scispace - formally typeset
Journal ArticleDOI

The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection

Roy Chen, +1 more
- 01 Oct 2011 - 
- Vol. 101, Iss: 6, pp 2562-2589
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
In this paper, a group-contingent social preference model was proposed and conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection for minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configura tions, which lead to an inefficient loweffort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity.
Abstract
When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordina tion games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configura tions which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, con sistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coor dination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordi nation game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71) Today's workplace comprises increasingly diverse social categories, including various racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. Within this environment, many organizations face competition among employees in different departments, as well as conflicts between permanent employees and contingent workers (tem porary, part-time, seasonal, and contracted employees). While a diverse work force contains a variety of abilities, experiences, and cultures which can lead to innovation and creativity, diversity may also be costly and counterproductive if members of work teams find it difficult to integrate their diverse backgrounds and work together (Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Daniel J. Zizzo 2009). This issue of integrating and motivating a diverse work force is thus an important consider ation for organizations. One method to achieve such integration is to develop a common identity. In practice, common identities have often been used to create common goals and values. To create a common identity and to teach individuals to work together toward a common purpose, companies have attempted various creative team-building exercises, such as simulated space missions where the crew works together to overcome malfunctions, perform research, and keep life sup port systems operational while navigating through space (J. R. Ball 1999), and

read more

Content maybe subject to copyright    Report

Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI

Maintaining Efficiency While Integrating Entrants From Lower-Performing Groups: An Experimental Study

TL;DR: This work creates an efficient group and an inefficient one, and explores the effectiveness of two policies intended to facilitate integration, using a laboratory experiment that models production as a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria.
Journal ArticleDOI

Best practices in replication: a case study of common information in coordination games

TL;DR: This work examines how even a seemingly minor protocol deviation in the experimental process can lead to a finding of “non-replication” of the results from the original study, and proposes a set of procedure recommendations to increase the quality of replications of laboratory experiments in the social sciences.
Book ChapterDOI

Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity

TL;DR: Tight bounds on the cost of strong Nash equilibria and potential function minimizers in network cost-sharing games with non-anonymous cost functions, parameterized by the set \(\mathcal{C}\) of allowable submodular cost functions are found.
Journal ArticleDOI

Rational Choice Theory at the Origin? Forms and Social Factors of “Irrational Choice”

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that such a reconstruction is inaccurate failing to do justice to the dual theoretical character of classical/neoclassical economics and propose and show that the latter involves not only elements of rational choice theory but also those of an alternative conception.
Journal ArticleDOI

Discrimination as favoritism: The private benefits and social costs of in-group favoritism in an experimental labor market.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine labor market favoritism in a unique laboratory experiment design that can shed light on both the private benefits and spillover costs of employer favoritism (or discrimination) and identify one potential micro-foundation of societal unrest that may link back to labor market opportunity.
References
More filters
Book

Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology

TL;DR: History Conceptual Foundations Uses and Kinds of Inference The Logic of Content Analysis Designs Unitizing Sampling Recording Data Languages Constructs for Inference Analytical Techniques The Use of Computers Reliability Validity A Practical Guide
Book ChapterDOI

The social identity theory of intergroup behavior

TL;DR: A theory of intergroup conflict and some preliminary data relating to the theory is presented in this article. But the analysis is limited to the case where the salient dimensions of the intergroup differentiation are those involving scarce resources.
Journal ArticleDOI

z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments

TL;DR: Z-Tree as mentioned in this paper is a toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, which allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time and is stable and easy to use.
Journal ArticleDOI

A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation

TL;DR: This paper showed that if some people care about equity, the puzzles can be resolved and that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior in cooperative games.
Journal ArticleDOI

A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

TL;DR: This article showed that if a fraction of the people exhibit inequality aversion, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish, and they also showed that when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperations are maintained.