Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis
Author(s): Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom
Source:
Land Economics,
Vol. 68, No. 3 (Aug., 1992), pp. 249-262
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3146375
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Property-Rights Regimes
and Natural
Resources:
A
Conceptual
Analysis
Edella
Schlager
and
Elinor
Ostrom
ABSTRACT.
The term
"common-property
re-
source" is an
example of
a
term
repeatedly
used
to
refer
to
property
owned
by
a
government
or
by
no one.
It
is also used
for
property
owned
by
a
community of
resource
users.
Such
usage
leads to
confusion
in
scientific
study
and
policy
analysis.
In this
paper
we
develop
a
conceptual
schema
for
arraying
property-rights
regimes
that
distinguishes
among
diverse
bundles
of
rights ranging
from
authorized
user,
to claim-
ant,
to
proprietor,
and to owner.
We
apply
this
conceptual
schema to
analyze
findings
from
a
variety
of
empirical
settings including
the
Maine
lobster
industry.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Political
economists'
understanding
of
property
rights
and
the rules
used to
create
and enforce
property rights
shape
percep-
tions of resource
degradation
problems
and
the
prescriptions
recommended
to
solve
such
problems. Ambiguous
terms blur
ana-
lytical
and
prescriptive clarity.
The
term
"common-property
resource"
is a
glaring
example
of
a term
that
is
repeatedly
used
by
political
economists
to refer
to
varying
empirical
situations
including:
(1)
property
owned
by
a
government,
(2)
property
owned
by
no
one,
and
(3)
property
owned
and defended
by
a
community
of
resource
users.1 The term
is also
used
to refer
to
any
common-pool
resource
used
by
multiple
in-
dividuals
regardless
of the
type
of
property
rights
involved.
The
purpose
of
this
paper
is to
develop
a
conceptual
schema
for
arraying
property-rights
regimes
that
distin-
guishes
among
diverse
bundles of
rights
that
may
be held
by
the users
of
a
re-
source
system.
We
define a
property-rights
schema
ranging
from
authorized
user,
to
claimant,
to
proprietor,
and
to owner.
We
do not find that
"owners"
are the
only
re-
source users
who make
long-term
invest-
ments
in
the
improvement
of
resource
sys-
tems.
Proprietors
face
incentives
that
are
frequently
substantial
enough
to
encourage
similar
long-term
investments. Even
claim-
ants
may manage
use
patterns
to
an
extent
not
predicted
by
a
simpler
property-rights
dichotomy.
We
apply
this
conceptual
schema
to
analyze
findings
from a
variety
of
empirical settings
but
focus
in
particular
on
the
Maine
lobster
industry.
II.
RULES, RIGHTS,
AND
PROPERTY
REGIMES
As
individuals conduct
day-to-day
activ-
ities
and as
they organize
these
activities,
they engage
in
both
operational
and
collective-choice
levels
of action
(Kiser
and
The authors
are,
respectively,
assistant
professor,
School
of
Public
Administration
and
Policy,
Univer-
sity
of
Arizona;
and
co-director
and
Arthur F.
Bentley
Professor of
Political
Science,
Indiana
University,
Bloomington.
This
paper
has
benefited from
the
critical
and
help-
ful
comments
from
many
colleagues
at
Indiana
Uni-
versity
and
elsewhere. In
particular,
we
would
like
to thank
William
Blomquist,
Ed
Connerly,
Louis
De
Alessi,
David
Feeny,
Howard
Frant,
Roy
Gardner,
Larry
Kiser,
Ron
Oakerson,
Vincent
Ostrom,
Tai-
Shuenn
Yang,
and two
anonymous
reviewers
for
this
journal.
The
comments of
participants
at the
"Political
Economy
of
Customs and
Culture:
Informal
Solutions
to the Commons
Problem"
Conference,
held at
Bose-
man, Montana,
June
1991,
were of
particular
help
in
our revision
process.
Financial
support
provided
by
the National
Science
Foundation
(Grant
No.
SES-
8921884)
is
gratefully
acknowledged.
'The
confusion in
the use
of the
term
"common
property"
has been
addressed
frequently
in the
past
(Ciriacy-Wantrup
and
Bishop
1975;
Bromley
1982,
1986,
1989;
Runge
1981)
without
much
impact
on
its
careless
usage.
Even
scholars,
who
are
meticulous
theorists and observers
of
behavior
related to
natural
resource
systems,
use the
terms
"open
access"
and
"common
property systems"
interchangeably
(see
Johnson and
Libecap
1982, 1005;
for
other
examples,
see
Agnello
and
Donnelly
1975;
Bell
1972;
Christy
1975;
Gordon
1954;
Scott
1955;
Scott
and
Christy
1965;
Smith,
Weber,
and
Wiesmeth
1991;
Sinn
1988).
