Algebraic side-channel attacks
Mathieu Renauld,François-Xavier Standaert +1 more
- pp 393-410
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In this paper, algebraic side-channel attacks are applied to the block cipher PRESENT, which is a stimulating first target, due to its simple algebraic structure, and the proposed attacks have a number of interesting features: (1) they exploit the information leakages of all the cipher rounds, (2) in common implementation contexts (e.g., assuming a Hamming weight leakage model), and (3) these attacks can succeed in an unknown-plaintext/ciphertext adversarial scenario and (4) they directly defeat countermeasures such as boolean maskingAbstract:
In 2002, algebraic attacks using overdefined systems of equations have been proposed as a potentially very powerful cryptanalysis technique against block ciphers. However, although a number of convincing experiments have been performed against certain reduced algorithms, it is not clear whether these attacks can be successfully applied in general and to a large class of ciphers. In this paper, we show that algebraic techniques can be combined with side-channel attacks in a very effective and natural fashion. As an illustration, we apply them to the block cipher PRESENT that is a stimulating first target, due to its simple algebraic structure. The proposed attacks have a number of interesting features: (1) they exploit the information leakages of all the cipher rounds, (2) in common implementation contexts (e.g. assuming a Hamming weight leakage model), they recover the block cipher keys after the observation of a single encryption, (3) these attacks can succeed in an unknown-plaintext/ciphertext adversarial scenario and (4) they directly defeat countermeasures such as boolean masking. Eventually, we argue that algebraic side-channel attacks can take advantage of any kind of physical leakage, leading to a new tradeoff between the robustness and informativeness of the side-channel information extraction.read more
Citations
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Book ChapterDOI
LBlock: a lightweight block cipher
Wenling Wu,Lei Zhang +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a new lightweight block cipher called LBlock, which can achieve enough security margin against known attacks, such as differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis and related-key attacks.
Posted Content
LBlock: A Lightweight Block Cipher.
Wenling Wu,Lei Zhang +1 more
TL;DR: The security evaluation shows that LBlock can achieve enough security margin against known attacks, such as differential crypt analysis, linear cryptanalysis, impossible differential cryptanalysis and related-key attacks etc.
Book ChapterDOI
A formal study of power variability issues and side-channel attacks for nanoscale devices
Mathieu Renauld,François-Xavier Standaert,Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon,Dina Kamel,Denis Flandre +4 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a comprehensive treatment of variability issues for side-channel attacks in deep sub-micron technologies, in which it becomes increasingly difficult to produce two chips with the same behavior.
Book ChapterDOI
Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks on the AES: Why Time also Matters in DPA
TL;DR: It is shown experimentally that most of the intuitions that hold for PRESENT can also be observed for an unprotected implementation of Rijndael in an 8-bit controller and exhibit that algebraic techniques lead to a new understanding of implementation weaknesses that is different than classical side-channel attacks.
Journal ArticleDOI
A review of lightweight block ciphers
TL;DR: A survey of lightweight cryptographic algorithms, presenting recent advances in the field and identifying opportunities for future research is provided, examining lightweight implementations of symmetric-key block ciphers in hardware and software architectures.
References
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. And they also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.
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Chaff: engineering an efficient SAT solver
TL;DR: The development of a new complete solver, Chaff, is described which achieves significant performance gains through careful engineering of all aspects of the search-especially a particularly efficient implementation of Boolean constraint propagation (BCP) and a novel low overhead decision strategy.
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PRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher
Andrey Bogdanov,Lars R. Knudsen,Gregor Leander,Christof Paar,Axel Poschmann,Matthew Robshaw,Yannick Seurin,C. Vikkelsoe +7 more
TL;DR: An ultra-lightweight block cipher, present, which is competitive with today's leading compact stream ciphers and suitable for extremely constrained environments such as RFID tags and sensor networks.
Proceedings Article
Template Attacks
TL;DR: This work presents template attacks, the strongest form of side channel attack possible in an information theoretic sense, and describes in detail how an implementation of RC4, not amenable to techniques such as SPA and DPA, can be broken using template attacks with a single sample.
Book ChapterDOI
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a framework for the analysis of cryptographic implementations that includes a theoretical model and an application methodology based on commonly accepted hypotheses about side-channels that computations give rise to.