Open AccessJournal Article
A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Yukio Koriyama,Balázs Szentes +1 more
TLDR
In this article, the optimal size of a deliberating committee where there is no conflict of interest among individuals and information acquisition is costly is analyzed, and it is shown that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2.Abstract:
This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of size k*-2. This result implies that oversized committees generate only small inefficiencies.read more
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A Rationale for Non-Monotonic Group-Size Effect in Repeated Provision of Public Goods
Chengsi Wang,Galina Zudenkova +1 more
TL;DR: The authors analyzed the impact of a group-size change on contributing incentives in repeated provision of pure public goods and showed that an increase in the group size generates two opposite effects -the standard free-riding effect and the novel large-scale effect which enhances cooperative incentives.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Condorcet Jury Theorem with Information Acquisition
TL;DR: In this article, a committee decision in which individuals with common preferences are uncertain which of two alternatives is better for them is analyzed, and it is shown that when the marginal cost at zero information acquisition is positive, the probability of making an appropriate decision tends to be less than one.
Optimality and equilibrium for binary decision problems in a committee
TL;DR: It is shown that a class of slightly randomized majoritarian voting rules make sincere voting a strict and unique equilibrium.
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The Welfare Economics of Tactical Voting in Democracies: A Partial Identification Equilibrium Analysis
TL;DR: This article provided exact asymptotic bounds on the welfare effects of insincere voting for an infinite class of democratic rules and showed that preference manipulation benefits one-half to two-thirds of the population in three-candidate elections held under first-past-the-post and one-third to one-hundred percent in anti-plurality elections.
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Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
TL;DR: In this paper, a simple model of a coordination game is used to explore how the information use of individuals affects an optimal committee size, and the authors show that enlarging the committee promotes information aggregation, but also stimulates the members' coordination motive and distorts their voting behavior through higher-order beliefs.
References
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Book
博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict
Roger B. Myerson,剣平 費 +1 more
TL;DR: This chapter discusses Decision-Theoretic Foundations, Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence, and the Decision-Analytic Approach to Games, which aims to clarify the role of rationality in decision-making.
Book
Game Theory : Analysis of Conflict
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a game theoretic approach to games based on the Bayesian model and demonstrate the existence of Nash Equilibria and the Focal Point Effect.
Book
Essai Sur L'Application de L'Analyse a la Probabilite Des Decisions Rendues a la Pluralite Des Voix
TL;DR: Condorcet's paradox (the non-transitivity of majority preferences) is seen as the direct ancestor of Arrow's paradox as discussed by the authors, and it was rediscovered as a foundational work in the theory of voting and societal preferences.
Journal ArticleDOI
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
TL;DR: The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred as discussed by the authors.
Posted Content
The Swing Voter's Curse
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of a swing voter's curse is demonstrated: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless, and the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another.