Showing papers in "World Trade Review in 2008"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present estimates of nominal and relative rates of assistance to farmers in China for the period 1981 to 2005; and by summarizing estimates from an economy-wide computable general equilibrium model of the measured distortions globally as of 2004.
Abstract: Notwithstanding the tariffication component of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, import tariffs on farm products continue to provide an incomplete indication of the extent to which agricultural producer and consumer incentives are distorted in national markets. Especially in developing countries, non-agricultural policies indirectly impact agricultural and food markets. Empirical analysis aimed at monitoring distortions to agricultural incentives thus need to examine both agricultural and non-agricultural policy measures including import or export taxes, subsidies and quantitative restrictions, plus domestic taxes or subsidies on farm outputs or inputs and consumer subsidies for food staples. This paper addresses the practical methodological issues that need to be faced when attempting to undertake such a measurement task in developing countries. The approach is illustrated in two ways: by presenting estimates of nominal and relative rates of assistance to farmers in China for the period 1981 to 2005; and by summarizing estimates from an economy-wide computable general equilibrium model of the effects on agricultural versus non-agricultural markets of the project's measured distortions globally as of 2004.
68 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that developing countries were active participants that consistently sought to have an impact on the nature and direction of the multilateral trading system and that while the energy of developing countries was often directed towards negotiating more favourable treatment for themselves, this was a result more of the asymmetrical manner in which the GATT was deployed and a consequence of their relative underdevelopment than of a desire to free-ride on the favourable trading conditions created by the concession exchanging activities of others.
Abstract: Two broad interpretations currently prevail in the literature on developing country participation in the GATT. The first suggests that developing countries spent most of their time in the GATT negotiating to be relieved of various commitments, focusing on the pursuit of industrialization through import substitution and/or free-riding on the commitments made by their industrial counterparts. The second interpretation suggests that developing countries spent the majority of their time in the GATT either as quiet bystanders lacking the expertise or political representation to participate fully, or else attempting to redress biases in the institution's design. The problem with both of these interpretations is that while each has merit neither offers a sufficiently rounded account of developing country participation. Our purpose in this paper is to offer an alternative account of developing country participation that shows more accurately the extent and variation of that participation. We argue that throughout the development of the GATT developing countries were active participants that consistently sought to have an impact on the nature and direction of the multilateral trading system. We also argue that while the energy of developing countries was often directed towards negotiating more favourable treatment for themselves, this was a result more of the asymmetrical manner in which the GATT was deployed and a consequence of their relative underdevelopment than of a desire to free-ride on the favourable trading conditions created by the concession exchanging activities of others. © Rorden Wilkinson and James Scott.
64 citations
42 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, an assessment of the recent wave of services agreements in East Asia, focusing on their liberalization content and their compliance with WTO rules on regional integration, is presented.
Abstract: The past seven years have seen a rapid proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in the East Asian region. Many of the recently concluded PTAs are comprehensive in their coverage, seeking not only the dismantling of barriers to trade in goods but also the liberalization of trade in services. This paper offers an assessment of this recent wave of services agreements in East Asia, focusing on their liberalization content and their compliance with WTO rules on regional integration. It draws on a database in which the authors recorded the value added of PTA liberalization undertakings relative to pre-existing multilateral services commitments. Among other things, this database is used to empirically assess the effect of the scheduling approach on the depth and breadth of liberalization undertakings.
42 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the issues that came before the Appellate body in the Softwood V dispute, concerning an affirmative antidumping determination by the US Department of Commerce, were addressed.
