Open coordination against poverty: the new EU `social inclusion process'

TLDR: The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as mentioned in this paper was proposed by the Portuguese Presidency in 2000 to combat social exclusion in the context of employment and other policy sectors, and has been successfully applied in the European Union.

Abstract: Until the mid 1990s, the notion of Social Europe was primarily associated with the introduction of binding supranational rules aimed at safeguarding and possibly upgrading the social protection systems of the Member States. The political and institutional obstacles to such kind of rules were well known in practice and well understood in theory - especially in the wake of the negative vs. positive integration debate. But 'hard law' seemed to be the only effective strategy of action, given the low impact of weaker institutional tools such as recommendations, on the one hand, and the growing incentives for 'social dumping' generated by the completion of the internal market, on the other hand. The second half of the 1990s witnessed a gradual change of climate and perspective. Binding legislation continued to be seen as a very important ingredient of Europe's social dimension: indeed the debate on fundamental rights and on a possible fully-fledged EU constitution shifted the front of legal ambitions even further. But at the same time another strategy of policy intervention started to be considered and experimented with, resting on a complex mix of soft institutional ingredients, endowed with a strong potential of conditioning the direction of change at the national level. Originally applied in the area of employment, this new approach was then extended to other policy sectors - and most notably, policies to combat social exclusion - under the name of 'open method of coordination' (OMC), coined during the Portuguese Presidency in 2000. The main institutional ingredients of the OMC are common guidelines, national action plans, peer reviews, joint evaluation reports and recommendations. None of such instruments has a binding character, underpinned by legal enforcement powers. Moreover, while providing policy actors with a relatively clear agenda, the mix of these ingredients leaves ample room