Journal ArticleDOI
Party governance and ideological bias
TLDR
In this paper, the authors argue that the rank-and-file is generally more concerned with the ideological content of the platform than the leadership, who is motivated by the benefits from electoral office.About:
This article is published in European Economic Review.The article was published on 1999-04-01. It has received 57 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Voting & Credibility.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
A Model of Forum Shopping
Josh Lerner,Jean Tirole +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the sponsor's choices ofcertifier and design, social preferences regarding these choices, and the impacts thereon of multiple categories of users, of a downstream presence of the sponsor, and of certifier market power.
Journal ArticleDOI
Parties as Political Intermediaries
Bernard Caillaud,Jean Tirole +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that intra-party competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes, but unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions (for example, by privileging form over content).
Journal ArticleDOI
Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce a model of representative democracy that allows for strategic parties, strategic candidates, strategic voters, and multiple districts, and show that if the distribution of policy preferences is sufficiently similar across districts and sufficiently close to uniform within districts, then the number of effective parties is larger under Proportional Representation than under Plurality Voting (extending the Duvergerian predictions).
Journal ArticleDOI
Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition
Klaas J. Beniers,Robert Dur +1 more
TL;DR: The authors study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office.
Journal ArticleDOI
Information and strategic political polarisation
TL;DR: This paper developed a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality, and demonstrated that when information is imperfect, the BlackDowns median voter theorem fails to hold.
References
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Book
An Economic Theory of Democracy
TL;DR: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout as discussed by the authors, particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote.
Journal ArticleDOI
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
Philippe Aghion,Jean Tirole +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a theory of the allocation of formal authority and real authority within organizations, and illustrated how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration.
Posted Content
Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-party System with Rational Voters
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected, but also about which policy to implement, once elected, the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows: the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election.
Posted Content
The Swing Voter's Curse
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of a swing voter's curse is demonstrated: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless, and the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another.
Journal ArticleDOI
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence*
Abstract: This analysis demonstrates that important implications of the multidimensional voting model are robust to significant changes in the model's assumptions. (1) If candidates in the model are allowed to be partially or totally interested in the election's policy outcomes, convergence to the median must still occur. (2) If candidates are uncertain about voters' responses, and therefore attempt to maximize the probability of winning, the candidate platforms should still converge in equilibrium under weak assumptions about symmetry of the candidates' situations. (3) If both of these nonstandard assumptions are made together, the convergence result no longer holds; but small departures from the classic assumptions lead to only small departures from convergence. In combination with other recent multidimensional voting models that examine behavior in the absence of a median, this study indicates the usefulness of the traditional model for conceptualizing electoral politics.