Abstract: This paper addresses the issues that came before the Appellate Body in the Softwood V dispute, concerning an affirmative antidumping determination by the US Department of Commerce. The paper addresses both the original Appellate Body opinion in the dispute, and the later opinion reviewing the compliance panel findings. We focus primarily on the ‘zeroing’ issue in ‘transaction-to-transaction (T–T)’ calculations of dumping, and briefly on two other cost-allocation issues. In general, we are ambivalent about the Appellate Body's approach to the zeroing issue. On the one hand, zeroing inflates dumping margins without any sound economic rationale for doing so. On the other hand, zeroing has been a standard administrative practice for many years and the ADA does not clearly prohibit it. The Appellate Body's legal analysis of the matter in T–T cases, in particular, rests on shaky premises. We also consider the wisdom of addressing the zeroing issue in piecemeal fashion through what has proven to be a lengthy sequence of narrow decisions.
38 citations
TL;DR: The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward? by the First Warwick Commission as mentioned in this paper, which was the first discussion of the multilateral trade regime, is a seminal work in the history of international trade.
Abstract: The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward? by the First Warwick Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Bernard Hoekman The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger by Marc Levinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . Meredith A. Crowley C. Fred Bergsten and the World Economy by Michael Mussa (editor) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Steve Charnovitz Dancing with Giants: China, India and the Global Economy edited by L. AlanWinters and Shahid Yusuf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chad P. Bown
29 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the EC is bound in its tariff schedule not to apply a duty rate in excess of 15.4% to "Meat and edible meat offal, salted, in brine, dried, or smoked" (Tariff item 02.10).
Abstract: The EC is bound in its tariff schedule not to apply a duty rate in excess of 15.4% to ‘Meat and edible meat offal, salted, in brine, dried, or smoked’ (Tariff item 02.10). The complainants, Brazil and Thailand, had been exporting frozen chicken cuts treated with salt to the EC, since, respectively, 1996 and 1998. Between 1996 and 2002, EC customs points generally, although not always and everywhere, applied the bound rate in tariff item 02.10 to these imports ; beginning in 2002, however, the Commission issued regulations requiring that customs authorities classify imports of meat under 02.10 only where salt has been added to the meat for the purpose of long-term preservation. The result of this regulatory action was that the exports of the claimants were reclassified as falling under tariff item 02.07, which applies to ‘fresh, chilled or frozen’ poultry; the bound rate under 02.07 is higher than under 02.10 (102.4 Euros per 100 kgs, an effective ad valorem rate of between 40 and 60%). As well, products under 02.07 may face special safeguard action pursuant to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Because the exports of the complainants were not salted for purposes of long-term preservation, European customs authorities were thus required to apply the higher tariff rate under 02.07 to these products. The complainants argued that through its binding under 02.10, the EC was obligated to apply a duty that did not exceed 15.4% ad valorem to their exports, regardless of whether the salt was applied for purposes of long-term preservation. By applying a higher rate of duty since 2002, the EC and its memberstate customs authorities were, according to the complainants, in violation of Art. II :1(a) and II :1(b) GATT, which prohibit WTO Members from applying duties and charges higher than the bound rates in their schedules for the product in question.
29 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors demonstrate the pragmatism of coalitions, as well as both the costs and benefits of creating or joining them in the current framework of negotiations in the Doha Round.
Abstract: Since its creation, the GATT/WTO has experienced a vast number of changes, from being a small agreement with 23 contracting parties to becoming an international organization with 151 Members; from negotiations on a limited number of tariff reductions and general rules to embracing wider and more sensitive areas, such as agriculture, services, intellectual property and environment; and from a main-trading-powers' leadership to a wider participation and more balanced reflection of interests from both developed and developing countries alike. This article attempts to demonstrate the pragmatism of coalitions, as well as both the costs and benefits of creating or joining them in the current framework of negotiations in the Doha Round.
28 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyse the merits and limits of "cross-retaliation" as a mechanism to induce compliance in WTO dispute settlement, specifically from the perspective of developing countries, and focus on cross-agreement retaliation, in particular with respect to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
Abstract: This article aims at analysing the merits and limits of ‘cross-retaliation’ as a mechanism to induce compliance in WTO dispute settlement, specifically from the perspective of developing countries. The focus is on cross-agreement retaliation, in particular with respect to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), as this seems to be the most ‘promising’ area for developing countries. Although there are several legal, economic, and administrative difficulties related to the implementation of a suspension of TRIPS obligations and there is so far no practical experience, this seems to remain an interesting option for developing countries – or at least for the largest ones among them – wishing to obtain greater leverage in the system.