Land
Economics
*
August
1992
*
68(3):
249-62
Land
Economics
Ostrom
1982).2
Operational
activities
are
constrained
and
made
predictable
by
operational-level
rules
regardless
of
the
source of
these
rules.
By
the term "rules"
we refer
to
generally
agreed-upon
and en-
forced
prescriptions
that
require,
forbid,
or
permit
specific
actions
for more
than a
sin-
gle
individual
(E.
Ostrom
1986).3
Examples
of
operational
rules are those
used
by
fish-
ers
to
specify
the
types
of
fishing equipment
authorized
or
forbidden
at
particular
loca-
tions
within
a
fishing ground.
Operational
rules are
changed
by
collective-choice
actions.
Such actions are
undertaken
within
a set of collective-choice
rules
that
specify
who
may
participate
in
changing operational
rules and
the
level
of
agreement
required
for
their
change.
Changing
the
types
of
fishing
equipment
au-
thorized
or
forbidden
at different locations
within
a resource
is
an
example
of
a
collective-choice
action.
The
particular
set
of
operational
rules
that are
actually
in use
and
enforced
may
have
been devised
in
multiple
arenas.
Operational
rules related
to
inshore
fisheries
are
as
apt
to
be
devised
in a local
meeting place,
even a
tavern,
as
they
are
in a
court,
a
legislature,
or
a
gov-
ernmental
bureau.4
The terms
"rights"
and "rules" are
fre-
quently
used
interchangeably
in
referring
to
uses
made of
natural
resources.
Clarity
in
analysis
is
enhanced
by recognizing
that
"rights"
are
the
product
of
"rules"
and
thus
not
equivalent
to
rules.
"Rights"
refer
to
particular
actions
that
are authorized
(V.
Ostrom
1976).
"Rules" refer
to the
pre-
scriptions
that create
authorizations.
A
property
right
is
the
authority
to
undertake
particular
actions
related to
a
specific
do-
main
(Commons
1968).
For
every right
an
individual
holds,
rules
exist
that authorize
or
require
particular
actions
in
exercising
that
property
right.
In
this
paper
we focus
entirely
on
rights,
but we
need to stress
from
the
beginning
that all
rights
have com-
plementary
duties. To
possess
a
right
im-
plies
that
someone
else
has
a
commensu-
rate
duty
to
observe
this
right
(ibid.).
Thus
rules
specify
both
rights
and duties.
In
regard
to
common-pool
resources,
the
most
relevant
operational-level
property
rights
are
"access" and "withdrawal"
rights.
These
are defined as:
Access:
The
right
to enter
a
de-
fined
physical property.
Withdrawal:
The
right
to obtain the
"products"
of
a
resource
(e.g.,
catch
fish,
appro-
priate
water,
etc.).5
If a
group
of fishers hold
rights
of
access,
they
have
the
authority
to
enter a
resource.
Rules
specify
the
requirements
the
fishers
must
meet
in
order to exercise
this
right.
For
instance,
fishers
may
be
required
to
re-
side
in a
specified
jurisdiction
and
to
pur-
chase
a license
before
entering
a
fishing
ground.
In
addition,
fishers,
through
a
lot-
tery,
may
be
assigned particular
fishing
spots
(Faris
1972;
Martin
1973).
The
assign-
ment of
fishing spots
is
an
operational-level
2A
third level
of
action
is also available
and that is
the constitutional
level.
Constitutional-choice
actions
entail
devising
collective-choice
rules. In
establishing
an
organization
or
changing
the
process by
which
op-
erational
rules
are to be
devised
within an
existing
organization,
individuals
engage
in
constitutional-
choice
actions.
Fishers
creating
a
marketing
coopera-
tive
is an
example
of a constitutional-choice
action.
3A
plan
adopted
by
an individual
for how that
indi-
vidual
wishes
to
undertake
future actions
is better
thought
of
as
a
"strategy"
rather
than as a "rule."
The
concept
of
"rule" relates
to shared
understand-
ings
about
prescriptions
that
apply
to more than a sin-
gle
individual.
A
marriage
contract
can be
viewed as
a set
of
rules
authorizing
and
forbidding
future actions
for
the
two individuals
involved.
A court decision
out-
lawing
some
types
of
agreements
among
fishers
using
inshore
fisheries
is
a set of
rules
affecting
future ac-
tions
for
all
individuals
using
the coastal
fisheries
un-
der
that court's
jurisdiction.
Rules,
be
they opera-
tional,
collective
choice,
or constitutional
choice,
instruct
individuals
to
take actions
that
are
required
or
permitted,
or
to avoid
taking
action
that is forbidden
(Gardner
and
Ostrom
1991;
E. Ostrom
1986;
see
Buck
[1989]
for
an
analysis
of the
rules
creating property
rights
in the
American
southwest).
