The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology

TLDR: For instance, the authors assume that to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires, and assume that human beings make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed.

Abstract: Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed. This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there have been interesting recent debates about how we should understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires.

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University of Wollongong University of Wollongong
Research Online Research Online
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Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Humanities
1-1-2007
The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk
psychology psychology
Daniel Hutto
University of Wollongong
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Hutto, Daniel, "The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology" (2007).
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers
. 777.
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The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology
Abstract Abstract
Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which
reason they were performed. This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there have been
interesting recent debates about how we should understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and
assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and
desires.
Keywords Keywords
narrative, practice, hypothesis, applications, origins, psychology, folk
Disciplines Disciplines
Arts and Humanities | Law
Publication Details Publication Details
Hutto, D. (2007). The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology.
Philosophy, 60 (May), 43-68.
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/lhapapers/777

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The Narrative Practice Hypothesis:
Origins and Applications of Folk
Psychology
DANIEL D. HUTTO
1. Folk Psychological Practice
Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional
actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed.
This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there
have been interesting recent debates about how we should
understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that,
at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately
interrelated beliefs and desires.
He left the party because he believed the host had insulted him.
She will head for the cabin in the woods because she wants peace
and quiet. These are typical examples of reason explanations, one
backward looking and the other future facing. Both imply more
than they say. To leave a party because of a suspected insult
suggests that one desires not to be insulted, or at least it implies
that the desire to avoid insult is stronger than that for some other
good on offer. Similarly, to seek tranquillity in an isolated cabin
implies that one believes that it can be found there, or at least more
so than elsewhere. Despite the fact that the situations and
characters involved in these dramas are woefully under-described,
we are able to ‘make sense’ of these actions in a basic manner using
the belief/desire schema. This involves designating a particular
pairing of a belief and a desire, each with its own specified
propositional content, in a way that rests on a quiet understanding
of the way propositional attitudes inter-relate.
To understand which beliefs and desires were responsible for a
person’s action is normally only to understand why they acted in a
quite skeletal way. Maximally, to understand why someone acted
requires a more or less detailed description of his or her
circumstances, other propositional attitudes (hopes, fears), more
basic perceptions and emotions and perhaps even his or her
character, current situation and history. In short, to fully grasp why
someone took action on a particular occasion requires relating that
43

person’s ‘story’. While I think this richer understanding of what it
is to act for reasons is important, my primary interest is to better
understand how we acquire and apply our understanding of ‘folk
psychology’ more minimally construed.
1
I am interested in how we
become skilled at the practice of predicting, explaining and
explicating actions by appeal to reasons of the sort that minimally
have belief/desire pairings at their core. To keep things straight, let
us call this folk psychology stricto sensu.
It is a commonplace in Anglophone philosophy that adult
humans make regular and reliable use of ‘folk pyschology’, so
understood. Some maintain this fuels even our most basic
encounters with others in daily life and that a great many of our
social institutions depend upon it. In promoting these ideas, many
so-called friends of folk psychology have overstated and misunder-
stood its role in social cognition and our lives more generally. First,
they typically see it as more basic and far more pervasive than it is.
We have many other—more basic, both phylogenetically and
ontogenetically—means of conducting social coordinations, inter-
actions and engagements. These yield neither predictions nor
explanations per se but instead involve recognition-response
patterns that generate ‘embodied expectations’. In ‘normal’
contexts these are not only quicker but also far more powerful and
reliable ways of relating to others and navigating social dynamics.
2
It is therefore false to say that without a capacity for folk
psychology we would be bereft of any reliable means of interacting
1
Some prefer to talk of ‘commonsense psychology’ as opposed to ‘folk
psychology’, because the latter label was pejoratively fashioned by the
enemies of this practice in order to highlight its weak scientific
credentials. Calling it ‘folk’ psychology was meant to signal that its tenets
are outmoded, limited and backward—i.e. to highlight the fact that it is
indeed ‘folksy’. However, since I do not think this folk practice can be
usefully compared with the promises of a scientific psychology, I am
happy to defend the vulgar on this (see D. D. Hutto, The Presence of Mind
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999)).
2
See D. D. Hutto, ‘The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology’,
Mind and Language 19, 2004, 548–73; D. D. Hutto, ‘Unprincipled
Engagements: Emotional Experience, Expression and Response’, Radical
Enactivism: Focus on the Philosophy of Daniel D. Hutto, R. Menary (ed.)
(Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2006). See also H. De
Jaegher, Social Interaction Rhythm and Participatory Sense-Making: An
Embodied, Interactional Approach to Social Understanding, with Some
Implications for Autism (Brighton, University of Sussex, 2006), unpub-
lished DPhil thesis.
Daniel D. Hutto
44

Frequently asked questions

Q1. What are the contributions in "The narrative practice hypothesis: origins and applications of folk psychology" ?

Although there have been interesting recent debates about how the authors should understand ‘ reasons ’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires. 

Q2. What is the purpose of encounters with folk psychology?

Encounters with such stories look ideally suited to provide children with the requisite specialised know-how—i.e. to teach them how to apply folk psychology, with sensitivity, in everyday contexts. 

Q3. Why is it easy to be misled on this score?

It is easy to be misled on this score due to the great emphasis that developmental psychologists place on the moment when children begin to pass false belief tasks. 

Q4. What does it mean to leave a party because of a suspected insult?

To leave a party because of a suspected insult suggests that one desires not to be insulted, or at least it implies that the desire to avoid insult is stronger than that for some other good on offer. 

Q5. What is the normal route through which folk psychology is procured?

Engaging in the relevant kind of story-telling practice is the normal route through which this practical knowledge and understanding is procured. 

Q6. What happens when the puppet leaves the room?

The puppet subsequently leaves the room and during his absence the children watch as an experimenter moves the biscuits into the other cupboard. 

Q7. What is the difference between engaging with narratives and those of the folk psychological variety?

17Engaging with narratives, and those of the folk psychological variety in particular, is anything but a passive affair: a wide range of emotive and imaginative abilities are typically brought into play.