Journal ArticleDOI
Corruption, extortion and evasion
TLDR
In this article, the authors examine the implications of corruptibility and the potential abuse of authority for the effects and optimal design of (potentially non-linear) tax collection schemes and find that the distributional effects of evasion and corruption are unambiguously regressive under the kinds of schemes usual in practice.About:
This article is published in Journal of Public Economics.The article was published on 1999-12-01. It has received 311 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Evasion (ethics) & Corruption.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
A free press is bad news for corruption
Aymo Brunetti,Beatrice Weder +1 more
TL;DR: The authors found evidence of a significant relationship between more press freedom and less corruption in a large cross-section of countries and suggested that the direction of causation runs from higher press freedom to lower corruption.
Posted Content
Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey
TL;DR: The Grabbing Hand as mentioned in this paper is a collection of articles published during the past 40 years in social science journals with contributions from political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, law scholars, and a few economists including Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny.
Journal ArticleDOI
Economic analysis of corruption: a survey*
TL;DR: The Grabbing Hand as discussed by the authors is a collection of articles published during the past 40 years in social science journals with contributions from political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, law scholars, and a few economists including Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corruption and the Shadow Economy: An Empirical Analysis
Axel Dreher,Friedrich Schneider +1 more
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa, and finds that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa
TL;DR: This article used panel data from African countries and a dynamic panel estimator to investigate the effects of corruption on economic growth and income distribution and found that corruption decreases economic growth directly and indirectly through decreased investment in physical capital.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Corruption and Growth
TL;DR: In this paper, a newly assembled data set consisting of subjective indices of corruption, the amount of red tape, the efficiency of the judicial system, and various categories of political stability for a cross section of countries is analyzed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
Bengt Holmstrom,Paul Milgrom +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a principal-agent model that can explain why employment is sometimes superior to independent contracting even when there are no productive advantages to specific physical or human capital and no financial market imperfections to limit the agent's borrowings is presented.
Book ChapterDOI
The theory of contracts
Oliver Hart,Bengt Holmstrom +1 more
TL;DR: The authors presented at the World Congress of the Econometric Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985, The authors, a paper that was later used at the International Journal of Mathematical Information.
Journal ArticleDOI
Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations
TL;DR: In this article, the analysis of hierarchical structures does not boil down to a compounding of the basic inefficiency, due to the fact that going from the simple two-tier principal/agent structure to more complex ones introduces the possibility of asymmetric information and insurance motives (or limited liability constraints).
Book
Bargaining Theory with Applications
TL;DR: In this article, the Rubinstein model and the Nash bargaining solution have been used to solve the problem of asymmetric information in bargaining in the context of bargaining with non-negotiators.