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Journal ArticleDOI

Superpresidentialism and Political Party Development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan

John Ishiyama, +1 more
- 01 Dec 2001 - 
- Vol. 53, Iss: 8, pp 1177-1191
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TLDR
In this article, the authors pointed out that political parties in the former Soviet Union are scarcely more than transient organisations with little continuity from one election to another, lacking coherent ideological programs and reliable social constituency.
Abstract
SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR many scholars have pointed to the weakness of the political parties in the states of the former Soviet Union.' Unlike some of the countries of post-communist Eastern Europe (such as the Visegrad states, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as the Baltic States), where relatively stable patterns of partisan competition have emerged, in most of the states of the former Soviet Union, it has been argued, only 'pseudo parties' have arisen. These 'pseudo parties' are seen as largely shifting coalitions of individuals, unanchored in post-communist society and incapable of performing even the most basic functions of political parties.2 Indeed, from this 'pessimistic' point of view, parties in the former Soviet Union are scarcely more than transient organisations with little continuity from one election to another, lacking coherent ideological programmes and reliable social constituencies.3 Many have argued that decades of totalitarian rule (more extreme and of longer duration in the Soviet Union than in Eastern Europe or the Baltic States) pulverised what little there was of civil society, a legacy that continues to retard the development of political parties. As Bielasiak notes, the 'numerous weaknesses of political society impede the formation and consolidation of a structured party system capable of providing informed choices to the electorate'.4 Others have pointed to the incentives generated by political structures, particularly the existence of 'superpresidentialism', which have also retarded the development of political parties.5 Unfortunately, most of the existing literature that relates superpresidentialism to party development in the countries of the former Soviet Union has focused only on single case studies, without the benefit of comparative perspective.6 Because of this tendency it is difficult to assess truly whether or not 'superpresidentialism' has the often cited retarding effect on party development. On the other hand, macro-comparative approaches that lump together all of the former communist states run the risk of conflating the effects of the electoral system and presidentialism on party development, especially since most parliamentary systems in post-communist Europe employ some form of proportional representation.7 The key then is to select cases that vary in terms of the degree of superpresidentialism but where variations in the electoral system are controlled. Finally, most studies that have pointed to the weaknesses of political parties in the countries of the former Soviet Union have relied

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References
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Political Order in Changing Societies

TL;DR: This now-classic examination of the development of viable political institutions in emerging nations is a major and enduring contribution to modern political analysis as mentioned in this paper, and its Foreword, Francis Fukuyama assesses Huntington's achievement, examining the context of the original publication as well as its lasting importance.
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Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies Theoretical Propositions

Herbert Kitschelt
- 01 Oct 1995 - 
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