25 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors address the question of whether it is possible to reconcile the SPS Agreement's requirement for scientific evidence with concerns regarding exclusion of the public voice in the domestic regulatory process.
Abstract: The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement) allows Members to enact SPS measures necessary to protect health so long as they are based on scientific evidence. This scientific evidence requirement has attracted controversy among academics, policy-makers, and civil society. The argument has been advanced that the requirement inappropriately excludes the consideration of public opinion in the domestic risk regulatory decision-making process. The article addresses the question of whether it is possible to reconcile the SPS Agreement's requirement for scientific evidence with concerns regarding exclusion of the public voice in the domestic regulatory process. It responds positively to this query, subject to certain caveats to ensure that trade liberalization goals are not undermined. It argues that the scientific evidence requirement is not only the most appropriate means available for advancing the SPS Agreement's objectives, but that it provides countries with more flexibility than critics contend, including to respond to public sentiment in cases of scientific uncertainty. Recommendations are made as to how panels and the Appellate Body should proceed in disputes under the SPS Agreement, and how governments can comply with their trade obligations while remaining responsive to public concerns.
22 citations
TL;DR: In the softwood lumber dispute, the United States argues that Canada's forestry practices, especially the fees charged by provincial governments to private firms to harvest trees on public lands (stumpage rights), result in undue subsidization of Canadian lumber.
Abstract: In the softwood lumber dispute, the United States argues that Canada's forestry practices, especially the fees charged by provincial governments to private firms to harvest trees on public lands (stumpage rights), result in undue subsidization of Canadian lumber. Within the World Trade Organization, the concept of subsidy is defined as a ‘government financial contribution’ that confers a ‘benefit’ on firms and that is ‘specific’. In US–Softwood Lumber IV, the WTO authorities ruled that stumpage rights were specific and constituted a financial contribution through the provision of a good (timber). However, in order to demonstrate whether and to what extent these rights confer a benefit on lumber producers, the United States still has to ensure that its methodology to assess the ‘adequacy of remuneration’ is compatible with WTO provisions and to conduct a satisfactory ‘pass-through’ analysis of the alleged input stumpage subsidy to unrelated downstream lumber producers.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the interpretation of the gambling decision of the Appellate Body under Article XVI GATS and the relationship of that Article to Articles XIV and XVII GATS, and the parallels with Articles III, XI and XX GATT.
Abstract: The controversial gambling decision of the Appellate Body is mostly important because of examination of the nature of Access under Article XVI GATS, the relationship of that Article to Articles XIV and XVII GATS, and the parallels with Articles III, XI, and XX GATT. Notably, the Appellate Body took the position that an apparant internal regulatory measure, which, nonetheless, had equivalent effect to a zero quota, violated Article XVI GATS. A similar measure in the area of goods would have been examined under Article III GATT and require a showing of discrimination. The facts of the case would have allowed the decision to be based on Article XVII GATS. Most of this paper deals with this issue. We agree with this interpretation of Article XVI by the Appellate Body but are critical of its hermeneutics, suffering from a textual fetish and a policy phobia. Some other elements in the decision are also examined critically.
TL;DR: This paper reviewed the determinants of core labor standards over time and concluded that efforts to improve these standards have to be tailored to the economic and social circumstances prevailing in a country at a specific time and that moral suasion from both domestic and external sources may work more slowly than more legalistic means but is preferred because it contributes to altering the social norms that underlie and will reinforce the acceptance and effectiveness of labor standards.
