights creation

Abstract: In an earlier article in the American Economic Review, James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock present an ingenious analysis of taxation versus regulation as alternative control instruments for external diseconomies from a methodological individualist public choice perspective. Their analysis endeavors to explain the prevalence of direct regulation, providing several reasons for concluding that "producing firms will always oppose any imposition of a penalty tax. However, they may well favor direct regulation restricting industry output, even if no consideration at all is given to the imposition of a tax. And, when faced with an either/or choice they will always prefer regulation to the tax" (p. 142). Their argument well may be overstated, after all it is only an inferential statement of tendency. But there is a part of their discussion, on which rests the primary normative implication of their analysis, which begs a very deep analytical problem of public choice. This problem has a fundamental bearing on their Wicksellian conclusion and severely limits the meaningfulness and probative value of their analytical technique. The problem which we will pose is non-normative for the analyst and is quite independent of the apparent widespread agreement among economists (so noted by Buchanan and TuUock, p. 139) preferring taxes to regulation as externality control instruments.

Identification of preference for election outcomes from aggregate voting data

Abstract: Many students of local and state government finance (most recently: William Neenan (1972), Robert Deacon and Perry Shapiro (1975)) have suggested that an analysis of voting choices on finance referenda would facilitate hypothesis-testing on what is the intrajurisdictional pattern of net fiscal incidence related to a government's provision of public services, assuming that all at the polls vote for their preferred outcome in the particular referendum issue. However those who vote in any given election comprise only a subset of the potential electorate. Aside from the question of aggregation of votes,1 a major problem in making an inference from voters' choices to the preferences of the citizenry occurs when the preferences of those at the polls systematically differ from those who have chosen not to *The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the policies of the Bureau of Labor Statistics or the views of other BLS staff members.

A note on nonwhite migration, welfare levels, and the political process

Abstract: This empirical note finds that nonwhite migration is positively and significantly affected by welfare levels and that welfare levels in turn are positively and significantly affected by nonwhite migration. Thus, this two stage least squares analysis of 1960-1970 net interstate migration lends support to the hypothesis that while nonwhite families are attracted for one reason or another to those states having higher welfare benefit levels per recipient on the one hand, through the political (voting) process they effectively exert pressures to raise welfare levels per recipient on the other hand.

A comment on the economics of campaign funds

Abstract: In a recent article in this journal William P. Welch (2.) applied basic economic concepts to the development of a theory of campaign funds. Included in the article was an empirical test of the hypothesis that campaign contributions can be transformed into expected vote percentage through a production function. The foremost objective of this comment is to re-estimate the Welch election production function in a more theoretically appropriate functional form. A distinctive characteristic of an election is that one candidate's actions influence the other candidate's outcome; that is, the output (expected vote percentage) represents a "zero sum game." An election does not depend on the absolute level of each candidate's inputs but upon the relative level of each candidate's inputs vis-a-vis the other. The value of the output will not be affected at all by equal proportion variations in the inputs. A function which describes the election of two candidates must be homogeneous of degree zero. The election production function estimated by Welch does not satisfy the above condition. Furthermore, the Welch approach with insertion of the input values for each candidate into the estimated model will result in predictions of their percent of votes which do not sum to one with probability one. A reformulation of the Cobb-Douglas production function to account for the relative nature of the inputs has been developed by Lott and Warner (1.):