4Not
all actions
taken
in collective-choice
arenas
affect
rules
in use.
Passing
a new
law or
writing
a new
regulation
is
not the
equivalent
of
establishing
a
new
rule.
Laws
and
regulations
must be enforced
to
be-
come
rules
(see
V. Ostrom
1991).
To be
effective
they
must
be
accepted
as
legitimate
by
resource
users.
5Rules
defining
the
rights
of
access and
withdrawal
may
or
may
not
permit
those
rights
to be
transferred.
August
1992
250
Schlager
and
Ostrom:
Property-Rights
Regimes
withdrawal
right
authorizing
harvesting
from a
particular
area.6
Individuals who have
access and
with-
drawal
rights may
or
may
not have
more
extensive
rights authorizing
participation
in
collective-choice
actions. The
distinction
between
rights
at an
operational-level
and
rights
at a
collective-choice level is
crucial.
It is the
difference between
exercising
a
right
and
participating
in
the
definition
of
future
rights
to
be
exercised. The
authority
to
devise
future
operational-level
rights
is
what
makes
collective-choice
rights
so
powerful.
In
regard
to
common-pool
re-
sources,
collective-choice
property rights
include
management,
exclusion,
and alien-
ation.
They
are defined
as
follows:
Management:
The
right
to
regulate
in-
ternal use
patterns
and
transform the
resource
by
making
improve-
ments.
Exclusion: The
right
to determine
who
will
have an
access
right,
and
how
that
right may
be
trans-
ferred.
Alienation:
The
right
to
sell
or
lease
either
or
both
of
the
above
collective-
choice
rights.
The
right
of
management
is a
collective-
choice
right
authorizing
its
holders to de-
vise
operational-level
withdrawal
rights
governing
the use
of a
resource.
Individuals
who hold
rights
of
management
have
the
authority
to
determine
how,
when,
and
where
harvesting
from
a
resource
may
oc-
cur,
and whether
and
how
the
structure
of
a resource
may
be
changed.
For
instance,
a
group
of fishers
who
devise a
zoning
plan
that limits
various
types
of
harvesting
activ-
ities to
distinct areas
of a
fishing ground
are
exercising
rights
of
management
for
their
resource
(see,
e.g.,
Davis
1984;
Cordell
1972).
The
right
of
exclusion is
a
collective-
choice
right
authorizing
its
holders to
de-
vise
operational-level
rights
of
access.
Indi-
viduals
who hold
rights
of
exclusion
have
the
authority
to
define the
qualifications
that
individuals
must meet
in
order to
ac-
cess
a
resource.
For
instance,
fishers
who
limit
access
to
their
fishing
grounds
lo
males
above a
certain
age
who live
in a
par-
ticular
community
and
who utilize
particu-
lar
types
of
gear
are
exercising
a
right
of
exclusion.7
The
right
of
alienation
is
a
collective-
choice
right
permitting
its
holder
to
transfer
part
or
all
of
the
collective-choice
rights
to
another individual
or
group. Exercising
a
right
of alienation
means
that an
individual
sells
or
leases
the
rights
of
management,
exclusion,
or
both.8
Having
alienated
those
rights,
the
former
rights-holder
can
no
longer
exercise
these authorities
in
relation
to a resource
or
a
part
thereof.
Arraying
these
rights,
as
shown
in
Table
6See
Copes
(1986)
for
an
analysis
of
quota
systems
in
relation
to
fisheries.
See Wilson
(1982)
for
an
effec-
tive
critique
of standard
economic
theory's
limited
view of
institutional
alternatives
in
relation
to
fish-
eries.
7If these
same fishers
revise
the
conditions
that
constitute
the
right
of access
by
expanding
the
number
of fishers
who can enter
their
fishery, they
have
not
exercised
a
right
of
alienation.
They
have
not
trans-
ferred
rights
to
additional
individuals.
Rather,
they
have exercised
their
right
of
exclusion to
redefine
who
may
or
may
not
enter. The
right
of
alienation
refers
only
to the
authority
to
alienate
collective-choice
rights,
that
is,
to sell or lease
such
rights.
8By
alienation we
specifically
mean the
authority
to sell
or
lease
collective-choice
rights.
We
do
not
include the
ability
to
bequeath.
In
most
common-
property regimes,
users have
the
ability
to
bequeath
their
rights
in
a
resource.
Rights
rarely
die with
an
individual.
In
many
situations,
however,
resource
us-
ers
do not have the
right
to
sell or
lease their
rights
to
others.
Limiting
alienation to
sale or
lease
also
brings
it closer
to
its
economic
usage.
The
importance
of
a
right
of
alienation for
many
economists is
that it
pro-
vides
the
possibility
that
resources will
be
transferred
to their
highest
valued
use.