Abstract: This paper addresses the issues of whether the linking of core labor standards with multilateral or bilateral trade agreements is an effective way of promoting the improvement of labor standards. We review the determinants of core labor standards over time and conclude that efforts to improve these standards have to be tailored to the economic and social circumstances prevailing in a country at a specific time. Legalistic means to prod governments into revising their domestic laws or enforcing them will therefore be unsuccessful unless economic incentives can be changed to erode prevailing social norms and ease the way for the acceptance of new norms that will meet with public approval and be consonant with the distribution of political power. Moral suasion from both domestic and external sources may work more slowly than more legalistic means but is preferred because it contributes to altering the social norms that underlie and will reinforce the acceptance and effectiveness of labor standards.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined what influence various domestic constituents exert on the negotiating positions member states adopt in WTO trade rounds based on a survey of national delegations to the WTO and found that in both developed and developing countries, a broad array of governmental and non-governmental actors substantially shape trade policymaking.
Abstract: The present article examines what influence various domestic constituents exert on the negotiating positions member states adopt in WTO trade rounds based on a survey of national delegations to the WTO. The findings show that in both developed and developing countries, a broad array of governmental and non-governmental actors substantially shape trade policy-making. At the cost of those ministries traditionally in charge of trade policy-making, many domestic constituents have increased their influence since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. This leads to a discussion of the problematic implications of these developments towards more participatory trade policy-making for WTO negotiations.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors make a prima facie case that the current dispute settlement system effectively discriminates against small claims and hence owners of small claims, and thus, in particular, against least developed countries, small island economies and low income developing countries.
Abstract: The current dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) creates a particular challenge for WTO Members with limited exports since litigation costs are more or less independent of the commercial stakes involved in a dispute. Small Members with small trade stakes may therefore find it too costly to pursue legitimate claims. Reviewing the aims and practices of small claims procedures at the national and supranational level, we analyse whether a similar institution could be introduced at the WTO. While a strong empirical case can be made for such an innovation, the legal and political challenges should not be underestimated. As an initial step, we make a prima facie case that the current dispute settlement system effectively discriminates against small claims and hence owners of small claims, and thus, in particular, against least developed countries, small island economies and low income developing countries. This empirical task is carried out in Part 2. In Part 3 we explain what small claims procedures are at the national level, what purpose they serve, how they are organized in different jurisdictions involving alternative design features, and what challenges they have faced. Part 4 explores the issues raised by adding a small claims procedure in the WTO context, and indicates specific design features that could address them.
TL;DR: The scope, reach and interpretation of these provisions were the subject of the Appellate Body's June 2005 Report on US-Countervailing Duty Investigation as discussed by the authors, which was the subject
Abstract: Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) defines a subsidy as a ‘financial contribution by government’ that confers a benefit. A ‘benefit ’ consists of something better than the market would provide.1 The governmental practices that would constitute a ‘financial contribution’ are set out in some detail in the first three of four subparagraphs of paragraph 1(a) of Article 1. These include grants, loans, equity infusions, and tax incentives. Subparagraph (iv) is an anticircumvention provision encompassing the financial contributions detailed in the first three subparagraphs when those contributions are made by a private body that a government ‘entrusts or directs ’ to make them. Paragraph 2 of Article 1 further provides that countervailing duties may be imposed only on subsidies that are ‘specific’ to an enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries. Thus a subsidy is the provision of a financial contribution that confers a benefit to a specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries. The scope, reach and interpretation of these provisions were the subject of the Appellate Body’s June 2005 Report on US – Countervailing Duty Investigation
TL;DR: One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth by Dani Rodrik as discussed by the authors, which is a collection of essays about globalization, institutions, and economic growth.
