Agents and Structures: Two Views of Preferences, Two Views of Institutions

TLDR: In this article, a limited information model of the strategic interaction between workers and capitalists is used to demonstrate ways in which the agency-centered approach can begin to make preferences endogenous, with special attention given to the way they treat the preferences that actors hold.

Abstract: Two analytically distinct approaches to the study of domestic politics have been referred to as the “new institutionalism.” The fundamental difference between the two brands of institutionalism can be seen in the way they handle the relationship between “agents” and “structures.”“Structure-based” approaches to institutions give ontological primacy to structures and view agents as being constituted by them. “Agency-centered” approaches view human agents as ontologically primitive and view institutions as structures that are created by goal-maximizing individuals. The two approaches are compared, with special attention given to the way they treat the preferences that actors hold. I argue that contrary to arguments made by many structure-based theorists, the agency-centered approach is capable of contributing to discussions regarding the sources of actor preferences. A limited information model of the strategic interaction between workers and capitalists is used to demonstrate ways in which the agency-centered approach can begin to make preferences endogenous.