Showing papers in "Southern Journal of Philosophy in 1986"

Externalist moral realism

Abstract: We might, perhaps a little misleadingly, represent my claims about realism and moral inquiry by saying that moral realism is presupposed or supported by certain features of commonsense moral thinking. Now, both those who accept this kind of argument for moral realism and those who do not will often identify another important feature in commonsense moral thinking, namely, the practical or action-guiding character of morality. The practical character of morality is often thought to call for an antirealist, especially noncognitivist, construal of moral claims. If moral judgments merely purported to state facts, it is claimed, they could not fulfill the action-guiding function they do. To fulfill this function, moral judgments must concern or express affective, fundamentally noncognitive, features of people's psychology. It is this sort of antirealist argument that I wish to consider here. I shall argue that, properly understood, the practical or action-guiding character of morality not only fails to undermine the case for moral realism but actually strengthens it. INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM Moral considerations are practical in some very important sense. Agents engage in moral deliberation in order to decide what to do and give moral advice with the aim of influencing others' conduct in certain ways. We expect people who accept moral claims or make moral judgments to act in certain ways. We would regard it as odd for people who accepted moral claims about an issue to be completely indifferent about that issue. For these reasons, we expect moral considerations to motivate people to act in certain ways, or at least to provide them with reason to act in those ways.

The Philosophical Foundations of Risk

Abstract: A partir de N Rescher : " A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management " (Univ Press of America, Washington, 1983), l'A confirme l'idee que la theorie de la decision ne suffit pas a fonder une analyse complete de la notion de risque : il y faut, en plus, une theorie epistemologique

The infinite regress of temporal attributions

Abstract: L'A. critique ce qu'il considere comme un dogme de la philosophie contemporaine du temps (a la suite de McTaggart) : l'idee que le passe, le present et le futur sont des proprietes des evenements, ce qui est dit conduire a une regression a l'infini des predications temporelles. L'A. montre que cette regression est evitable, a travers une etude de la notion de propriete temporelle et par comparaison avec d'autres types de proprietes

Objectivity, pluralism and relativism: a critique of macintyre's theory of virtue

Abstract: Critique de la theorie morale de A. McIntyre dans " After Virtue " (p. 307-319). Selon McIntyre, nous devons revenir a une theorie aristotelicienne des vertus pour sauver l'objectivite de la morale, menacee par le relativisme contemporain. Mais l'A. soutient que la theorie propre de McI. est elle-meme sujette au relativisme qu'il critique