Abstract: One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth by Dani Rodrik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Robert E. Baldwin Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium by Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke . . . . . . . . . . . . .David S. Jacks International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime edited by Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Edwin Lai WTO at the Margins: Small States and the Multilateral Trading System edited by Roman Grynberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Michael Michaely Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines by Holger P. Hestermeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Susan K. Sell
TL;DR: The following sections are included:IntroductionBackgroundState trading enterprises and WTO rulesEconomic dimensionsAnalyzing the disciplines of Article XVIICommercial considerations and the right to regulateDiscrimination under Article XVII: 1 (a)What are the implications for STE-based economic policy? as mentioned in this paper
Abstract: The following sections are included:IntroductionBackgroundState trading enterprises and WTO rulesEconomic dimensionsAnalyzing the disciplines of Article XVIICommercial considerations and the right to regulateDiscrimination under Article XVII: 1 (a)What are the implications for STE-based economic policy?ReferencesAnnex
TL;DR: However, despite the ever more rapid proliferation of PTAs, they do not appear to have led to the trade diversion that economists worry about as mentioned in this paper, which may be because PTA-based reforms mostly have been applied in a nondiscriminatory manner or been accompanied with external liberalization.
Abstract: ship may not be needed (yet). As noted, the trend in both policy and outcomes has been towards more openness and more trade. This is so despite the ever more rapid proliferation of PTAs. Although the section of the report dealing with PTAs is balanced and nuanced, PTAs do not appear to have led to the trade diversion that economists worry about. This may be because PTA-based reforms mostly have been applied in a nondiscriminatory manner or been accompanied with external liberalization (for some recent evidence on the latter see Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas, 2007). This is an area where the report’s call for more transparency and analysis is very important and urgent. We simply do not know to what extent recent PTAs have resulted in additional policy reforms, whether this entails an increase in discrimination, and if so what the incidence of the associated costs are. Greater transparency is likely to have much greater benefits than efforts to strengthen the WTO rules on PTA provisions or to define ‘best practices’ – experience suggests that rule-making, even if feasible, will have low returns because of a lack of enforcement.
TL;DR: Subramanian et al. as mentioned in this paper argued that the World Trade Organization promotes trade strongly but unevenly, and argued that vertical specialization explains the growth of world trade, but not international trade.
Abstract: Freund, Caroline and Diana Weinhold (2000), ‘On the Effect of the Internet on International Trade’, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Paper No. 693. Hummels, David (2001), ‘Toward a Geography of Trade Costs’, Purdue University mimeo, September 2001. —— (2007), ‘Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of Globalization’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(3): 131–154. Subramanian, Arvind and Wei, Shang-Jin (2007), ‘The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly’, Journal of International Economics, 72 : 151–175. Yi, Kei-Mu (2003), ‘Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth ofWorld Trade?’ Journal of Political Economy, 111(1): 52–102.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the Appellate body's finding in this case that no causation analysis is required in sunset reviews and address the AB's approach towards the legal instrument that provides for the US policy in terms of sunset reviews, the Sunset Policy Bulletin.
Abstract: This paper reviews the WTO Appellate Body Report on United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (WT/DS282/AB/R 2 November 2005). This dispute concerns the disciplines imposed by the Anti-Dumping Agreement on WTO Members seeking to extend their anti-dumping measures beyond the original five-year period through a so-called sunset review. Our analysis focuses on the Appellate Body's finding in this case that no causation analysis is required in sunset reviews, and addresses the AB's approach towards the legal instrument that provides for the US policy in terms of sunset reviews, the Sunset Policy Bulletin. We conclude that the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as interpreted by the Appellate Body in this and other similar cases, imposes only minimal disciplines of a general nature on Members wishing to extend the anti-dumping measure beyond its original five-year period. We argue that the ‘textual’ argument relied on to support this deferential approach is weak and has resulted in undermining the practical effect of, what was considered to be, one of the major achievements of the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Agreement: limiting the life span of an anti-dumping measure to five years. From an economic perspective, Panels and the Appellate Body are simply debating the wrong type of questions. The prospective nature required by a sunset review analysis raises questions such as why exporters engaged in dumping in the first place, and what the conditions of the industry were so that the dumped imports caused injury. At the moment, sunset reviews seem adrift as panels and the Appellate Body fail to give guidance to Members on how to do a more economically sound and informed review.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors review the WTO Appellate body report on United States anti-dumping measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (WT/DS268/AB/R, 29 November 2004) and argue that this ruling is unfortunate, because it diminishes scope of and incentives for ‘as-such' challenges to laws and practices, which have a potentially useful role to play in the world trading system.
