Journal ArticleDOI
Task complexity, equilibrium selection, and learning: an experimental study
Teck-Hua Ho,Keith Weigelt +1 more
TLDR
In this article, three measures of task complexity-cardinality of choice space, level of iterative knowledge of rationality, and level of knowledge of strategy-were manipulated and tested.Abstract:
We consider several coordination games with multiple equilibria each of which is a different division of a fixed pie. Laboratory experiments are conducted to address whether "task complexity" affects the selection of equilibrium by subjects. Three measures of task complexity-cardinality of choice space, level of iterative knowledge of rationality, and level of iterative knowledge of strategy-are manipulated and tested. Results suggest the three measures can predict choice behavior. Since strategically equivalent games can have different task complexity measures, our results imply that subjects are sensitive to game form presentation. We also fit data using three adaptive learning models: 1 Cournot, 2 Fictitious Play, and 3 Payoff Reinforcement, in increasing order of required cognitive effort. The Fictitious Play model, which tracks only cumulative frequencies of opponents' past behaviors fits the data best.read more
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Journal ArticleDOI
A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
TL;DR: The Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model as discussed by the authors assumes that each player assumes that his strategy is the most sophisticated, and assumes that other players are distributed over step 0 through step k − 1, and explains why equilibrium theory predicts behavior well in some games and poorly in others.
Journal ArticleDOI
Experience‐weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
Colin F. Camerer,Teck-Hua Ho +1 more
TL;DR: Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) as mentioned in this paper is a special case of reinforcement learning that combines reinforcement learning and belief learning, and hybridizes their key elements, allowing attractions to begin and grow flexibly as choice reinforcement does but reinforcing unchosen strategies substantially as belief-based models implicitly do.
Journal ArticleDOI
Cognition and Behavior in Normal‐Form Games: An Experimental Study
TL;DR: In this paper, the extent to which behavior in games reflects attempts to predict others' decisions, taking their incentives into account, was investigated, where subjects' initial responses to normal-form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique pure-strategy equilibria without dominance, using a computer interface that allowed them to search for hidden payoff information.
Posted Content
Game Theory and Economic Modelling
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide the reader with some basic concepts from non-cooperative game theory, and then explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis.
Posted Content
Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best-Response in Experimental P-Beauty Contests
TL;DR: The game-theoretic answer is that all the developers should locate exactly where the natural attractions are as mentioned in this paper, but does not depend on the fraction of lazy tourists or the number of developers (as long as there is more than one).
References
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Journal Article
The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing information
TL;DR: The theory of information as discussed by the authors provides a yardstick for calibrating our stimulus materials and for measuring the performance of our subjects and provides a quantitative way of getting at some of these questions.
Book
Evolution and the Theory of Games
TL;DR: A modification of the theory of games, a branch of mathematics first formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 for the analysis of human conflicts, was proposed in this paper.
Journal ArticleDOI
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
In-Koo Cho,David M. Kreps +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a number of formal restrictions of this sort, investigate their behavior in specific examples, and relate these restrictions to Kohlberg and Mertens' notion of stability.
Book
A general theory of equilibrium selection in games
John C. Harsanyi,Reinhard Selten +1 more
TL;DR: Harsanyi and Selten as mentioned in this paper proposed rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any non-cooperative game, and applied this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games, bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides.
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Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term*
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