Journal ArticleDOI
Large Robust Games
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In this paper, the authors show that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications, such as sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.Abstract:
With many semi-anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous-move games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.read more
Citations
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Book ChapterDOI
Mean Field Games and Applications
TL;DR: The Course Bachelier 2009 as discussed by the authors was inspired from a course inspired by the work of Jean-Michel Lasry, and the course was based upon the articles of the three authors and upon unpublished materials they developed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Robust Mechanism Design
Dirk Bergemann,Stephen Morris +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the "ex post equivalence" question: when is interim implementation on all possible type spaces equivalent to requiring ex post implementation on the same type space.
Journal ArticleDOI
Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: an extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness
TL;DR: It is shown that the Nash equilibria in security games are interchangeable, thus alleviating the equilibrium selection problem and proposed an extensive-form game model that makes the defender's uncertainty about the attacker's ability to observe explicit.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the problem of implementing equilibria of complete information games in settings of incomplete information, and address this problem using "recommender mechanisms" which is one that does not have the power to enforce outcomes or to force participation, rather, it only has the capability to suggest outcomes on the basis of voluntary participation.
Journal ArticleDOI
Aggregate Comparative Statics
TL;DR: In this paper, a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games is provided, and sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate.
References
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Book
The Probabilistic Method
TL;DR: A particular set of problems - all dealing with “good” colorings of an underlying set of points relative to a given family of sets - is explored.
Journal ArticleDOI
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
Journal ArticleDOI
Robust Control and Model Uncertainty
TL;DR: In this paper, a Benchmark Resource Allocation Problem with Model Misspecification and Robust Control Problems is discussed. But the problem is not addressed in this paper, and the following sections are included:
Journal ArticleDOI
Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of Payment
Lloyd S. Shapley,Martin Shubik +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a general non-cooperative trading equilibrium is described in which prices depend in a natural way on the buying and selling decisions of the traders, avoiding the classical assumption that individuals must regard prices as fixed.