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Open AccessProceedings ArticleDOI

A look back at "security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite

Steven M. Bellovin
- pp 229-249
TLDR
It is instructive to look back at that paper on security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite, to see where my focus and my predictions were accurate, where I was wrong, and where dangers have yet to happen.
Abstract
About fifteen years ago, I wrote a paper on security problems in the TCP/IP protocol suite, In particular, I focused on protocol-level issues, rather than implementation flaws. It is instructive to look back at that paper, to see where my focus and my predictions were accurate, where I was wrong, and where dangers have yet to happen. This is a reprint of the original paper, with added commentary.

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Citations
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Taxonomies of attacks and vulnerabilities in computer systems

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On interdomain routing security and pretty secure BGP (psBGP)

TL;DR: PsBGP is designed to successfully defend against various (nonmalicious and malicious) threats from uncoordinated BGP speakers, and to be incrementally deployed with incremental benefits.
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TARP: Ticket-based address resolution protocol

TL;DR: TARP implements security by distributing centrally issued secure MAC/IP address mapping attestations through existing ARP messages and improves the costs of implementing ARP security by as much as two orders of magnitude over existing protocols.
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Off-path TCP Sequence Number Inference Attack - How Firewall Middleboxes Reduce Security

TL;DR: A newly discovered "off-path TCP sequence number inference" attack enabled by firewall middle boxes allows an off-path attacker to hijack a TCP connection and inject malicious content, effectively granting the attacker write-only permission on the connection.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

New Directions in Cryptography

TL;DR: This paper suggests ways to solve currently open problems in cryptography, and discusses how the theories of communication and computation are beginning to provide the tools to solve cryptographic problems of long standing.
Book ChapterDOI

SIP: Session Initiation Protocol

TL;DR: Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) as discussed by the authors is an application layer control (signaling) protocol for creating, modifying, and terminating sessions with one or more participants, such as Internet telephone calls, multimedia distribution, and multimedia conferences.

Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol

R. Atkinson
TL;DR: This document describes an updated version of the "Security Architecture for IP", which is designed to provide security services for traffic at the IP layer, and obsoletes RFC 2401 (November 1998).

A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)

Yakov Rekhter, +1 more
TL;DR: This document, together with its companion document, "Application of the Border Gateway Protocol in the Internet", define an inter- autonomous system routing protocol for the Internet.
Journal ArticleDOI

Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers

TL;DR: Use of encryption to achieve authenticated communication in computer networks is discussed and example protocols are presented for the establishment of authenticated connections, for the management of authenticated mail, and for signature verification and document integrity guarantee.
Frequently Asked Questions (14)
Q1. What are the contributions in "Security problems in the tcp/ip protocol suite" ?

The authors describe a variety of attacks based on these flaws, including sequence number spoofing, routing attacks, source address spoofing, and authentication attacks. The authors also present defenses against these attacks, and conclude with a discussion of broad-spectrum defenses such as encryption. 

In Berkeley systems, the initial sequence number variable is incremented by a constant amount once per second, and by half that amount each time a connection is initiated. 

The TCP specification requires that this variable be incremented approximately 250,000 times per second; Berkeley is using a much slower rate. 

the best option is to restrict route changes to the specified connection; the global routing table should not be modified in response to ICMP Redirect messages6. 

The authors have also seen how netstat may be abused; indeed, the combination of netstat with the authentication server is the single strongest attack using the standardized Internet protocols. 

A server that wishes to rely on another host’s idea of a user should use a more secure means of validation, such as the Needham-Schroeder algorithm[20][21][22]. 

One would need at least 16 bits of random data in each increment, and perhaps more, to defeat probes from the network, but that might leave too few bits to guard against a search for the seed. 

If the genuine response is not blocked by the intruder, though, the target will receive multiple replies; a check to ensure that all replies agree would guard against administrative errors as well. 

The most likely attack of this sort would be to claim a route to a particular unused host, rather than to a network; this would cause all packets destined for that host to be sent to the intruder’s machine. 

In general, a host wants to see such a message only at boot time, and only if it had issued a query; a stale reply, or an unsolicited reply, should be rejected out of hand. 

if one initiates a legitimate connection and observes the ISN S used, one can calculate, with a high degree of confidence, ISNS′ used on the next connection attempt. 

Even a ‘‘read-only’’ mode is dangerous; it may expose the target host to netstat-type attacks if the particular Management Information Base (MIB)[38] used includes sequence numbers. 

And such passwords are becoming less popular; they are too vulnerable to wire-tappers, intentional or accidental disclosure, etc. 

In fact, given that most such generators work via feedback of their output, the enemy could simply compute the next ‘‘random’’ number to be picked.