Abstract: We review the WTO Appellate Body report on United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (WT/DS268/AB/R, 29 November 2004). This dispute is one of several that deals with sunset reviews of antidumping-duty orders. In its ruling, the AB reasserts a rigid distinction between mandatory and discretionary law, and sets a very high standard for Member challenges to laws or practices that allow for violations of WTO obligations but do not mandate such behavior. We argue that this ruling is unfortunate, because it diminishes scope of and incentives for ‘as-such’ challenges to laws and practices, which have a potentially useful role to play in the world trading system. The AB ruling also overlooks the purpose and objectives of sunset reviews – to ensure that duty orders are not extended when their removal would generate no harm to an import competing industry – by failing to impose sufficient discipline on their conduct. We argue that a sunset review requires an evaluation of competitive conditions in the industry and of the reasons and incentives for dumping, in order that the investigating authority can judge whether the removal of a duty order would lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. The Appellate Body's rulings in this and other similar cases have the effect of relieving the investigating authority of this responsibility and thereby render the sunset review process virtually meaningless.
TL;DR: The authors make a compelling case that for too long traditional narratives of the ‘rise of the west and decline of the rest’ have ignored the role of the West's rich and meaningful interaction with the rest of the world in conditioning its growth prospects.
Abstract: Having been backed into a corner by Marxists of varying persuasions and motivations, mainstream economic historians have, for a number of years, systematically underplayed what for other disciplines is obvious: the continued application of force, suasion, and sometimes outright plunder that has accompanied the development of the global economy. However, the authors make it very clear at the beginning that this is not a story about the primitive accumulation of capital as the wellspring of capitalist economic growth. ‘‘ Inventiveness and incentives’’ (p. xx) are at the heart of this process for the authors, but they make a compelling case that for too long traditional narratives of the ‘rise of the west and decline of the rest’ have ignored – willfully or not – the role of the West’s rich and meaningful interaction with the rest of the world in conditioning its growth prospects. This book represents a first step in the right direction. As it stands, I can offer two criticisms of the book. First is its encyclopedic nature. This is both a curse and a blessing: a blessing in that it will be a sure source of citations for the authors as this is a wonderful reference apart from its other qualities ; a curse in that one can only imagine that its length will have a detrimental effect on general – not even to say, popular – readership. As I have tried to impart above, this is a book that should be widely read. I can only hope that a shorter and snappier version might soon appear to address this fairly minor shortcoming. Finally, the titular emphasis on power seems strangely underemphasized in the latter half on the interwar and post-WorldWar II periods. True, the world economy might be converging on the armchair economist’s optimistic assessment that we live in a world of purely voluntary exchange. But it counters the dominant view in some political science and international relation departments that globalization is a mere expression of Western power and dominance. The authors would do well to fully confront this divergence head-on or at least make this particular subtext of the declining role of power determining much more explicit in a future edition.
TL;DR: In this paper, the main issues involved in US-Countervailing Duty Investigation of DRAMS are the question of whether creditors were "entrusted or directed" to make financial contributions to Hynix, a large South Korean DRAM producer.
Abstract: There are two compelling issues involved in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation of DRAMS. First, there is the question of whether creditors were ‘entrusted or directed’ to make financial contributions to Hynix, a large South Korean DRAM producer. This was the main topic addressed by the Appellate Body (AB) and is the focus of the Francois–Palmeter paper. Second, there is there is the question of injury assessment and nonattribution. Because the US did not appeal the Panel's decision, this aspect of the WTO dispute was not considered by the AB.