While
being
able
to
sell
or
lease
collective-choice
rights
provides
that
potential,
the
right
to
bequeath
these
rights
is
usually
presumed
by
economists to be
an
insufficient
property
right
to
achieve
full
efficiency.
Larson
and
Bromley
(1990)
ef-
fectively
challenge
this
commonly
held
view
and
argue
that
much
more needs
to be
known
about
the
specific
values
of
a
large
number of
parameters
in a
particular
setting
before
analysts
can
make
careful
judgments
whether the
right
of
alienation
leads
to
higher
levels
of
efficiency
than the
right
to
bequeath.
See
also
An-
derson
and Hill
(1990)
for an
analysis
of three
different
alienation
rules that
the
U.S.
government
used
in
transferring public
lands
to
individuals.
68(3) 251
Land Economics
TABLE
1
BUNDLES OF RIGHTS
ASSOCIATED
WITH
POSITIONS
Authorized
Owner
Proprietor
Claimant
User
Access and
Withdrawal X
X
X
X
Management
X
X
X
Exclusion
X X
Alienation
X
1,
enables
us to make
meaningful
distinc-
tions
among
four classes of
property-rights
holders
related to
fisheries. The five
prop-
erty rights
are
independent
of
one another
but,
in relation
to
fisheries,
are
frequently
held
in the cumulative
manner
arrayed
in
Table
1. It is
possible
to have
entry rights
without
withdrawal
rights,
to
have with-
drawal
rights
without
management rights,
to
have
management
rights
without exclu-
sion
rights,
and to
have exclusion
rights
without
the
rights
of
alienation.9
In
other
words,
individuals
or collectivities
may,
and
frequently
do,
hold
well-defined
prop-
erty
rights
that do
not include
the full
set
of
rights
defined
above.
On the other
hand,
to
hold
some
of
these
rights implies
the
pos-
session
of
others.
The exercise of
with-
drawal
rights
is not
meaningful
without the
right
of
access;
alienation
rights depend
upon
having
rights
to
be transferred.
We call
individuals
holding
operational-
level
rights
of access
and withdrawal
"au-
thorized
users."'0
If
specified
in
opera-
tional
rules,
access
and withdrawal
rights
can
be transferred
to others either
tempo-
rarily,
as
in a lease
arrangement,
or
perma-
nently
when
these
rights
are
assigned
or
sold
to others.
Transfer of these
rights,
however,
is not
equivalent
to alienation of
management
and
exclusion
rights
as we dis-
cuss
below.
The
rights
of
authorized users are de-
fined
by
others who hold collective-choice
rights
of
management
and
exclusion.
Au-
thorized
users
lack the
authority
to devise
their
own
harvesting
rules or
to exclude
others
from
gaining
access to
fishing
grounds.
Even
though
authorized
users
may
be able
to sell their
harvesting rights,
nevertheless, they
lack the
authority
to
par-
ticipate
in
collective action to
change
oper-
ational
rules.
An
example
of authorized users are the
salmon
and
herring
fishers of Alaska. In
1972,
the
Governor's
Study
Group
on
Lim-
ited
Entry
was
created to research and de-
velop
limited
entry
legislation,
which the
Alaskan
legislature adopted
in
1973
(Ada-
siak
1978,
771).
The Alaskan limited
entry
system
divides Alaskan salmon and
herring
fisheries
into a number of different
fisher-
ies.
An
Entry
Commission determines the
number of
permits
available for each
fish-
ery.
The
Commission
can make
adjust-
ments
in
the numbers as circumstances
change,
either
by issuing
additional
permits
or
by buying
back
existing
permits.
Fishers
cannot
hold
more
than
one
permit per
fish-
ery.
The
permits
are
freely
transferable,
but
cannot
be
used as
collateral.
The
Alaskan
fishers
who hold
permits
are
authorized us-
ers.
The Alaskan
legislature
in
conjunction
with a
study group
devised
the
fishers'
rights
of
access and
withdrawal,
which
9While
theoretically
it
is
possible
to hold
entry
rights
without
withdrawal
rights,
in
practice
this
rarely
occurs.
The distinction
between access and with-
drawal becomes
crucial
at a
collective-choice
level.
Oftentimes
individuals who hold
rights
of
management
and
thereby
define
withdrawal
rights
are not the same
individuals
who hold
rights
of exclusion and
thereby
define
access
rights.
We
provide
a number of
examples
throughout
the
remainder of the
paper.
10One
could also
define a
position
called
"squat-
ter"
to consist
of individuals who
possess
no
rights
at
any
level
in relation to
a
common-pool
resource.
Squatters
use
natural
resources,
such as
fisheries,
but
they
do so
at their own risk.
If
challenged by
a
person
who
holds
collective-choice
or
operational rights,
squatters
lack
authority
to enforce their claims.
Squat-
ters stand
entirely exposed
to the actions of others
as
concerns
the use of
a resource.
252
August
1992