Journal ArticleDOI
Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities
Paul Milgrom,John Roberts +1 more
TLDR
The existence of a Pareto best element in the set of strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies implies the existence of coalition-proof correlated equilibrium for any specification of coalitional communication possibilities that always permits individual deviations as mentioned in this paper.About:
This article is published in Games and Economic Behavior.The article was published on 1996-11-01. It has received 70 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Nash equilibrium & Epsilon-equilibrium.read more
Citations
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Proceedings Article
Computing shapley values, manipulating value division schemes, and checking core membership in multi-issue domains
Vincent Conitzer,Tuomas Sandholm +1 more
TL;DR: A concise representation of characteristic functions is studied which allows for the agents to be concerned with a number of independent issues that each coalition of agents can address, and it is shown that given a value division, determining whether some subcoalition has an incentive to break away is NP-complete.
Journal ArticleDOI
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Vincent Conitzer,Tuomas Sandholm +1 more
TL;DR: A concise, natural, general representation for games in characteristic form that relies on superadditivity, in which individual agents' values are given as well as values for those coalitions that introduce synergies, and it is shown that this representation allows for efficient checking of whether a given outcome is in the core.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Board Composition, Protocols, and Voting Behavior: Experimental Evidence
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners and conclude that boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed "watchdog" agents can implement institutionally preferred policies.
Journal ArticleDOI
The State of Solving Large Incomplete-Information Games, and Application to Poker
TL;DR: In short, game-theoretic reasoning now scales to many large problems, outperforms the alternatives on those problems, and in some games beats the best humans.
Journal ArticleDOI
Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
TL;DR: The inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities, and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
TL;DR: The authors showed that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits, and showed that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
Journal ArticleDOI
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
Oliver Hart,John Moore +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a framework for addressing the question of when transactions should be carried out within a firm and when through the market, by identifying a firm with the assets that its owners control.
Journal ArticleDOI
Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements
TL;DR: A firm's actions in one market can change competitors' strategies in a second market by affecting its own marginal costs in that other market as mentioned in this paper, and whether the action provides costs or benefits in the second market depends on whether it increases or decreases marginal costs.
Journal ArticleDOI
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Paul Milgrom,John Roberts +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a rich class of non-cooperative games, including models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others, are studied.
Journal ArticleDOI
Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
TL;DR: This paper examined the consequences of basing mixed strategies on subjective random devices, i.e. devices on the probabilities of whose outcomes people may disagree (such as horse races, elections, etc.).
Related Papers (5)
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Paul Milgrom,John Roberts +1 more