TL;DR: Rodrik as mentioned in this paper argued that the arguments against industrial polices are that they are prone to political capture and corruption and that governments are not very good at picking economic winners, however, he believes there are good counterarguments against these points.
Abstract: points to as illustrating successful development through government-directed industrial policies are the same ones that other economists point to as illustrating the successful development with Washington-consensus type policies. The latter group emphasizes such factors as the turning away by these countries of import-substitution policies and the adoption of sound monetary and prudent fiscal polices. The industrial policies adopted by these countries tend to be regarded as measures that either helped to remove existing economic distortions or actually slowed economic growth. Unfortunately, we do not seem to have sufficient data to distinguish definitely the relative importance of these two approaches in contributing to sustained economic growth. As Rodrik points out, arguments against industrial polices are that they are prone to political capture and corruption and that governments are not very good at picking economic winners. However, he believes there are good counterarguments against these points. While it seems to this reader that he fails to present a convincing case for the extensive use of industrial policies to promote long-run growth in developing countries, the thoughtful and scholarly elaboration of his pro-industrial policy views in this book should be essential reading for all interested in stimulating growth in these countries.
TL;DR: Sampson as mentioned in this paper argued that the World Trade Organization (WTO) should not be the arbitrator on matters well outside the realm of conventional trade policy considerations, such as sustainable development.
Abstract: In the Foreword to my recent book – The WTO and Sustainable Development – Pascal Lamy, the Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), comments that: ‘Given the evolution of the rules-based trading system, as well as the growing attention paid to policies designed to achieve sustainable development, there has been an increasing overlap between what have now become ‘‘ trade’’ policies and policies relating to sustainable development. ’ He continues: ‘ In this respect, a crucial question that emerges throughout this book is whether a clearer mission for the WTO in support of sustainable development implies major institutional reforms’ (Sampson, 2005: vii, xi). Based on 18 years experience as Director of several divisions in both the GATT and the WTO, my answer to this question is very clear : ‘ I do not advocate a greater role for sustainable development in the WTO’ (Sampson, 2005: 7). I also state at the outset that ‘a trade policy organization such as the WTO should not be responsible for the many non-conventional trade issues that are gravitating towards it ’ (Sampson, 2005: 6). The remaining 307 pages of the book elaborate why I firmly believe this to be the case. With respect to the many specific issues addressed in the book, I conclude that the ‘WTO should not be the arbitrator on matters well outside the realm of conventional trade policy considerations’ (Sampson, 2005: 125). I offer many policy proposals relating to both substance and process, but I do not recommend changes to any WTO concepts, principles, and rules. In an inaccurate review of my book, David Robertson misrepresents my arguments and attributes conclusions to me that are the opposite of those in my book. World Trade Review (2008), 7 : 2, 467–471 Printed in the United Kingdom
TL;DR: In this article, the authors proposed that the overall poverty rate in Vietnam would not be greatly affected by multilateral trade liberalization since there would be a redistribution of wealth from urban to rural population and from rice consumers to rice producers and sellers.
Abstract: poor, while the ambitious scenario combined with elimination of Cambodian tariffs would be beneficial due to increased production of rice and consumption of food. There could also be benefits if Cambodia’s exports of textiles were increased and if rice production technology and lower transactions costs were achieved. . The overall poverty rate in Vietnam would not be greatly affected by multilateral trade liberalization since there would be a redistribution of wealth from urban to rural population and from rice consumers to rice producers and sellers. Some benefits could be realized if Vietnam’s textile exports increased. . Effects on Bolivia would depend on the extent to which multilateral trade liberalization increased Bolivian manufacturing and agricultural exports. . Nicaragua would benefit to some extent from an ambitious Doha scenario, particularly if its exports of manufactures increased. Improvements in agricultural extension services and road infrastructure could foster greater welfare if marketoriented production were to displace subsistence agriculture.