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Journal ArticleDOI

The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection

Roy Chen, +1 more
- 01 Oct 2011 - 
- Vol. 101, Iss: 6, pp 2562-2589
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TLDR
In this paper, a group-contingent social preference model was proposed and conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection for minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configura tions, which lead to an inefficient loweffort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity.
Abstract
When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordina tion games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configura tions which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, con sistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coor dination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordi nation game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71) Today's workplace comprises increasingly diverse social categories, including various racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. Within this environment, many organizations face competition among employees in different departments, as well as conflicts between permanent employees and contingent workers (tem porary, part-time, seasonal, and contracted employees). While a diverse work force contains a variety of abilities, experiences, and cultures which can lead to innovation and creativity, diversity may also be costly and counterproductive if members of work teams find it difficult to integrate their diverse backgrounds and work together (Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Daniel J. Zizzo 2009). This issue of integrating and motivating a diverse work force is thus an important consider ation for organizations. One method to achieve such integration is to develop a common identity. In practice, common identities have often been used to create common goals and values. To create a common identity and to teach individuals to work together toward a common purpose, companies have attempted various creative team-building exercises, such as simulated space missions where the crew works together to overcome malfunctions, perform research, and keep life sup port systems operational while navigating through space (J. R. Ball 1999), and

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Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence

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Group Identity and Social Preferences

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Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics

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References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the private provision of discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions and show that in this range of cost, the subscription game is superior to the contribution game.
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Incentive-compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research

Yan Chen
TL;DR: Important policy questions, of whether this chapter can rely on the market to provide optimal amounts of public goods such as air pollution, and how much the authors can reliance on “natural” processes such as voluntary contribution to solve environmental problems, boil down to fundamental issues about human nature, i.e., about whether people are selfish or cooperative.
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Identity, Cooperation, and Punishment ∗

TL;DR: The authors found that negative out-group opinion (acting as an inter-group identity threat) can motivate in-group/out-group effects in a simple bargaining context, and that disparagement of group norms by members of the ingroup increased the use of costly punishment within the in group.
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Groups Work for Women: Gender and Group Identity in Social Dilemmas

TL;DR: The authors used a threshold social-dilemma game to examine factors that have not yet been investigated and that may have an impact on behavior in these settings: gender and group identity.
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What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to Play

TL;DR: In this article, a model is proposed to explain the results of recent experiments in which subjects repeatedly played a coordination game, with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group.