Book ChapterDOI
A Game Analysis of Quality Supervision Over Rural Development Projects
Fu-jiang Sun
- pp 185-192
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TLDR
In this article, an analysis of the principal-agent relationship in implementation of rural development projects is conducted, and the authors conclude that information asymmetry exists in the game relationship between the principal and the agent in quality supervision of the projects, which makes it likely for the quality supervision agent to pose moral hazards.Abstract:
This paper begins with an analysis of the principal-agent relationship in implementation of rural development projects, and proceeds to conclude that information asymmetry exists in the game relationship between the principal and the agent in quality supervision of rural development projects, which makes it likely for the quality supervision agent to pose moral hazards, and that the introduction of a supervision and penalty mechanism can help achieve the consistency between the two parties in terms of interest goals. When the penalty is imposed to the extent that there comes a mixed equilibrium in the supervision game between the principal and the agent, the principal may supervise the agent in a way that combines key examinations with general ones, and, where necessary, punish severely the individual quality supervisor who has worked poorly.read more
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Legal Issues of Rural Financial Supervision System in China
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors studied the legal issues of rural financial supervision system in China, and tried to solve the problems, and proposed a concept for perfecting Chinese rural financial supervising system based on investigation and discussion.
References
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Optional contributions have positive effects for volunteering public goods games
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