Constitutional parliamentarism in Europe, 1800–2019
TLDR
In this article, the authors analyze the institutions associated with government termination in parliamentary systems: no-confidence and confidence motions, and the early dissolution of the parliament, and propose a model for the early termination of a government.Abstract:
This paper analyses the institutions associated with government termination in parliamentary systems: no-confidence and confidence motions, and the early dissolution of the parliament. We consider ...read more
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Making Constitutions. Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America
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The vote of no confidence: towards a framework for analysis
Tal Lento,Reuven Y. Hazan +1 more
TL;DR: The most important instrument by which parliament can express its lack of support for the government is the vote of no confidence in the government as mentioned in this paper, which is the most important way for expressing opposition to the government.
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Termination of parliamentary governments: revised definitions and implications
TL;DR: The literature on government coalitions uses a common definition of when governments terminate and new ones form as discussed by the authors, which has served empirical coalitions studies quite well and has served quite we...
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The Growth of Responsible Government in Stuart England
References
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Democracy and dictatorship revisited
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors address the strengths and weaknesses of the main available measures of political regime and extend the dichotomous regime classification first introduced in Alvarez et al. (Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 31(2):3-36, 1996).
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Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies
TL;DR: Parliamentary democracy has been widely embraced bypoliticians and especially by the scholarly community, but remains less widely understood as mentioned in this paper, which can be seen as a particular regime of delegation and accountability that can be understood with the help of agency theory.
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Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that elections,usually taken to be a hallmark of democracy,can also become a tool of authoritarian powerholders seeking to legitimate their rule, and that they can be used as a threat to democratic institutions.
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Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism
Alfred Stepan,Cindy Skach +1 more
TL;DR: This paper found that parliamentarianism is a more supportive constitutional framework due to the following theoretically predictable and empirically observable tendencies: its greater propensity for governments to have majorities to implement their programs, its ability to rule in a multiparty setting, its lower propensity for executives to rule at the edge of the constitution and its greater facility in removing a chief executive if he or she does so, and its lower susceptibility to a military coup.
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Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a framework to analyze the effects of constitutional features on legislative voting with respect to cohesion and the distribution of payoffs, and apply this framework to parliamentary democracies and show how a prominent feature of decision making in parliaments, the vote of confidence procedure, creates an incentive for ruling coalitions to vote together on policy issues that might otherwise split them.