Strategy and equity: an ERC-analysis of the Gu¨th-van Damme game
Gary E. Bolton,Axel Ockenfels +1 more
TLDR
The general ERC model is described, and it is shown that it predicts many of the key phenomena observed in the experiment, as well as standard game theoretic concepts.About:
This article is published in Journal of Mathematical Psychology.The article was published on 1998-06-01 and is currently open access. It has received 106 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Stochastic game.read more
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ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Gary E. Bolton,Axel Ockenfels +1 more
TL;DR: The authors demonstrate that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, and demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people were motivated by either their payoff or their relative standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern, which explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is played a role and games where competitive behavior is observed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Gary Charness,Matthew Rabin +1 more
TL;DR: This paper found that subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare, sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all recipients, especially low-payoff recipients, than with reducing differences in payoffs.
Journal ArticleDOI
Understanding Social Preference with Simple Tests
Gary Charness,Matthew Rabin +1 more
TL;DR: The authors show that subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare, sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all recipients, especially low-payoff recipients, than with reducing differences in payoffs.
Journal ArticleDOI
Inequality Aversion, Efficiency and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution experiments
Dirk Engelmann,Martin Strobel +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the relative importance of efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion, as well as the relative performance of the fairness theories by Gary E Bolton and Axel Ockenfels and by Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt were compared.
Journal ArticleDOI
Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?
TL;DR: The authors showed that subjects' generosity can be reversed by allowing them to take a partner's money, as posited in rational choice theory, which may instead be an artefact of experimentation.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Gary E. Bolton,Axel Ockenfels +1 more
TL;DR: The authors demonstrate that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, and demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people were motivated by either their payoff or their relative standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern, which explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is played a role and games where competitive behavior is observed.
Journal ArticleDOI
Dictator game giving: rules of fairness versus acts of kindness
TL;DR: A hypothetical decision procedure is proposed, based on the notion that dictator giving originates with personal and social rules that effectively constrain self-interested behavior, that provides a link between dictator behavior and a broader class of laboratory phenomena.
Journal ArticleDOI
Social influence in the sequential dictator game
Timothy N. Cason,Vai-Lam Mui +1 more
TL;DR: It is found that subjects who exhibit more self-regarding behavior on their first decisions are less likely to change choices between their first and second decisions, and the use of the Strategy Method in this setting does not significantly alter choices.
Journal ArticleDOI
Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: an experimental study
Werner Güth,Eric van Damme +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, an experimental study of ultimatum bargaining situations in which an inactive third player is present is presented. But the results are limited to three messages m =( x, y, z ), m = y, and m = z ).